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ABSTRACT
The participation and integration of women into the United States Army has been 
increasing since the late 1940’s. Despite this fact, the United States Army remains an 
institution “shaped by strongly maintained traditions and myths” (Holm 1996, 508) with 
a masculine-warrior paradigm that remains largely intact. This has presented a series of 
challenges to a woman’s advancement. That said, like other organizations, the Army is 
made up of individuals, whose characteristics both reflect and inform the organization’s 
culture. There continues to be a dynamic relationship between the individuals -  women 
and men -  coming into the organization, and the organization itself, represented by the 
men operating in the organization.
In this study, organizational and individual changes are revealed through the 
experiences of the study’s participants and the telling of these experiences. The time 
frame includes careers spanning more than 36 years with the first male participant joining 
the military around 1960, the first female participant entering the Woman’s Army Corps 
in 1968, and the most junior participant coming on board in 1982.
This study’s focus is on women who have chosen the Army as a career and who 
have continued to progress through its hierarchy, achieving command at battalion and 
brigade levels. The investigation centers on the strategies these women developed to 
cope, adapt, and better fit in a predominantly male organization during a process of
integration. While the main focus is on the individual in a military environment, this 
study also considers the impact the individual may have had on the organization, and the 
changes that may have occurred as a result. Schein’s elaboration of Lewin’s change 
model is used as a way to explain and understand how the individual, both male and 
female, as well as how the organization may have changed.
This study relied on a qualitative research strategy with semi-structured 
interviews as the primary method of inquiry.
Organizational changes occurred at the individual level through the development 
of personal relationships. These relationships speak to individual change in terms of 
these women applying strategies that helped them cope, adapt, and better fit the 
organization. This change is considered in the analysis of the strategies used in the 
development of a workable persona. These strategies include being tough, being 
feminine, working harder, regendering and organizational fit. These workable persona 
characteristics assisted these women as they pursued their careers in the Army 
organization. In some cases, women became more acceptable to the men when they were 
seen as being exceptional, unlike “the rest of the women.”
Organizational changes became more likely and began with the mandate by 
legislation that permanently assigned women to Army branches with the exception of the 
combat arms. Women, in greater numbers, were integrated into units and into 
nontraditional jobs. Organizational changes were manifested in several ways. First, 
organizational changes occurred through personal interaction and demonstrated ability. 
Once women began working side by side their male peers, for their male supervisors, and
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under the observation of the males around them, their demonstrated performance changed 
the opinions o f these men. Second, organizational changes were seen as reactions to 
women in nontraditional jobs became more routine and less of a major, out of the 
ordinary event. The general societal acceptance of women in combat, and the attitude of 
business as usual by senior officers illustrate the movement from exceptional to routine. 
Third, the study’s participants described how they felt the Army had changed during their 
time in the organization. Fourth, organizational changes were implied by the actions of 
the male leaders who made decisions that promoted the integration and advancement of 
women in the organization. The importance of mentorship/sponsorship was also 
discussed as it related to providing access to positions of increasing responsibility and 
stature. Finally, organizational changes were seen in the different approaches to the 
debate concerning women in the combat arms. While relatively insignificant in the 
moment, these seemingly small incremental changes appear to add up, producing greater 
changes in the long-term, attesting to the potential for changes in the future.
This study has three major implications. The first implication concerns the overly 
optimistic nature of the Schein/Lewin change model and addresses its efficacy in 
accounting for individual and organizational changes. The second implication deals with 
organizational change and the realization that, no matter what, the military organization is 
unlikely to fundamentally change in the near or distant future. Finally, the third 




You are integrated in a way, but not fully integrated. It is not sort of parallel. It is 
like a helix. At certain points we go in and out. We touch and everything is 
peachy keen and then we diverge. You ask the guys and they say ‘what do you 
expect? You are hanging out in an all male organization. Boys will be boys.
You have to be willing to put up with a little bit of abuse. Everybody does. 
(Female Commander, 2000)
The Research Problem.
Thirty years ago, with the end of the male draft and the advent of the All
Volunteer Force (AVF), women in the Army witnessed and participated in an
organization undergoing unprecedented structural change.
With the decision in 1970 to end the draft, the United States embarked on a 
venture unpreeedented in any nation’s history: to field a military force over 2 
million strong relying solely on volunteers. Could enough men be found, willing 
and able to volunteer, without exorbitant additional costs, and without 
compromising the quality of military manpower? Reasonable people disagreed. .
. . The Department of Defense realized it had to further expand the role of women 
(Binkin and Bach 1977, 13-14).
It was fortuitous these events coincided with a powerful national movement for women’s
legal and economic equality and the drive to ratify the equal rights amendment (ERA). It
is often said that the military is a microcosm of the society it was sworn to protect and
defend. So it is not surprising that there would be an effort to incorporate these
prevailing social attitudes concerning equal opportunity and the greater utilization of 
women into policies concerning women in the military. The combination of the need for 
more women in the military and a powerful social awareness of women’s rights 
accelerated the change process. Laws and regulations were overhauled which “resulted 
in stunning reversals of policies long regarded as inviolable” (Holm 1992, 260). This 
change “swept away the majority of those sex discriminating rules that prevented women 
from being assimilated into the military mainstream . . .  and integration progressed faster 
and farther than even the most visionary military planner would have thought possible” 
(Holm 1992, 260). Gradually, women’s separate training programs and promotion 
systems were combined, and women, in greater numbers, became permanently assigned 
to Army branches with the exception of the combat arms. The military role for women 
had significantly increased.
These new opportunities for women did not translate into an easy acceptance by 
an organization with deeply rooted traditions and a strong culture that questioned the 
appropriateness of women under arms. The United States Army is an institution “shaped 
by strongly maintained traditions and myths” with a masculine-warrior paradigm that 
remains largely intact (Holm 1996, 508). This institution has presented a challenging 
environment within which women have had to succeed, and against this background, they 
have succeeded. This study focuses on a specific group of women in the Army, women 
who have commanded at the battalion and brigade level. In this case, their success is 
measured by their advancement through a hierarchical system of promotions to higher 
ranks, greater responsibility, and selection to command organizations at increasingly
higher levels. At this point, it is important to note that attaining command at battalion 
and brigade level is by no means the only way to achieve success in the Army. Success 
is determined largely by one’s own feelings of personal satisfaction and accomplishment.
This study focuses on women who have chosen the Army as a career and who 
have continued to progress through its hierarchy, achieving command at battalion and 
brigade levels. The investigation centers on the strategies these women developed to 
cope, adapt, and better fit in a predominantly male organization during a process of 
integration. While the main focus is on the individual in a military environment, this 
study also considers the impact the individual may have on the organization, and the 
changes that may occur as a result. An understanding of the environment is also 
important as it establishes the organizational context in which these individuals operate. 
Schein’s elaboration of Lewin’s change model is used as a way to understand and explain 
how the individual, both male and female, as well as how the organization may change. 
As part of this study, the following research questions are considered: What strategies 
did these women use to cope, adapt, and excel in the Army? What impact did these 
women have on the organization and what organizational changes occurred as a result? 
How well does the change model account for individual and organizational changes? 
How does organizational culture relate to organizational change? Where is the Army 
now in terms of the integration of women?
Purpose
The purpose of this study is twofold. First, it offers insight into the women who 
chose the Army as a career and who have continued to progress through the hierarchy,
achieving command and leading at the Army’s upper echelons. It is valuable to study 
these women in order to diseover how they coped, adapted, and excelled. Through their 
experiences, strategies, and processes, we can better understand the relationship between 
the women and the organization, represented by the men operating in the organization. 
This understanding provides a greater awareness of the issues that women face during a 
process of integration into a male-dominated setting, and helps to identify obstacles and 
effective ways to overcome these obstacles. Identifying and dealing with these key 
roadblocks will help the women who follow those currently in command. It is important 
to state that this research is not about proving that women can do anything a man can do, 
but rather it is about being judged as individuals and being allowed to pursue a profession 
based on ability rather than stereotypes, institutional bias, and artificial barriers based 
solely on gender (Holm 1996, 508).
Second, this research allows the reader to gain a better understanding of the 
military as a national institution, and as an institution undergoing organizational changes. 
For many, especially since conscription ended and participation became voluntary, the 
military organization has become less familiar and appears largely monolithic and one 
dimensional to outsiders. Gaining a different perspective of the organization, especially 
during a period of greater integration, may be central to understanding similar changes in 
other institutions in American society.
Background: Significant Changes for Women in the Military
The following section outlines significant changes for women in the military and 
establishes the organizational landscape that became the background for the study
participants as they pursued careers in the Army. It is important to understand the
context in which these military women serve, and the history of women’s inclusion in the
United States military (Yoder 2001, 772).
Women’s Armed Services Integration Act and Modifications
With the passage of the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act (part of Title
10, u s e )  in 1948, women (other than nurses) became eligihle to serve in the active
forces in peacetime (Women’s Research and Education Institute (WREl) 1998, 3).
Enlisted women were not allowed to constitute more than two percent of total enlisted
strength and female officers (excluding nurses) could not be greater than ten percent of
female enlisted strength. Although the 1948 legislation was considered a significant
breakthrough for women, it also “sowed the seeds of sex discrimination” that would
endure for many years until future legislation mandated ehange. In particular, career
opportunities for women were restricted because they were not allowed to serve in
command positions, nor permitted to advance beyond the grade of lieutenant colonel.
(Binkin and Bach 1977, 11).
Restrictions on the utilization of women in the Army are conspicuously absent 
from the statutory provisions of the 1948 act, which simply states, ‘The Secretary 
of the Army shall prescribe the military authority which commissioned officers of 
the Women’s Army Corps may exercise, and the kind of military duty to which 
they may be assigned’ (62 Stat. 359) (Binkin and Bach 1977, 26).
The Army excluded specific combat restrictions at that time because it was impossible to
outline future combat areas. “Although the law was imprecise, ambiguous, and
incomplete, the Army would have little doubt that Congress opposed the assignment of
women to jobs that would expose them to danger or to duties considered physically too
arduous” (Binkin and Bach 1977, 26-27). Determining which assignments meet this 
vague “exposure to danger and too physically arduous” criteria has been an ongoing 
dilemma for the assignment of women in the Army. Currently, the Army utilizes a direct 
combat rule, which will be explained later in this section.
In 1967, Title 10 USC was modified by public law and the two percent ceiling on 
women’s numbers and the caps on officer promotions above captain (pay grade 0-3) 
were removed. Women became eligible for colonel and could now also be appointed to 
general officer rank. These appointments, however, were made outside the normal 
selection board process. It was not until 1980, when “Congress enacted the Defense 
Officer Manpower Personnel Management Act (DOPMA), which abolished laws 
requiring separate appointment, promotion, accounting, and separation procedures for 
women officers.” As a result, officer promotion lists were integrated and women were 
able to compete for selection to general officer rank (WREI 1998, 5).
Integration of the Women’s Army Corps
In 1973, with the end of the draft and the advent of the All-Volunteer-Force, 
women’s accessions into the military began to increase. In 1976, the service academies 
were opened to women. The leadership, at all levels, struggled over how to best utilize 
women. Many leaders of the Women’s Army Corps felt that women would not be treated 
fairly if they were assimilated into the Regular Army and sought to remain a separate 
entity. It would be several years before the Women’s Army Corps was eliminated in 
1978.
At the same time, the Army Chief of Staff, General Bernard W. Rogers, began
working on the support that would be required during the integration process. He
“recognized that for integration to work it would have to have support from the top to the
very bottom of the organization” (Holm 1992, 286). As the Army’s top leader, he was
committed to the integration of women and directed his commanders to accomplish
integration “smoothly and rapidly”. General Rogers wrote,
Qualified women now have the opportunity to serve in all but a few specific 
combat units and combat specialties. In availing themselves of the opportunity 
women, like their male counterparts, must accept the responsibility for sharing all 
risks and enduring all hardships inherent in their specialty. Some people believe 
that women soldiers will not be deployed in the event of hostilities; that they are 
only to be part-time soldiers -  here in peace gone in war. Some women are being 
used in skills other than those for which they are trained and some are being 
excused from performance of unit duties. The Army cannot operate effectively in 
this manner. Women are an essential part of the force; they will deploy with their 
units and they will serve in the skills in which they have been trained.. . .  The 
first considerations in the assignment of women in the Army have been, and will 
continue to be, the mission of the Army itself, and the uniquely demanding nature 
of Army service in wartime. Within that context, women can make important 
contributions; indeed, they are doing so now. The burden which rests on leaders 
at every level is to provide knowledgeable, understanding, affirmative and even- 
handed leadership to all our soldiers (Rogers 1978).
The conditions were set for the integration of women. While the Army Chief of Staff had
prepared the playing field, women would be entering units and working in positions
where they had not before been assigned. The start of a new era of integration for women
had begun. “ A fivefold increase in the number of active duty women occurred between
1973 and the end of the 1980’s, expanding women’s participation to 10.8% of the
military and ranking the United States first in the world for its representation of women “
(Yoder 2001, 773).
Women’s Involvement in Hostilities
Just as General Rogers had predicted, women began to be deployed with their
units in the event of hostilities and their involvement in combat operations increased. In
1983, 170 women soldiers were involved in Operation Urgent Fury, the invasion of
Grenada. In 1989, in Operation Just Cause, the invasion of Panama, 770 military women
were deployed (WREI 1998, 3-5). One woman, a military police commander, Linda
Bray, led troops in a three hour, infantry style firelight. This event “was big news to the
American public raised on the myth that women were excluded from military
combat.. .the attention was deeply resented by many male soldiers who thought the
women were getting far too much attention for their small contribution” (Holm 1992,
435-436). After a deluge of negative attitudes and poor treatment. Captain Bray became
so disillusioned and demoralized that she left the Army (Holm 1992, 436).
Nearly 41,000 military women were deployed to support the Persian Gulf War,
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991. Thirteen women were
killed and two became prisoners of war (WREI 1997, 6). In her book, Women in the
Military (1992) Jeanne Holm writes.
The one clear lesson that should be taken from this experience is that American 
men and women are capable of serving side by side as professionals in a combat 
zone, doing whatever they are trained to do . . . .  Even before the dust had settled 
over the Arabian desert, some skeptics were already contending that the Persian 
Gulf War was not a true test of integrated forces because of the war’s short 
duration, the type of terrain, the ability to achieve early air superiority, and the 
low casualties (471).
Since the Persian Gulf War, women have participated in U. S. military operations in 
many areas to include Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Women were
heavily involved in the build up and execution of the war against Iraq and continue to 
remain engaged in post-war Iraq.
New Definition of Direct Combat and Assignment Rule
During this time frame, many of the remaining restrictions on military women 
were eliminated. In 1994, the Secretary of Defense Les Aspin rescinded the Department 
of Defense Risk Rule and announced a new assignment policy for women. This policy 
states that,
Service members are eligible to be assigned to all positions for which they are 
qualified, except that women shall be excluded from assignment to units below 
the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the 
ground. In addition to this ground combat exclusion, the Secretary also permitted 
the services to close positions to women if (1) the units and positions were 
required to physically collocate and remain with direct ground combat units, (2) 
the service secretary attests that the cost of providing appropriate living space for 
women is prohibitive, (3) the units are engaged in special operations missions, or 
(4) job-related physical requirements would exclude the vast majority of women. 
(No jobs are closed to women because of job-related physical requirements.) 
(Rabkinl999,2).
That new policy subsequently opened 32,700 Army positions to women. The battlefield 
of today is no longer linear and characterized by frontlines. Technology has changed the 
face of the battlefield and women are often in locations that, while not collocated with 
direct ground combat units, are considered high value targets. These strategic targets 
include command posts, signal sites, and logistic centers. During the first Gulf War the 
largest number of casualties occurred when a skud missile hit a logistics unit located in a 
rear area.
Table 1
Active Duty Service Personnel by Branch of Service, 
Enlisted/Officer Status, and Sex. September 30, 2002
Number o f 
Women











































































* Officers include warrant officers
+Does not include the Coast Guard, which, in peacetime, is part of the Department of 
Homeland Security
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center, unpublished data 
compiled by the Women’s Research & Education Institute (WREI), September 30, 2002.
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Summary
“Since 1973, when the male draft ended, the percentage of active duty personnel 
who are women has increased dramatically -  from 1.6 percent in 1973 to 8.4 percent in 
1980” to 15 percent today” (WREI, 2002, 9). In the Army, women officers make up 14.7 
percent of the force (WREI, 2002, 9). There are currently 38 female brigade 
commanders and 74 female battalion commanders serving in centrally selected 
commands (Peterson 2003). (There are 315 brigade and 799 battalion active component 
commands, minus medical commands and acquisition commands (Beans 2003).) In the 
last thirty years, the integration of women has been an ongoing process. Organizational 
changes have been occurring, albeit in varying degrees. While relatively insignificant in 
the moment these seemingly small incremental changes appear to add up. In this study, 
organizational and individual changes are revealed through the experiences of the study’s 
participants and the telling of these experiences. This study seeks to organize these 





The theoretical framework for this dissertation considers ideas and theories that 
fall into the general categories of the individual and the environment. These female 
commanders represent 14.7 percent of the Army’s personnel, and it is necessary to 
examine how they have progressed through the military organization as individuals. 
While the initial focus is on the individual, and how the individual may behave in a 
military or similar type setting, it is also important to consider the impact an individual 
may have on his or her environment. Additionally, it is essential to understand the 
environment in which commanders operate to establish the organizational context in 
which these military women serve. What impact does the environment have on a 
commander, or on commanders in general? Different aspects of an environment are 
explored and discussed in order to gain a better understanding of the potential 
relationships that can exist between a commander and his or her environment.
Within each broad category, this study considers several specific subcategories. 
The Individual includes proportional representation and tokenism, stereotyping, sex role 
behavior, and the role of sponsorship and mentorship. The Environment includes 
organizational culture, military culture, women in the Army, different perspectives on
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women in combat, the concept of gendered institutions, the structural implications of 
military policies, how an organizational paradigm may foster social conformity (Social 
Conformity and the Masculine-Warrior Paradigm), and the idea o f an organization and 
individual “fit”.
Organizational change is also considered using Schein’s elaboration of Lewin’s 
change model of unfreezing, reframing, and refreezing. This model speaks to how 
individuals may change in an organization and, in turn, allows for some speculation on 
how an organization might change. While it is more difficult to get at real organizational 
change, it seems appropriate to consider how the organization may have been affected by 
individual change within the organization and to further examine some of these changes.
These categories form the theoretical framework that establishes the context for 
further discussion and analysis. In most cases, these categories are structured to first 
examine ideas and theories in general before considering studies that are specific to the 
military.
The Individual
Proportional Representation or Tokenism
Women officers currently make up 14.7 percent of the Army’s population (WREI, 
2002). It is likely that these women have had “only woman status” and have been tokens 
in their units (proportional representation of 15% or less), “symbols of how-women-can - 
do, stand-ins for all women” (Kanter 1977, 207). This status presents a series of 
challenges. On the issue of tokens, Kanter (1977) writes, “the existence of tokens 
encourages social segregation and stereo-typing and may lead the person in that position
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to overcompensate through either over achievement or hiding successes, or to turn 
against people of his or her own kind” (206). She identifies three perceptual tendencies 
that are associated with tokenism: visibility, contrast, and assimilation. “Visibility 
creates performance pressures on the token. Contrast leads to heightening of dominant 
culture boundaries, including isolation of the token. And assimilation results in the 
token’s role encapsulation” (212). These tendencies or processes often seem negative 
and research has shown a chillier climate for women in male-dominated groups (Yoder 
1994). The token, while highly visible as someone different in the organization, is forced 
to represent the generalization or stereotype of that token group. In this case, the token 
woman represents every woman in the Army.
There are several different ways a token can respond to performance pressures: 
overachieve and construct a public image that minimizes organizational and peer 
scrutiny; seek publicity and make the most of one’s rare status; or try to become socially 
invisible (Kanter 1977, 219). “For token women, the price of being ‘one of the boys’ was 
a willingness to occasionally turn against ‘the girls’ ” (Kanter 1977, 228). These women, 
who “occasionally turn against the girls”, have been labeled as “queen bees” and tend to 
be anti-feminine and primarily interested in preserving their unusual status in a world of 
men” (Bass 1990, 716). One goal relevant to this issue of token behavior is to discover 
how the women in this study responded to the performance pressures placed on them.
Did they overachieve, try to become invisible, or revel in their rare status?
Expanding on Kanter’s work, Yoder (2002) highlights two points that consistently 
emerged from her work on tokenism processes, “first, gender constructs different social
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contexts for women and for men; and second, gender is most usefully conceptualized as a 
status variable, not something internal to the individual” (2). She questioned both 
Kanter’s remedy for tokenism, which was to simply increase the number of tokens, and 
the gender neutrality of Kanter’s findings and argued that Kanter examined “the gender 
composition of specific work groups -  without taking into consideration the broader 
societal context in which these groups operate” (Yoder 2002, 3). Enlarging Kanter’s 
perspective, and using the description of tokens as “ ‘double deviates;’ nontraditionally 
employed women who deviate first from androcentric norms by virtue of their gender and 
who deviate a second time by virtue of the gender-uncongeniality of their occupational 
pursuits”, Yoder found that the influence of gender was pervasive throughout tokenism 
theory, including the construct of tokenism itself, its outcomes, and solutions to tokenism 
(3). In her research where she manipulated the status of tokens, Yoder (2002) found that 
“the social costs of being a gender token diminished for the higher-status tokens, despite 
their proportional scarcity” suggesting “that the unfavorable social costs of being a 
female token can be negated by enhancing the status of the token” (4). This finding has 
implications for the women commanders in this study as they have achieved higher status 
in the organization by virtue of their rank and position.
Yoder reported that tokenism researchers are reaching a consensus that “argues 
that groups need to move toward 35% or more representation of former tokens to 
eliminate tokenism consequences” (Yoder 2002, 6). Although these researchers advocate 
increasing the number of women to counter negative tokenism effects, just adding more 
women has also been found to create new problems, such as enhanced boundary
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tightening and exclusion (Yoder 2002, 14). Given a percentage of 35% or more 
representation to eliminate negative tokenism consequences, it remains unlikely that 
women in the Army will lose their token status. In another study, Yoder’s (2002) 
“findings suggest that the status-enhancement of tokens, albeit competent tokens, rests in 
the hands of organizations whose high-status members can legitimate women” (7). These 
findings are also applicable to the study’s participants and the status of their mentors.
To better understand tokenism outcomes, Yoder’s (2002) “overarching message is 
that context matters’' (7). She writes, “it is critical to understand the status implications 
of being female or male, how gender status combines with other status markers, and the 
impact of deviation from gender stereotypes defining occupational appropriateness” (7). 
Yoder proposes that in order to disrupt the cycle that produces and sustains negative 
tokenism outcomes; it is necessary to not only change proportions but to also redefine 
occupational roles and to enhance the status of the tokens (7). This study will consider 
how the individual commanders and the organization have addressed these tokenism 
processes and remedies.
Stereotyping
Another important and related consideration is the response of these women’s 
supervisors and coworkers. Were these women categorized by their peers and superiors 
and neatly placed into stereotypical roles; roles that preserved familiar forms of 
interaction that would occur in a more traditional environment (i.e., mother, seductress, 
pet, iron maiden) (Kanter 1977, 233)? In Bass and StogdilTs Handbook of Leadership 
(1990), Bass references studies that found female leaders to he stereotyped negatively at
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two ends of a continuum. “At one extreme, as mother, pet, or sex object, women are 
considered too submissive or emotional to be effective leaders. At the other extreme, 
women violate what is expected of them as women and are seen as ‘iron maidens’, 
aggressive workaholics, and as domineering and manipulative” (Bass 1990, 711). In the 
same vein, Bass refers to a study that concludes executive women may differ little from 
their male counterparts on most matters but must conform to two sets of demands in 
order to be successful. Women need to contradict the stereotypes that their male 
superiors and peers have about women. These women need to be seen as different in that 
they are “better than women” but they must not forfeit all traces of femininity because 
such behavior makes them “too different’’(Bass 1990, 737). It seems that one of the keys 
to a woman’s success in a large, male-dominated organization depends on the woman’s 
ability to balance these expectations of “different but not too different.” A Fortune 
magazine profile of seven powerful and successful women highlights this idea of 
qualified difference. In “Women, Sex & Power” (August 1996), Fortune magazine 
proposed several ways these women had behaved to acquire and maintain their powerful 
positions in organizations. These methods illustrate success in the balance of behaving 
differently within the allowable bounds of different. They use their sexuality. “We never 
gave up our femininity, we didn’t become little men” (Fortune 1996, 46). They do not 
blend in. “In order to lead in a man’s world, you can’t be plain vanilla” (55). They don’t 
favor women. “Hard-core feminists might call the Fortune Seven - queen bees- women 
who move ahead but don’t pull along their sisters” (57). It is also a goal of this study to
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see how the women in this study fall along this dual-edged continuum of competency and 
expected feminine behavior.
Women who are successful may, in fact, exemplify “the talking platypus 
phenomenon” (Abramson, Goldberg, Greenberg, and Abramson 1977). This 
phenomenon occurs “when an individual achieves a level of success not anticipated, 
his/her achievement tends to be magnified rather than diminished” (Abramson et al.
1977, 114). This study, “Competence Ratings as a Function of Sex and Professional 
Status”, found that a woman could be perceived as being more competent than a man 
within a male dominated profession provided her performance or behavior is credible and 
laudable. (Abramson et al. 1977, 120). The present study makes the assumption that 
women, selected to command, have been perceived to conduct themselves in a laudable, 
credible manner.
Bass (1990) found that in a majority of cases, differences between male and 
female leaders were more “a matter of stereotyped expectations than actual fact” (726). 
Stereotyped expectations, however, have enduring power and far-reaching effects as 
evidenced by the results of a Harvard Business Review survey. In 1965, Harvard 
Business Review sent a survey to its readers to determine what their attitudes were about 
women in business. The same survey was sent to another sample of executives twenty 
years later (Sutton and Moore 1985). Although they found that stereotypes once held as 
truth had slowly started to crumble, there is still the perception that women must be 
exceptional to succeed in business and almost half the women surveyed believe that
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women will never be completely accepted as executives in corporate America (Sutton 
and Moore 1985, 66).
In two large meta-analyses considering gender and leadership style (Eagly, Karan 
& Johnson 1992; Eagly & Johnson 1990), women were found to adopt a more democratic 
or participative style of leadership while the men were found to adopt a more autocratic 
or directive style (247). In organizational settings, Eagly et al (1990) found that leader 
behavior lost much of its gender stereotypic character with the exception that women 
chose a more democratic or participative style of leadership. The meta-analysis, “Gender 
and Leadership Style Among School Principals” (Eagly et al 1992) also found that 
female principals were more task oriented than were male principals (91). “Although the 
sex differences obtained on task-oriented style may seem surprising because it is counter 
stereotypical,” Eagly’s earlier study reported a tendency for leaders of both sexes to 
emphasize task accomplishment when they were in a leadership role regarded as 
congenial to their gender (91-92). “In general, leaders of each sex were especially task 
oriented when their role was viewed as congenial to their gender” (Eagly 1990, 246).
A1986 study using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth Labor 
Market Behavior found that 34% of women in the military, but only 3% of women in the 
civilian sector, held jobs in which 90% or more of civilian workers were male. Military 
women were more likely to do jobs stereotypically regarded as masculine and less likely 
to do traditionally feminine jobs than civilian women (Yoder 2001, 775). How did these 




There are also examples of studies in which stereotypic expectations and 
perceptions were manifested in actual sex role behavior. In a study conducted in a 
female-dominated health care profession (Rozier and Hersh-Cochran 1996), “females 
believed more than males that they relied upon interpersonal skills, hierarchical position, 
providing growth and opportunities to employees, and communication skills as sources of 
power” (Rozier and Hersh-Cochran 1996, 62). In the same study, men relied less on 
items of interpersonal skills and communication and more on the ability to provide 
financial reward (Rozier and Hersh-Cochran 1996, 67).
Considerable research has been conducted on sex role identification and gender 
preference as a way to explain observed attitudes and behavior. Generally, the various 
masculinity and femininity scales measure, respectively, the tendencies to be directive 
and assertive and the tendencies to be nurturing and interpersonally concerned (Bass 
1990, 722). A study focused on factors affecting emergent leaders (Goktepe and 
Schneier 1989), found that “regardless of sex, individuals with masculine gender role 
orientations (i.e., those who described themselves with masculine characteristics using 
the BSRI [Bem’s Sex Role inventory]) emerged as leaders within groups significantly 
more than those with feminine, androgynous, or undifferentiated gender roles” (Goktepe 
and Schneier 1989, 166-167). It seems likely that the female participants in this study 
would also describe themselves with masculine characteristics. Male and female 
undergraduates who had high masculinity scores were perceived to have talked more and 
to have had the good ideas in mixed sex discussion groups (Bettenhausen 1991, 355). A
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meta-analysis on gender and the evaluation of leaders (Eagly, Klonsky, & Makhijani 
1992) found that the tendency for men to be more favorably evaluated than women was 
greater for roles occupied mainly by men. Their “findings gave considerable evidence of 
selective devaluation. Women in leadership roles were devalued relative to their male 
counterparts when leadership or management was carried out in stereotypically masculine 
styles” (Eagly et al. 1992,16).
“Research has shown that when women and men come together, women tend to 
change more. Women accommodate more to the presence of men than men do to the 
presence of women “ (Tannen 1997, 38). Tannen also found that “women expect more 
feedback from male bosses than they sometimes get” (36). Another study (Heilman, 
Block, Martell, and Simon 1989) found that the qualities of leadership ability and skill in 
business matters, both central to effective managerial performance, were seen to 
characterize men managers and successful managers more than women managers; 
discrepancies between the perceived leadership of men and women continued to persist 
despite explicit statements of success for women managers (Heilman et al. 1989, 941). 
These findings have important implications for this study.
Sponsorship/Mentorship
Another significant aspect in the vertical mobility of women is the issue of 
sponsorship. Kanter (1977) found that sponsors seemed absolutely essential for the 
success of women in organizations (183). As discussed earlier, Yoder (2000) found “that 
the status-enhancement of tokens , albeit competent tokens, rests in the hands of 
organizations whose higher-status members can legitimate women” (7). High status
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members in the Army may have enhanced the status of these commanders while serving 
as their mentors. Bass (1990) cites two studies that also found support from higher 
authorities as necessary for the success of women at the higher executive levels (735). A 
study that includes questions about mentors and protégées found that “mentor and 
protégée relationships are fairly extensive among the elite of the business world, but not 
every executive has had a mentor” (Roche 1979, 14). Roche defines mentor as “a person 
who took a personal interest in your career and who guided and sponsored you” (15). He 
found that most executives seek a mentor during their first fifteen years, which they 
characterize as the learning and growing period (20). Roche (1979) also reports that 
“despite the high levels of influence executives report their mentors exerted, respondents 
do not consider having a mentor an important ingredient in their own success. They 
ascribe higher value to such personal characteristics as the ability to make decisions, 
motivation, the ability to motivate others, the ability to lead, energy level, the ability to 
complete assignments, and willingness to work long hours” (20). Interestingly, less than 
one percent of the respondents were women. Of this percentage, however, he found that 
women executives “tend to have more mentors than men, averaging three sponsors to the 
men’s two” (24). Roche writes that his “survey findings agree with the conclusions of 
Margaret Henni g and Anne Jardim, who find in The Managerial Woman (1977) that 
father like sponsors are a necessity for women without family connections to reach top 
management positions” (24). This study examines the role mentors have played during 
the career progression of these female commanders.
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During her study, “Phases of the Mentor Relationship,” Kram, (1983) developed a 
conceptual model of the phases of the mentor relationship. She found that a mentor 
relationship goes through four predictable phases: an initiation phase, a cultivation 
phase, a separation phase, and a redefinition phase. A mentor relationship potentially 
serves both career and psychosocial functions. Career functions are those aspects that 
support career enhancement and include; sponsorship, exposure-and-visibility, coaching, 
protection, and challenging assignments. Psychosocial functions relate to aspects that 
include role modeling, acceptance-and confirmation, counseling and friendship (614). 
During a research phase for the study, she found that “the research data from which the 
relationship phases were delineated indicated significant limitations in cross-sex 
relationships” (622). “The lack of an adequate role model in a male mentor caused young 
female managers to seek support and guidance from other female peers” (Shapiro, 
Haseltine, & Rowe 1978). Collusion in stereotypical behaviors encouraged women to 
maintain feelings of dependency and incompetence when they were attempting to 
become independent contributors (Kanter, 1977; Sheehy, 1976). Concerns about 
increasing intimacy and concerns about the public image of the relationship caused both 
individuals to avoid interaction that had the potential to provide a wide range of career 
and psychosocial functions” (623). In her chapter, “Constraints of Place on Leadership,” 
Simon Rosenthal (1998) identifies organizational barriers that work against opposite-sex 
mentorships. “For example, opposite-sex relationships may invite heightened public 
scrutiny, provoke questions about potential sexual involvement, arouse peer resentment 
and jealousy, and stir up sex-role stereotypes and biases. . .  . These problems suggest how
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mentoring is a gendered process that may reinforce differential power and opportunities 
of men and women” (72). Did the women in this study experience organizational barriers 
that had an impact on their mentorship?
In a later study, Kram and Isabella (1985) examined peer relationships to discover 
if they also provided some of the same functions as mentoring. “The results of this study 
suggest that peer relationships offer an important alternative to conventional mentoring 
relationships by providing a range of developmental supports for personal and 
professional growth at each career stage” (116). She and her team found career- 
enhancing and psychosocial functions similar to the functions observed in mentoring 
relationships. The career-enhancing functions include information sharing, career 
strategizing, and job-related feedback while the psychosocial functions included 
confirmation, emotional support, personal feedback and friendship. Kram and Isabella 
(1985) found that peer relationships have a special attribute that makes them unique from 
mentoring relationships. “Peer relationships offer a degree of mutuality that enables both 
individuals to experience being the giver as well as the receiver of these functions. This 
mutuality appears to be critical in helping individuals during their careers to develop a 
continuing sense of competence, responsibility, and identity as experts” (118). How 
many of these commanders relied on peer relationships versus mentoring relationships 
will be discussed.
In Women. Mentors, and Success (1992), Jeruchim and Shapiro found that 
“women must find a way to identify with their male mentors professionally yet keep their 
female identity intact” (34). They discuss the use of women as secondary or peer
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mentors and point out that these “supplementary mentors can strengthen a woman’s 
female identity in a male dominated environment” (34). In this case, women would use 
both conventional mentoring and peer relationships in their career progression. Did the 
women in this study also resort to a combination of conventional mentoring and peer 
relationships during their careers?
Some researchers are more cautious and prescriptive in their approach and believe 
“that mentoring needs to be more fully developed before its effects can be understood” 
(Vertz 1985, 415). In a case study o f obstacles to career advancement of women in a 
district office of the Internal Revenue Service, Vertz (1985) identified these obstacles, 
assessed how they affected the women in the organization, and discussed the implications 
for mentoring. She measured five categories of obstacles; attitudes and personality 
characteristics, domestic constraints, structural constraints within the work organization, 
structural constraints encountered prior to current employment, and job qualifications.
She found that “women and men in advanced positions differ significantly on only a few 
personality traits. Women in advanced positions maintain self-perceptions of femininity, 
while men in similar positions think of themselves as masculine and athletic. These 
findings indicate that gender identification remains an important part of a person’s self- 
concept, regardless of position” (416). These findings also relate to the earlier discussion 
on stereotyping. The other statistically significant difference between men and women in 
advanced positions was that women “have much more non-traditional attitudes toward 
the role of women in employment than do men in similar positions” (416). In fact, Vertz 
(1985) found that men, regardless of position, had more traditional attitudes toward the
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role of women. Women in more advanced positions (GS-11 and higher) also did “not 
differ from men on important personality dimensions, such as self-esteem, 
aggressiveness, and management” (416). In regards to domestic constraints, Vertz (1985) 
found that women in advanced positions in contrast to men in comparable positions were 
“more likely to be single, to have fewer children, to be more responsible for domestic 
chores, and to have been out of the work force to have or to care for a child” (417). Since 
the military has a career progression system that has only special opportunities for lateral 
entry, most commanders start their careers early, before having children, and it is unlikely 
that they would have entered the military work force after having cared for a child. It is 
likely however that many of these commanders will have remained single or if married, 
will have no or few children. Under structural constraints within the work organization, 
“women in upper-level positions were more likely to perceive themselves as having 
suffered sexual harassment and discrimination” (418). Additionally, while men in similar 
positions preferred male supervisors, women had no preference for the sex of their 
supervisor (418). (This may in fact be a moot point for many of these commanders since 
they often were the highest-ranking officers and there is little ehoice regarding who is 
going to be the boss.). This study shows that while experience with mentoring has been 
sufficiently positive, it is important that it be carried out systematically with an awareness 
of the pros and cons of mentoring. Vertz (1985) makes several observations about 
mentoring including how to develop mentor-protégée relationships and how to ensure 
these relationships don’t become dysfunctional. These observations are useful in the 
evaluation of mentors and the commanders being studied. What role have mentors
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played in their careers? What types of obstacles did they encounter which warranted the




Critical to the development of this study’s theoretical framework is the
overarching concept of organizational culture and the idea of an organizational culture
perspective. Using this perspective, one is able to more fully appreciate the
organizational context in which these commanders operated. In his book. Organizational
Culture and Leadership. Edgar Schein (1992), defines and analyzes organizational culture
and explains how organizations evolve and change. He defines culture formally as
A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its 
problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well 
enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the 
correct way to receive, think, and feel in relation to those problems (12).
Schein analyzes culture at three levels: artifacts, espoused values, and basic
underlying assumptions. Once the pattern of basic underlying assumptions is understood,
the more visible artifacts and espoused values (to be discussed further below) of the
organization’s culture can be explained to the external environment.
In the Organizational Culture Perspective, Steven J. Ott (1989) uses
organizational culture to mean the culture of an organization, and the organizational
culture perspective to mean the use of organizational culture as a frame of reference for
looking at, understanding and working with organizations (1).
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[The] organizational culture perspective puts on a different set of ‘lenses’ through 
which to ‘see’ an organization. When we look through these special 
organizational culture lenses, we see a mini-society made up of social 
constructions. These social constructions vary in different areas of an 
organization (there are sub cultures), but consistent threads are woven across the 
organization which clearly identify the existence of an “umbrella” organizational 
culture. . . .  As in all cultures, all facts, truths, realities, beliefs and values are what 
the members agree they are—they are perceptions (vii).
This research will use the concept of organizational culture lenses to better examine and
understand the environment where military commanders work and flourish. The
“umbrella organizational culture,” and the Army’s different subcultures are important
factors in the establishment of an organizational context within which to examine the
actions and strategies used by commanders to cope and excel in the Army. Using these
conceptual tools, organizational culture and the organizational culture perspective, this
study also considers the relationship between organizational culture and leadership and
examines the impact that a strong organizational culture may have on an individual’s
demonstrated leadership. While it is important to evaluate an individual’s leadership in
discrete terms (individually distinct), it is essential that this examination also be
conducted within the context of the organizational culture.
At this point, it is important to reiterate the significance of an organization’s basic
underlying assumptions and the challenges these assumptions pose for any newcomers.
Ott (1989) describes basic assumptions as “beliefs, values, ethical and moral codes, and
ideologies that have become so ingrained that they tend to have dropped out of
consciousness. They are unquestioned perceptions of truth, reality, ways of thinking
about, and feeling that develop through repeated successes in solving problems over
extended periods o f time” (47). If these assumptions have “dropped out of
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consciousness,” how does someone new to the organization learn these assumptions? Ott 
(1989) makes the point that new members are not explicitly taught the basic assumptions 
but new members learn them “unconsciously through stories and myths and by modeling 
patterns of behavior” (42).
Schein (1992) compares the process of culture formation to that of group 
formation. He finds that basic assumptions allow the group to survive and help reconcile 
the problems of external adaptation and internal integration (51). Essentially, “the 
process of culture formation is, in a sense, identical to group formation in that the very 
essence o f ‘groupness’ or group identity, the shared patterns of thought, belief, feelings, 
and values that result from shared experience and common learning, results in the pattern 
of shared assumptions that [Schein] calls the culture of that group” (52). Leaders develop 
a “coping cycle” that ensures new group members understand and share the basic 
assumptions and values that establish “the correct way to define the situation” (52). The 
essential elements of this coping cycle are mission and strategy, goals, means, 
measurement, and correction. Mission and strategy refer to achieving a shared 
understanding of core missions, primary tasks and related functions. Goals must be 
derived from these missions and agreed upon. There must be a consensus on the means 
used to attain the stated goals. Measurement speaks to a criteria developed to measure 
how well the group is doing in meeting its goals. Correction refers to steps taken to 
change strategies if goals are not being sufficiently met (52). The group’s effectiveness 
is dependent upon its ability to reach consensus on how to accomplish these goals. In 
turn, this consensus “creates the behavioral regularities and many of the artifacts that
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eventually come to be identified as the visible manifestations of the culture. Once these 
regularities and patterns are in place, they become a source of stability for members and 
are therefore strongly adhered to” (61).
Schein (1992) writes, “culture ultimately reflects the group’s effort to cope and 
learn and is the residue of the learning process. Culture thus fulfills not only the function 
of providing stability, meaning, and predictability in the present but is the result of 
functionally effective decisions in the group’s past” (68). It is within this cultural context 
that the commanders of this study are considered. Implicit in this analysis of culture is 
the complexity of the phenomenon, and the potential difficulties an individual faces when 
trying to effect change in an organization with a strong, long established culture.
Schein (1992) lists the processes groups need to manage internal integration: a 
common language for communication and understanding, a way to determine group 
membership, a system for power distribution, rules to regulate relationships, a system of 
rewards and punishments, and ways to explain or account for certain unexplainable 
events (70-71). Schein (1992) writes, “most communication breakdowns between people 
result from their lack of awareness that in the first place they are making basically 
different assumptions about meaning categories” (72). He also found that certain 
organizations actually had their values embedded in these categories, and “what was 
being taught was really a category system, along with the values embedded in the rules of 
how to respond” (73). According to Schein (1992), the leader normally set the criteria 
for group inclusion although the group further refines these criteria. He writes, “defining
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the criteria for deciding who is in and who is out of an organization or any of its subunits 
is one of the best ways of beginning to analyze a eulture” (78-79).
Most o f these management processes are evident in Army organizations. Military 
terminology and jargon, both generic and specific, establish a common language for 
communication. Unit assignment determines group membership at the most basic level. 
The hierarchical organizational (chain-of-command) structure supports a power 
distribution system and also regulates relationships. The Army’s system of promotions 
and awards, along with the Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) provides a 
system of rewards and punishments. Military tradition and the retelling of stories about 
extreme heroism and courage are some ways that the military tries to account for certain 
unexplainable events. The Army works at the internal integration of its members at 
several levels and some of these overlap. Meaning categories at the basic entry level, the 
Army in general, differ somewhat qualitatively with meaning categories related to a 
specific branch (i.e.. Infantry, Special Forces (Combat Arms), Signal Corps (Combat 
Support), or Quartermaster Corps (Combat Service Support)) and unit size (i.e., corps, 
division, battalion), type (i.e., Ranger, Airborne, mechanized), and location (i.e.. 
Continental United States, Europe, Korea). Most officers receive general military 
training at the college level prior to commissioning, and spend time at basic and specialty 
schools following commissioning prior to their pinpoint assignment to a specific unit and 
military post. Throughout their careers, soldiers continue to attend schools and training 
required for career progression. The first criterion for inclusion in specific branches or
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units is set by service mandate and the combat exclusion rule (defined in Chapter 1, 
Introduction).
The idea that basic underlying assumptions are unspoken but determine an 
organization’s pattern of behavior alludes to the difficulty some newcomers may have in 
learning the organization’s culture, especially if the newcomer and the organization are at 
odds. In fact, studies have addressed the issue of organizational and individual 
incongruence. Individuals, who do not “fit” in an organization, often leave the 
organization. Since this study’s subjects have spent at least twenty years in the Army, it 
seems safe to say that they were able to fit into the organization and its culture.
Schein (1992) identifies three distinct developmental stages in an organization’s 
evolution; the founding and early growth stage, the mid-life stage, and the final stage of 
maturity. He discusses how culture becomes embedded in an organization and how these 
mechanisms change as the organization evolves and matures. In the development of an 
organizational culture in the early growth stage, organizations rely on the primary 
embedding mechanisms, which include “what leaders pay attention to, measure, and 
control; deliberate role modeling, teaching and coaching” (231). Once the organization 
has matured, the secondary articulation and reinforcement mechanisms, i.e., organization 
design and structure; organization systems and procedures; and stories, legends, and 
myths about people and events, become the primary culture-creating mechanisms that 
will ultimately constrain future leaders (245). Organizational maturity is defined more by 
the interaction of the organization with its environment than by its internal dynamics 
alone. At this stage, the culture defines leadership more than leadership creates culture.
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“The culture survives through the teaching of shared assumptions” and once the culture 
exists, determines the criteria for leadership and thus determines who will or will not be 
leader (15).
In accordance with Schein’s stages, the Army today would be defined as a mature
organization. “As the organization matures.. .its stractures, processes and norms come to
be taken more and more for granted. A mature organization in this sense can function
successfully for a long time as long as its cultural assumptions are in line with the
realities of its environmental contexts” (255). Since the end of the Cold War, its
participation in peacekeeping operations, and the current war against terrorism, the Army
has been working to transform itself in the face of a changing environmental context. A
Cold War paradigm no longer fits the environment that the Army is now facing. In the
process of developing organizational structures to meet these new demands, the Army
continues to struggle with how to really change its culture and in this process must also
consider the basic underlying assumptions that have defined Army culture in the past.
“The important point to grasp is that all these mechanisms do communicate 
culture content to newcomers. Leaders do not have a choice about whether or not 
to communicate. They only have a choice about how to manage what they 
communicate. What are secondary mechanisms at the growth stage will, of 
course, to a large degree become primary maintenance mechanisms as the 
organization matures and stabilizes, what we ultimately call bureaucratization. 
The more the structure, procedures, rituals, and espoused values work in making 
the organization successful, the more they become the filter or criteria for the 
selection of new leaders. As a result, the likelihood of new leaders becoming 
cultural change agents declines as the organization matures. The socialization 
process then begins to reflect what has worked in the past, not what may be the 
primary agenda of the management of today” (253).
Understanding the complexity of organizational culture and the importance of basic
underlying assumptions highlights the value of using an organizational culture
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perspective in the analysis o f the environment and context in which female commanders 
learn and operate. This perspective also emphasizes the difficulty associated with 
changing a mature organization. As implied above, the ability to affect change in an 
organization declines as an organization matures.
Military Culture
While the preceding section dealt more with organizational culture in general, the 
following section wrestles with what specifically distinguishes military culture from other 
institutional cultures. Certainly, the mission of the United States Army, to fight and win 
the nation’s wars is central to its culture. “The elements of military culture derive from 
the purpose or tasks for which societies raise, support, and maintain modem militaries, 
for instance, waging war on behalf of the nation-state and, if needed, enforcing domestic 
order” (Snider 1999, 14). On a Defense Task Force Panel charged with defining military 
culture, Snider considers several different approaches in his search for a definition. He 
writes,
What makes military culture unique is that its central elements derive from ‘an 
attempt to deal with (and, if possible, to overcome) the uncertainty of war, to 
impose some pattern on war, to control war’s outcome, and to invest war with 
meaning and significance.’ Military culture is ‘an elaborate social construction, 
and exercise of creative intelligence, through which we come to imagine war in a 
particular way and to embrace certain rationalizations about how war should be 
conducted and for what purposes.’ While it is a product of war, military culture 
also influences the likelihood and form of future wars (Snider 1999, 14).
Snider examines a functional approach to military culture and discusses four basic
elements: discipline, professional ethos, ceremonial displays and etiquette of military
life, and cohesion and esprit de corps.
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The American Heritage Dictionary (1994) defines discipline as “training expected 
to produce a specific character or pattern of behavior and controlled behavior resulting 
from such training” (243). The purpose of discipline in the militaiy^ is twofold. It 
“minimizes the confusion and disintegrative consequences of battle by imposing order on 
it with a repertoire of patterned actions” and “it ritualizes the violence of war . . . .  
Following discipline reassures soldiers in combat and defines when and how they are 
‘authorized’ to violate the normal societal prohibitions against killing and violence” 
(Snider 1999, 14). Discipline is both a familiar idea and an observable phenomenon 
associated with military organizations.
The second element, professional ethos, refers to the legitimacy of the profession 
of arms. Snider refers to Samuel Huntington’s discourse on the military as a profession 
in The Soldier and the State (1957). “A profession is more narrowly defined, more 
intensively and exclusively pursued, and more clearly isolated from human activity than 
are most occupations.. .the military function is performed by a public bureaucratized 
profession expert in the management of violence and responsible for the military security 
of the state” (Snider 1999, 15). Part of this professional ethos is the subordination of the 
military to civilian institutions and the requirement to follow international laws of 
warfare (16).
The third element of military culture consists of the ceremonial displays and 
etiquette that play an important role in military life (16). “The salute, the uniform, 
insignia of rank, ceremonies of induction, promotion, and change of command, all 
inculcated in training, provide order, hierarchy, and continuity to the life of military
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units.. .Such rituals mark collective identity and group affiliation, forge a common 
identity, and symbolize a common fate” (16-17).
The last element of military culture from this viewpoint is cohesion and esprit de
corps.
Military cohesion refers to the feelings of identity and comradeship that soldiers 
hold for those in their immediate military unit, the outgrowth of face-to-face or 
primary (horizontal) group relations. In contrast, esprit de corps refers to the 
commitment or pride soldiers take in the larger military establishment to which 
the unit belongs, and outgroivth of secondary (vertical) group relations. Both 
result to an important degree from structural factors of military organization, but 
they are primarily matters of belief and emotional attachment (17).
Certainly these elements; discipline, professional ethos, ceremonial displays, and
etiquette, and cohesion and esprit de corps begin to give structure and substance to the
understanding of military culture. In Schein’s levels of culture, these elements fall into
the categories of artifacts and espoused values.
Another approach considers the heterogeneity of military culture illustrated by the
subcultures of each service: Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines. “Derived over time
from their assigned domain of war on land, sea, and in the air, these individual services
have developed very different ideals and concepts that in turn strongly influenced their
institutional cultures and behavior, particularly their strategic approach to war that
establishes their claim on the nation’s assets” (Snider 1999, 18). As he cites Stephen
Rosen (1991) in Winning the Next War, “each branch has its own culture and distinct
way of thinking about the way war should be conducted. ..If we start with this perspective
we will be inclined to regard military organizations as complex political communities in
which the central concerns are those of any political community: who should rule, and
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how the ‘citizens’ should live” (Snider 1999, 19). The commanders in this study belong 
to the subculture of the Army, the military’s ground combat force. In most cases, these 
commanders are in units that provide direct support or service support to combat forces 
of Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, and Aviation. The combat arms, combat support and 
combat service support branches are subcultures within the Army, as well. These 
subcultures are an example of, in part, what Schein (1992) refers to as a process of 
functional differentiation. The Army has always structured itself by function; it is 
important to this study to consider the subcultures that have formed as a result of this 
differentiation.
In his examination of military culture, Snider also presents military sociologist
Charles Moskos’ Institutional/Occupational (I/O) model that speaks to the military’s
legitimization by American society.
Moskos noted that society legitimates an institution ‘in terms of norms and 
values, a purpose transcending individual self-interest in favor of a presumed 
higher good. Members of a professional institution are often seen as following a 
calling captured in words like duty, honor, country.’ Conversely, an occupational 
model is legitimated in terms of the marketplace where supply and demand are 
paramount, and self-interest takes priority over communal interests” (Snider 1999, 
20^
Military members can potentially lose their lives, which also distinguish their profession 
from an occupation.
Snider’s final perspective on military culture discusses the cultural dominance of 
the officer corps (to which the participants in this study belong) and focuses on the 
stratification of the military by rank; officer, non-commissioned officer, and enlisted 
personnel (20). He writes that it is the officer who is responsible for “the unique
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elements of the profession essential for the military to be accorded high professional 
status hy American society” and that the elements of this “profession are almost 
exclusively the domain of officers” (20-21). “In sum, because of their role, their 
longevity, and their profession’s unique avoidance of lateral entry, officers create and 
maintain over time those elements that make the military a profession. If you change 
what officers think, you will succeed in changing the culture” (21). Snider also points 
out that officers upon commissioning have sworn to support and defend the Constitution 
of the United States and, because of this oath, are “the military’s connection to American 
society” (21). Officers “are the ones who have received a commission, a warrant, from 
that society to be its agent and to act on its behalf, and it is logical for society to expect 
individual accountability” (21). Understanding military culture is important as it helps 
establish the organizational context in which the participants of this study pursued their 
careers.
Women in the Armv
This study focuses on female commanders in the Army. This section examines 
opinions and attitudes about women in the Army in order to provide more detail to the 
environment in which they operate. In “Army Opinions about Women in the Army,” 
Judith Hicks Stiehm (1998), using data from the Fall 1994 Sample Survey of Military 
Personnel, found the data suggested that the acceptance of women remained limited.
Data came from over 500,000 respondents and responses were divided into five groups. 
The enlisted personnel were divided into three groups: 1) privates, privates first class, 
corporals, and specialists; 2) sergeants and staff sergeants; and 3) sergeants first class.
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master sergeants and sergeant majors. Commissioned officers were divided into two
groups; 1) second and first lieutenants and captains; and 2) majors, lieutenant colonels,
and colonels. (The female commanders in this study fall into the second group of
commissioned officers who have had at least ten years of service and plan to stay in the
Army until retirement.) Soldiers were asked a set of fifteen questions that related to
women in the Army. Several questions related to physical strength and their ability to
meet the physical demands of being a soldier; numerous questions related to women in
combat, their effectiveness, mental toughness and killer instinct, as well as their potential
to hamper combat effectiveness due to male soldiers trying to protect them in combat
situations; and several questions focused on the issue of unit cohesion and how well men
and women can work together (89-92). “Indeed, to even ask the questions which were
asked about them would seem to marginalize women, to set them apart-and this is an
institution that places a high value on cohesiveness” (88). Stiehm writes.
One suspects that in an all-volunteer Army one is likely to attract men with the 
most conventional views of gender roles and women with the least conventional. 
However, the Army does a lot of training. Whether and how personnel views on 
gender roles are changed by the Army experience remains unclear (93).
It will be interesting to examine how the female commanders in this study felt about their
acceptance in the organization and to consider how conventional their views are on
gender roles.
In another discussion on women in the military, Yoder (2001) writes, “scholarly 
surveys of the public’s attitudes about women in the military are scarce” (773). She 
references two surveys. The General Social Survey (GSS) conducted by the National 
Opinion Research Center that last asked about women’s roles in the military in 1982, and
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a recent survey by the Roper Organization in 1992 that considered attitudes concerning 
women in combat (773). She found that “attitudes about military women reflect patterns 
common to gender stereotypes in that the more nontraditional the role, the more dissent. 
However, like gender attitudes in general, overall support for military women engaged in 
a wide array of roles is remarkably favorable” (774).
Perspectives on Women in Combat
This study considers women who have spent their careers in the military, and 
more specifically, in the Army. While there are similarities between services (Army, Air 
Force, Navy, and Marines), each has its own idiosyncratic nature. There are different 
layers to military culture. Army culture and sub-cultures, and the role women play in 
these cultures. As one gets closer to the basic assumptions that define the Army’s 
culture, it is difficult to escape the tension created by the question of women in combat, 
the rationale for total integration and the rationale against full integration. This study 
does not attempt to answer the question of whether women should be allowed into 
combat units or not. However, the environment in which this study’s subjects operate 
cannot be fully understood without addressing the tension that characterizes arguments 
for and against the complete integration of women in the Army. What is not clear and 
makes the environment even more complicated are the reports that many women in the 
military believe that women do not belong in combat, and the fact that individuals outside 
of the organization express many of the arguments both for and against full integration. 
While it is difficult to capture these often-disparate issues, it is essential for the 
appreciation of an extremely complex environment.
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The debate concerning women in the military, and their role in combat, often 
comes down to two value rationales, military effectiveness and citizen rights and 
responsibilities.
Military effectiveness is a goal emphasizing the ability of the military to perform 
its mission of securing national defense by fighting and winning wars, being 
prepared to fight, and/or being so strong as to deter other nations from provoking 
war. The goal of citizenship rights and responsibilities which transcends the 
military institution, stresses the relationship between citizenship and military 
service by considering the opportunities afforded by military service as a right of 
citizenship, treating service as an intrinsic privilege of citizens and/or viewing 
service as an obligation of citizenship (Segal, 1989).
In a content analysis of congressional testimony on women in the military, Segal 
(1992) found that “speakers opposed to expanding women’s military roles were much 
more likely to express only military effectiveness values than those who favored such 
expansion” (307). Speakers citing both military effectiveness and citizenship values 
appeared to recognize that both values appear necessary when considering policy 
affecting women’s military roles (307). Segal (1992), considering how the importance of 
each value might be affected in the future, theorized that “threats to national security are 
likely to lead to increased emphasis on effectiveness, whereas greater gender equality in 
the broader society should increase the extent to which such equality is evoked as the 
basis for military personnel policy” (307). While the relative weights of these value 
rationales have not been systematically analyzed, it is likely that in today’s environment 
of post 9-11, the reconstruction of Iraq and the war on terrorism, an increased emphasis 
on military effectiveness seems probable.
Similar to the two value rationales discussed above. Peach (1996), in “Gender 
Ideology in the Ethics of Women in Combat,” outlines three distinct ethical perspectives.
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the ethic of accountability, the ethic of justice, and the ethic of care. UTiile the ethic of 
care does not seem to apply to this study’s participants, the ethic of accountability and the 
ethic of justice are relevant to the debate on women in combat. (The ethic of care orient 
women more toward peace than war and “rather than seeking to increase their 
participation in the military, such peace advocates conclude, women should devote their 
distinctive moral resources to developing nonviolent alternatives to war" (Peach 1996, 
178)). The ethic of accountability emphasizes that military leaders “have a special 
responsibility for the safety and protection of their troops as well as the efficient and 
effective accomplishment of the military mission” (Peach 1996, 164). For those opposed 
to women in combat roles, the accountability ethic assumes that women in combat roles 
will degrade military efficiency, effectiveness, and troop safety. “The major rationales 
posited by the ethic of accountability fail to justify maintaining the current restrictions on 
women’s participation in combat roles and are primarily based on gender ideology rather 
than demonstrated evidence of women’s inability to perform combat duties effectively” 
(Peach 1996, 174). The ethic of justice supports the argument to increase women’s 
participation in combat and is based on principles of equal rights and responsibilities, 
equal protection of the laws and basic fairness (Peach 1996, 174). Peach writes that the 
failure of the justice ethic is that it treats women as though they were essentially the same 
as men and, therefore, “does not fully consider the differences among women and the 
implications of the combat issue for women inside and outside the military” (Peach 1996, 
177h
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Peach believes a different ethical approach needs to be developed arguing, that
these ethical positions are “linked to gender-biased assumptions about the nature of men
and women in relation to war and eombat” (180). She proposes an ethie committed to the
idea of gender neutrality and she highlights how the ethics of accountability and justice
can contribute to this approach.
The accountability ethic’s concern for combat effectiveness and for the protection 
and safety of troops highlights the importance of requiring both men and women 
to demonstrate their combat capabilities in accordance with rigorous physical and 
psychological tests. The justice ethic’s concern with equal opportunity and 
fairness stresses the importance in a democratic society of affording women as 
well as men the opportunity to prove themselves capable of satisfactorily 
performing combat assignments (Peach 1996, 181).
Peach (1996) also writes “where relevant, factors such as physical strength, psychological
fortitude, bonding, troop eohesiveness, and the effect of pregnancy and maternity on
military effectiveness and efficiency must be assessed on the basis of gender-neutral
standards” (181). While Binkin and Bach, as discussed earlier, recommended setting up
an experimental program for each military service to test the effects women would have
on combat units, Peach (1996) suggests that “positive experience with women in
traditionally all male fields, such as police forces, that require skills similar to those used
in combat supports the conclusion that many women are capable of carrying out
numerous types of combat assignments” (185).
While the debate continues about whether women should or should not be
allowed to serve in combat units, many of the women in the military are also undecided.
In “Feminism and the Exclusion of Army Women from Combat”, Miller (1998) writes,
Most women soldiers do support opening the combat arms to women, however 
only on a volunteer basis and with physical qualifications for those jobs. Most
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Army women are not interested in serving in the combat arms, and roughly half 
do not believe they would be capable of doing so. A gap exists, then, between 
activists who deny differences between men and women and seek to bring 
women’s policy in line with men, and women soldiers who support greater 
opportunities for women but who do not perceive most women as equally 
qualified for the combat arms as men (33).
In her study, Miller (1998) offers a compromise that opens combat roles to women on a
voluntary basis with physical screening tests in place to ensure qualified men and women
are admitted (35). She makes the argument that “although the voluntary option is still a
double standard for men and women, it is much less so than the status quo, and it would
make the feminist point that not all women are unfit for jobs that demand upper-body
strength, and not all men are qualified simply because they are men” (Miller 1998, 35).
Miller (1998) found that “Army women tend to not believe that women could do
anything men can do if only they were socialized differently.. . .They think assignments
should be determined by women’s choice, ability, and military need, not by gender” (51).
Women officers are more likely to support women in combat units than enlisted women.
“For officers, ‘combat roles’ are generally extensions of skills they already employ:
leadership of a structure that includes combat units or piloting in offensive missions as
opposed to defensive or support roles” (Miller 1998, 54). At the enlisted level, women in
combat roles would have to be trained in new tasks that are more physically demanding
than their present occupations (Miller 1998, 54).
It is quickly evident that the debate concerning the assignment of women to
combat units is complex. This study does not attempt to solve this debate and this brief
discussion was presented in order to better describe the environment and the context in
which these female commanders have pursued their military careers. As Billie Mitchell
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(1996) wrote in “The Creation of Army Oflicers and the Gender Lie,” “in the hullabaloo
over women in combat, and in the disagreements between women soldiers and feminists,
precious little discussion of consequence has been devoted to the military women
themselves, why they made the choices they made, and how they cope” (37-38). This
study focuses on a specific group of military women, those who command at battalion
and brigade levels and examines, in part, the strategies and adaptations they developed to
cope in a military environment.
Concept of Gendered Institutions
The concept that the Army is a gendered institution is an applicable construct and
adds another perspective of analysis to this study. In her article, “New Research on
Gendered Political Institutions”, Sally J. Kenney (1996) explores the gendered culture of
institutions by reconceptualizing gender as a category of analysis. She cites Acker (1992)
who writes, “the term ‘gendered institutions’ means that gender is present in the
processes, practices, images and ideologies, and distributions of power in various sectors
of social life” (567). Kenney (1996) defines gender as first meaning that everyone within
institutions has a gender. There is no universal category for professions or job titles and,
in her review of texts, she finds
that women report clearly being seen and treated as women holders of a role.
Work is part of the construction of masculinity for many workers. Jobs, as well 
as institutions, have gender, and institutions will mount enormous efforts to 
contain threats to the gendered identity of the institution” (455).
Second, she reports the experience of members within an organization will vary
according to gender. “Not only will women most likely have fewer opportunities than
men, but their perceptions of the obstacles and the existence of circumstances will vary
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by gender” (456). Finally, she asserts that institutions “produce, reproduce, and subvert
gender” (456). Gender does not represent some biological category for women but is
socially constructed and changed arbitrarily. Kenney writes,
To say that an institution is gendered, then, is to recognize that constructions of 
masculinity and femininity are intertwined in the daily culture of an institution 
rather than existing out in society or fixed within individuals which they then 
bring whole to the institution” (456).
She cites McGlen and Sarkees who found that competent women were often regendered
as men. “By recoding the competent woman as an honorary male, the job and the
qualities associated with it remain gendered” (458). It will be interesting to see if many
female commanders report being regendered as men. The Army as a gendered institution
means that the men and women experience the organization differently. While this study
is narrow in scope and not designed to be comparative, the experiences of these female
commanders will provide an idea of what it means to be a woman in a masculine
organization characterized by a warfighting mission.
Structural Implications of Military Policy
Commanders face another structural challenge with the Secretary of Defense
direct eombat definition and assignment rule. This rule has a direct impact on the policy
of the assignment of women in the military. “Under this rule, women cannot be assigned
to units below the brigade level whose primary mission is ground combat” (WREI 1997,
7). This policy also restricts women from being assigned to units
Where the service Secretary attests that the costs of appropriate berthing and 
privacy arrangements are prohibitive; units and positions are doctrinally required 
to physically collocate and remain with direct ground combat units that are closed 
to women; where units are engaged in long-range reconnaissance operations and
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Special Operations Forces missions; and where job-related physical requirements 
exclude the vast majority of women service members” (WREI 1997, 7).
Often arbitrary, opportunities for women are hampered by this policy. For example,
women aviators may fly in support of units as part of an aviation brigade. They cannot,
however, do the same job in support of a combat battalion.
In a Government Account Report (Rabkin 1999), “Gender Issues - Trends in the
Occupational Distribution of Military Women,” the data suggests that military women are
beginning to enter more nontraditional fields (1). Discussing occupations of women in
the military, the report indicated a significant number of officers continued to be
concentrated in the health care, administration (includes occupations in general
administration, manpower and personnel, comptrollers, data processing, information,
police, and morale and welfare), and supply occupations (3). The report found that while
most military occupation and career fields were open to women, it identified two
institutional barriers that limited women going into these occupations. The first barrier
affects the women in this study as it applies to officer and enlisted women while the
second only applies to enlisted women. “First, because of Department of Defense (DOD)
and service policies, some units are closed to women even thought the units may include
occupations that are open to women”. In the Army, some occupations may be open to
women, but the number of women in those occupations is limited because many of the
job slots are in male-only units (Rabkin 1999, 2). Army women can serve in 97 percent
of officer career fields but can serve in less than 70 percent of the job slots because the
remaining slots are in combat units or in units that collocate with combat units. On the
basis of DOD and Army policy, women cannot serve in ground combat units or units
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collocated with such units, even though they may be qualified to fill particular 
occupations in those units (Rabkin 1999, 7). (The second barrier is the Armed Services 
Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test, used to match enlisted personnel to 
occupations, which contains sections that are based on exposure to a subject instead of 
aptitude.)
What is the impact of being able to serve in less than 70 percent of the job slots 
because they are in male only units? As Rand (1997) also reports, 67 percent of the 
Army’s positions are open to women. This also means that 33 percent of the Army’s 
positions are closed to women. “Restricting women from more than a third of Army 
positions [has] had the natural consequences of limiting their career advancement. The 
army’s most senior leaders traditionally come from these three branches” [Infantry, 
Armor, and Field Artillery] (Armv Times, Nov 10, 1997, 19). How have the women in 
this study dealt with these “natural consequences”?
Social Conformitv and the Masculine-Warrior Paradigm
In her article, “Military Culture; Change and Continuity,” Karen Dunivin (1994) 
characterizes military culture by its combat, masculine-warrior paradigm; the military’s 
core activity is combat and the masculine-warrior image speaks to a culture shaped by 
men (533). She defines paradigm as “the underlying collection of broad, often unstated 
assumptions, beliefs, and attitudes that shape our ideal types and models” (532). In the 
context of this masculine-warrior paradigm, the issue of social conformity illustrates the 
potential difficulty that many women face in their drive to achieve command. Ranter 
(1977) writes, “It is not news that social conformity is important in managerial careers.
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There is ample evidence from organizational studies that leaders in a variety o f situations 
are likely to show preferences for socially similar subordinates and help them get ahead” 
(47-48). Dana Priest’s (1997) Washington Post article, “Few Women Get Generals’ Top 
Jobs,” illustrates this preference for similarity. She points out that generals select as aides 
the person with whom they are most comfortable.. . . “Some say they simply prefer 
someone like themselves” (Priest, AOl). She cites, as an example. Major General David 
H. Ohle, the assistant deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel who chooses someone that he 
believes should be a future general. He selects someone who has similar hobbies. It is 
apparent that being different comes with its own set of challenges. This study will look 
at the challenges that many of these female commanders may have had to face in their 
attempt to perhaps be seen as less different.
Kanter (1977) related uncertainty with social conformity; “conformity pressures 
and the development of exclusive management circles closed to ‘outsiders’ stem from the 
degree of uncertainty surrounding managerial positions” (48). The degree of uncertainty 
is proportionate to the degree of pressure exerted on those who have to rely on each other 
and trust each other, to form homogeneous groups; the greater the uncertainty, the greater 
the pressure to form these groups (Kanter 1977, 49). Most studies have found that 
diversity, or non-homogenous groups, hindered group and organizational performance, 
especially in times of crisis or rapid change, characterized by uncertainty (Bettenhausen 
1991, 356). This discussion on uncertainty and the likely formation of homogeneous 
groups raises the issue of how the women being studied have themselves conformed to 
meet the Army’s social criteria. Within this relationship between uncertainty and
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conformity, it is important to get a good understanding of the standing these women had
in their various units and to discover how they feel they have conformed to the Army’s
social criteria. Did they have the same outlook as their male peers and superiors and if
they did not, how did they “build a feeling of communion” (Kanter 1977, 53).
Another way to consider the issue of social conformity would be to examine the
socialization process of integration. More specifically, the question of how these
commanders “negotiated the acquisition of professional identities in fields where there
are no (or virtually no) established women to serve as models” (Douvan 1976, 10). In
fact, most of these women commanders have become the models, either by choice or
default, for the women next in line who are pursuing Army careers. Douvan (1976)
proposes three different adaptation techniques: first, “becoming just like the dominant
group and abandoning one’s past”, second, “deprofessionalization, the abandonment or
de-emphasis of competence”, and third, a “continuing effort to integrate professionalism
and feminine goals” (11). It may be that all professional women have tried these various
adaptation techniques before settling on one that “fits” and one may be more comfortable
than another. In her discussion of these adaptations Douvan (1976) writes.
The difference is one of the degree and consistency with which a particular 
element is emphasized. Is there a professional woman alive who has not at one 
time or another enjoyed being treated as one of the boys or as the little princess? 
The main difference between those who settle solidly on one or the other element 
in the duality and those who try continuously for integration may be omnipotence- 
the desire to be all things and have all the rewards. Or it may be the degree to 
which surprise and a gaming attitude are valued. The integrator wants to use 
rough language and dirty words (just like her ‘boyish’ colleagues)” but enjoys the 
impact that’s added by virtue of her also being a delicate, womanly woman” (14).
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Regardless of the rationale, the integration adaptation is difficult “for it requires a 
willingness to remain forever marginal, to live between and partake in two realities 
without negating or invalidating either of them” (14). While the individual who chooses 
professional identification with the organization has male superiors and peers as models, 
Douvan believes that it is the integrator who needs a model to see that what she wants to 
achieve can in fact be done. If integrating one’s duality was the goal, who would have 
been the model for some of these women, especially when they were the first to hold 
their positions? It is a goal of this study to see how the participants have utilized these 
adaptation techniques. It is likely that most of these commanders did not use the 
adaptation that de-emphasized their professional goals or style as it runs counter to their 
achievements in the Army environment.
Organization-Individual Fit
Another way to understand how these commanders flourished in a military, male- 
dominated environment is to consider that they self-selected the organization because 
they already “fit in”. It wasn’t necessarily a matter of trying to fit because they already 
felt comfortable with a military-type environment. One relevant study focusing on a 
domain of human characteristics “that are relevant to the way a person relates to a 
particular work setting, that is, whether individual characteristics match characteristics of 
the organization” examined the possibilities for assessing the match between people’s 
cultural preferences and organizational culture during selection processes” (Van Vianen 
2000, I). Van Vianen (2000) refers to an attraction-selection-attrition (ASA) framework 
that “describes the mechanism of mutual adaptation between the person and the
51
organization” (2). People are not just randomly assigned to organizations, but they 
choose organizations for themselves. This selection process includes several steps. First, 
organizations are attractive to people based on their judgment of the congruence between 
the characteristics of the organization and their own characteristics. A second step 
matches the people to the organization by hiring those individuals who have the attributes 
the organization desires. Once these people have become part of the organization and 
discover they do not fit their work environment, they normally leave the organization 
(Van Vianen 2000, 3). “In short, do people’s characteristics need to match the shared 
perceptions of others about organizational characteristics or do they need to match other 
people’s characteristics in the organization?” (Van Vianen 2000, 3). “Attraction- 
Selection-Attrition theory assumes that individuals’ characteristics are the basic 
ingredients of existing organizational culture. This implies that the match between 
individuals and the organizations they select also should refer to the match between 
individuals’ characteristics and the characteristics of others in the organization.” (Van 
Vianen 2000, 16). How similar were the characteristics of these female commanders to 
the characteristics of the others in the organization? If not similar, what occurred to 
modify or change these characteristics?
Organizational Change
As stated earlier, this study focuses on women who have chosen the Army as a 
career and who have continued to progress through its hierarchy, achieving command at 
battalion and brigade levels. It considers change, individual change and changes to the 
organization that may have occurred during this process of integration. It examines the
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changes that women may have made as they pursued their career path to command, and 
the changes the institution may have made during this pursuit. Some of these changes 
may be illustrated by the strategies these women developed to cope, adapt, and better fit 
in a predominantly male organization. Institutional changes are considered within the 
context of an organization that has not undergone fundamental change. For fundamental 
change to occur in the military, the Army organization would have to undergo drastic 
change. While the integration of women has had an effect on the organization, it has not 
changed the organization in a fundamental way. This study examines the relationship 
between organizational culture and change and considers organizational change using 
Schein"s elaboration of Lewin’s change model of unfreezing, reframing, and reffeezing. 
This model speaks to how individuals may change in an organization and, in turn, allows 
for some speculation on how an organization might change. While it is more difficult to 
get at real organizational change, it seems appropriate to consider how the organization 
may have been affected by individual change within the organization and to further 
examine some of these changes.
An institution’s ability to make changes is strongly influenced by its culture. Ott 
(1989) writes that “a strong organizational culture controls organizational behavior; for 
example, it can block an organization from making changes needed to adapt to a 
changing environment (3). This theory has far reaching implications for this research. If 
the commanders being studied have been strongly influenced by an enduring 
organizational culture, their organizational behavior may now actually impede change in 
the organization. In his discussion on mature organizations, Schein (1992) writes, “if an
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organization has had a long history of success with certain assumptions about itself and 
the environment, it is unlikely to want to challenge or reexamine those assumptions” 
(321).
The Army is not adverse to changes, especially if these changes can be made in 
the context of the organization’s basic underlying assumptions. The Army has realized 
the need to adapt to today’s changing global environment with the end of the Cold War, 
the necessity for power projection, and lately, how to best respond to terrorism and post­
war Iraq. The Army has sought ways to transform itself in order to become a more 
responsive and flexible organization. These changes have been difficult, as the basic 
assumptions at the core of the Army’s culture are resistant to change, especially when the 
call for change comes from the external environment that does not share these 
assumptions.
Organizational cultures have deep roots, and they develop over long periods of 
time through complex individual and group mechanisms. Usually they can be 
altered only slowly, through painful learning processes that often are resisted by 
members” (Ott 1989, 87).
Schein (1997) derives his theoretical foundations about change from Kurt Lewin’s
basic change model of unfreezing, cognitive restructuring (or change) and refreezing.
The key, of course, was to see that human change, whether at the individual or 
group level, was a profound psychological dynamic process that involved painful 
unlearning without loss of ego identity and difficult relearning as one cognitively 
attempted to restructure one’s thoughts, perceptions, feelings, and attitudes (4).
Conceptually, unfreezing begins with the belief that the stability of human behavior is
based on a state of equilibrium between a system of driving and restraining forces. For
change to occur in this system, or force field, the driving or restraining forces must be
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altered. In order to drive the equilibrium in the direction of change, it makes more sense 
to remove restraining forces since driving forces are usually already in the system. 
“Unfortunately, restraining forces [are] harder to get at because they [are] often personal 
psychological defenses or group norms embedded in the organizational or community 
culture” (4).
Unfreezing is actually three processes, each necessary to some degree in order for 
change to occur. These processes are disconfirmation, survival anxiety, and overcoming 
learning anxiety (4-5). Schein (1997) believes that all forms of change begin with some 
form of frustration generated by data that disconfirm expectations. This disconfirming 
information is not sufficient in itself for change to occur. In order to actually effect 
change, this disconfirmation must arouse “the feeling [survival anxiety] that if we 
[individuals in the organization] do not change we will fail to meet our needs or fail to 
achieve some goals or ideals that we have set for ourselves” (4). In order to have this 
feeling, the disconfirming information has to be accepted as true and this, in turn, 
generates a second form of anxiety called learning anxiety. The feeling that if  there is an 
admission that something might be wrong with the current way of doing something, 
running the risk of losing self-esteem, effectiveness and “maybe even identity” generates 
learning anxiety.
Learning anxiety is the fundamental restraining force, which can go up in direct 
proportion to the amount of disconfirmation, leading to the maintenance of the 
equilibrium by defensive avoidance of the disconfirming information. It is the 
dealing with learning anxiety, then, that is the key to producing change (5).
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Schein (1997) argues that to counter the restraining force of learning anxiety, we need to 
create a feeling of psychological safety, which allows us to feel the survival anxiety that 
motivates change.
Once an individual is motivated and prepared to learn, a process of cognitive 
restructuring takes place. This occurs when new information effects semantic 
redefinition, cognitive broadening, and/or new standards of judgment or evaluation (6). 
The most basic mechanism used in the process of cognitive restructuring is being able to 
see and accept something from a perspective that is different from your own. Schein 
(1997) writes,
Readers who are familiar with socialization processes in families, schools, 
companies, religious movements, and other organizational settings will readily 
recognize this mechanism as the key to apprenticeships, to ‘big brother’ 
programs, to the concept of ‘mentoring’ and to the various more fonnal group 
based indoctrination programs that organizations use. The mentor or big brother 
is often both a source of psychological safety and the role model to facilitate 
cognitive redefinition (7).
Identifying with role models or mentors may accelerate the process of cognitive
restructuring but may pose problems if the changes do not fit the “learner’s” total
personality. Once this restructuring is complete, some form of refreezing must occur to
ensure the change remains stable. “The main point about refreezing is that the new
behavior must be to some degree congruent with the rest of the behavior and personality
of the learner or it will simply set off new rounds of disconfirmation that often lead to
unlearning the very thing one has learned” (8).
Schein’s elaboration of Lewin’s change model can be applied to the Army and its
members and may help to explain some of the difficulties women have encountered in the
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organization. The Army is a hierarchical organization made up of individual leaders who 
share the basic underlying assumptions that define its culture and “way of doing” 
business. Even if the Army, as an organization of individuals, is motivated to change 
itself or to make changes, the process is complex and cumbersome. Once decisions to 
change have been made, however, as a hierarchical organization, these changes can be 
carried out efficiently using the Army’s military chain of command. In general, in order 
for the individuals in the Army to be motivated to change, they must accept that 
something is wrong. As an example, before there could possibly be a change in 
assignment policy, i.e. assign by ability and not gender, the Army’s leaders would have to 
experience enough anxiety and disconfirmation about current policy to seek an 
alternative. This disconfirming information is not sufficient in itself for change to occur. 
In order to actually effect change, this disconfirmation must arouse “the feeling [survival 
anxiety] that if the individuals in the Army do not change, the organization will fail to 
achieve its goals. In order to have this feeling, there has to be an acceptance that the 
disconfirming information is true and this acceptance, in turn, generates a second form of 
anxiety called learning anxiety. The feeling that if  the individuals in the Army admit that 
something might be wrong with their way of doing something, running the risk of losing 
organizational effectiveness and maybe even organizational identity generates learning 
anxiety. Different perspectives and options would provide the psychological safety 
required to overcome the organization’s “learning anxiety.” Since there is no real 
disconfirming information to arouse the Army, as an organization of individuals, to 
experience survival anxiety, the change process never really begins. There is no real
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impetus for the organization to change. The only individuals who seem likely to be 
affected by the change process are the women who are entering the organization. The 
process of unfreezing, cognitive restructuring, and refreezing for these women seems 
logical, especially as they begin to learn the basic underlying assumptions that define the 
organization’s culture. Any problems these women may experience with dissonance 
might be attributed to the selection of a role model who does not necessarily fit the 
"learner’s" total personality. It seems logical that the newly arrived woman may change 
to meet the expectations of her mentor or role model.
In order for an organization to change, it has to need to learn new ways to do 
things. The change effort is an organizational learning process and it is the leader who 
must drive this process. In an article on organizational learning, Schein (1993) writes 
that before this learning takes place, “leaders must learn something new. Before anyone 
else changes, leaders must overcome their own cultural assumptions and perceive new 
ways of doing things and new contexts in which to do them. They must acknowledge 
and deal with their own anxiety before they can appreciate and deal with the anxieties of 
others. They cannot obtain insights into the limitations of their organizational cultures 
unless they expose themselves to other cultures—national, occupational, and 
organizational” (90). Schein (1993) recommends developing a parallel structure to work 
through the challenges associated with change. “The details of how this works will be 
different for every organization. But the essential dynamics of anxiety, effects of 
organizational culture, and needs for psychological safety during the learning process are 
likely to be universal and cannot be ignored” (91). This very discussion points to the
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difficulty and tremendous effort required for any learning/change process. It diagrams a
very difficult task for a large, mature organization. Just making changes to upgrade
weapons systems in the Army takes years, one can imagine the effort to change or learn
new ways to utilize all personnel based on this discussion.
An organization’s culture and the mechanisms to change that culture evolve in
concert with the growth, mid-life and maturity stages that Schein (1992) uses to
characterize the evolution of organizations.
At different stages in the evolution of a given organization’s culture, different 
possibilities for change arise because of the particular function that culture plays 
at each developmental stage. To change a culture requires a change to the 
organization’s basic assumptions which is difficult because it requires possible 
changes to some of the more stable portions of our cognitive structure. Such 
learning is intrinsically difficult because the reexamination of basic assumptions 
temporarily destabilizes our cognitive and interpersonal world, releasing large 
quantities of basic anxiety (22).
Organizations seek to minimize uncertainty and anxiety and appear to be anti-change,
especially when change involves a reexamination of basic assumptions and belief
constracts. Individuals within organizations are comfortable with others who share the
same set of assumptions and this desire for familiarity challenges the change process.
Summarv
The theoretical framework presented in this chapter provides a means to examine 
the female commanders who are at the center of this study. The framework considers 
ideas that fall into two broad categories, the individual and the environment. The 
individual category included several subcategories; proportional representation and 
tokenism, stereotyping, sex role behavior and the role of sponsorship/mentorship. The 
environment category helped establish the context in which these commanders operated
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and included organizational and military culture, women in the Army and different 
perspectives on women in combat, the concept of gendered institutions, the structural 
implications of military policies, how an organizational paradigm may foster social 
conformity, and the idea of organization and individual “fit.” Organizational change is 
discussed in terms of Schein’s elaboration of Lewin’s change model. This model can be 
used as a way to consider how the individual, male and female, as well as how the 
organization might change. This dynamic process of change also relates to 
organizational culture. If basic underlying assumptions, held by organization members, 
are at the core of an organization and help to define the organization, then getting at these 
basic assumptions may have an effect on the organization. This study examines female 
commanders in the Army and considers changes both at the individual and organizational 






This study’s focus is on women who have commanded in the Army at battalion 
and brigade level. This study examines these women as they pursued a career path that 
led to command at battalion and brigade level and considers the strategies these women 
developed to cope, adapt, and fit better in a predominantly male organization during a 
process of integration. The change model (Lewin and Schein), discussed in the previous 
chapter, is also used as a way to understand how the individual, both male and female, as 
well as how the organization might change. For the purpose of this study, a qualitative 
research strategy was primarily used.
Most of the evidence for this study is drawn from interviews conducted with 
commanders in all three branches of the Army; combat arms, combat support, and 
combat service support. Other sources of information are also used (e.g. personnel 
reports and Army surveys), but the primary research source is interview data and the 
triangulation of those data. “Investigator triangulation consists o f using multiple rather 
than single observers of the same object” (Berg 1995, 5). Each individual interviewed 
offered a different line of sight directed toward the organization and the individual self. 
By combining these lines of sight, one was able to obtain a more complete picture of the
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reality that existed, both within the individual and the organization, as well as the
identification of the theoretical concepts that were applicable. This research strategy
relied on the observations of individuals who had entered the Army organization and had
progressed through its hierarchy achieving positions of command at battalion, brigade
and higher levels. The analysis of these observations followed the grounded theory
approach of Glaser and Strauss (1967) as described by Berg (1995) in Qualitative
Research Methods for the Social Sciences.
After the interviews are completed, however, researchers must closely examine 
potential patterns to see what findings actually emerge directly from the data 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Schatzman & Strauss, 1973). Such grounded findings, 
emerging from the data themselves, are frequently among the most interesting and 
important results obtained during research, even though they may have gone 
unnoticed during the data collecting phase (Berg 1995, 62).
This continuous system of observation, theorizing, reobservation, retheorizing
characterizes the process of discovery used in this study.
Purposive Sample
This research used purposive sampling. “When developing a purposive sample, 
researchers use their special knowledge or expertise about some group to select subjects 
who represent this population” (Berg 1995, 179). Since the focus of this study was on 
battalion and brigade female commanders, women who had commanded, or were going 
to command, were selected for interviews. (One woman interviewed had been 
considered for command and not selected around the time of her interview. Although not 
selected to command, she provided valuable insight to this study.)
To ensure a diverse sample, female commanders of different ranks and branches 
were sought. These commanders needed to be of varying ranks and from one of the three
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branch categories, combat arms, combat support, and combat service support. Using a 
network of active duty officers and government service workers, female commanders 
were identified and contacted. Individual acquaintances in command were also called 
and asked to participate in the study. These individuals often recommended and provided 
access to other potential study participants. Since the researcher lived in Germany, 
women commanding in Germany were considered first. Seven female officers were 
interviewed in Germany. During this timeframe, the researcher had the opportunity to go 
to Washington, D.C. and was able to interview several high-ranking females at the 
Pentagon and in the immediate area. Using the network of active duty acquaintances and 
subsequent recommendations, five study participants were identified and interviewed. 
Following these interviews, several briefer, more focused follow-on interviews were 
conducted. These interviews were used to ask specific questions related to organizational 
and individual change. Two female commanders who had expressed an interest and 
willingness to participate in the study were contacted in these follow-on interviews.
The men in the study were selected in a similar manner. Commanders who were 
commanding, due to command, or had commanded combat arms units were selected for 
interviews. These men were sought in order to get an idea about their career paths and 
experiences with women in the Army. Since the focus of this study was on female 
commanders, only a few men were selected with the purpose of examining their 
experiences along side the experiences of the female participants in the study. The 
researcher was acquainted with each commander, which facilitated a frank discussion. 
Two commanders were interviewed in Germany and one was interviewed in Virginia
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during the researcher’s trip to Washington, D.C. Another male commander participated 
in a follow-on interview in the same manner as the women discussed above.
These women had been in the Army at least 20 years and had continued to 
progress through the Army’s hierarchy. Twelve women of varying rank, branch, and 
commissioning sources were interviewed along with three men, also commanders at 
battalion level and higher. The women are representative of the three major branch 
categories, combat arms, combat support, and combat service support. The men were all 
members of the combat arms and had been in units closed to women (Armored Cavalry 
and Infantry). To ensure confidentiality, pseudonyms were randomly assigned to each 
officer from A through R.
The goal for this purposive sample was to achieve a varied assortment of branches 
(combat arms, combat support, and combat service support), rank (from General officer 
(4-star) to lieutenant colonel), and commissioning sources (Women’s Army Corps 
(WAC), Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC), and the United States Military 
Academy (at West Point)). While not designed as a longitudinal study, participants’ 
careers varied from more than 36 years to 20 years. These differences in time in the 
Army allude to distinct career experiences and perspectives. This variety, in turn, 
strengthens the research strategy of investigator triangulation. A finding would have 
more credence as these separate lines of sight converge and reveal specific events or 
circumstances that are similar. This study was limited in that it focused on female 
officers who had the experience of commanding at battalion and brigade levels. Studies 
of officers who were not selected for command, as well as studies of enlisted women
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would add to the findings of this study and give the reader a much broader view of the 
strategies women in general used as they progressed through their Army careers. This 
study assumes that women had to change as they were integrated into the masculine, 
hierarchical organization of the Army. This research design is not capable of capturing 
the degree of change since it lacks a clear picture of participants “before” integration; a 
longitudinal study that observed these women over time would have been a more 
appropriate, albeit a much longer-term endeavor. What makes this study interesting is its 
emphasis on the strategies these women developed to cope, adapt, and succeed.
Six of the study’s participants entered the Army via the Women’s Army Corps 
(WAC), Officers D, E, F, G, J, and N. Within this group, there was also a time 
differential between women which allowed for a somewhat different perspective. A few 
women had spent more time as members of the Women’s Army Corps than others before 
legislation disestablished the Corps and permanently assigned women to the Regular 
Army. These women seemed to have selected a military career more as an afterthought 
or on a whim. Officers E and J had been married to men in the Army and needed 
employment while their husbands completed their military obligations. Officers D and G 
did not want to pursue the career fields they had selected in college and entrance into the 
Army gave them an exciting option. Officer F enlisted in order to leave a small town and 
to see the world. She was later commissioned through ROTC.
Officers A, C, L, M, and Q participated in Reserve Officers Training Corps 
programs and entered the Army during the period from 1979 to 1981. Officers B, H, and 
O received their commissions from the United States Military Academy in 1980 and
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1981. The reasons for joining the Army varied from a choice between taking a physical 
education class and participating in ROTC to a means of paying for school. Only one 
woman. Officer L reported that she had always wanted to be an Army officer. Five of 
these eight women had fathers who had spent considerable time in the military.
While the focus of this study has been on women commanders and their 
experiences, the several men interviewed also provided another perspective on women in 
the military. Of these men, Officers I, K, P, and R, ranking from General to lieutenant 
colonel, three were accessed into the Army through ROTC programs, and one received 
his commission from the United States Military Academy at West Point. These men 
were all members of combat arms branches. Of these four, only one was in a combat 
arms branch that allowed women (although these women could only be assigned to 
certain types of units within the branch) so the exposure to women for these officers was 
limited until they reached organizational levels where women were habitually assigned. 
While their perspectives cannot be generalizeable due to the sample size, their points of 
view offer another line of sight to be used in the analysis of the data.
Following is a brief description of each officer.
Officer A is a lieutenant colonel in a combat support branch. She received her 
commission from an ROTC program in 1979. She commanded a division level battalion. 
She is married with one child. Her husband had a career in the military and is no longer 
on active duty. Her father also had a career in the military.
Officer B is a colonel in a combat arms branch. She received her commission 
from the United States Military Academy in the early eighties. She commanded a
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division level battalion and is currently commanding at brigade level. She is married and 
has no children. Her husband is on active duty has a military career. Her father also had 
a career in the military.
Officer C is a lieutenant colonel in a combat support branch. She received her 
commission from an ROTC program in 1978. She was, as she described, “on the 
borderline of history,” and was initially in the Women’s Army Corps, detailed to her 
branch. Although a member of the Women’s Army Corps, she did not attend the WAC 
basic course and participated, instead, in an integrated basic course. She commanded a 
corps level battalion. She is single. Her father had a career in the military.
Officer D is a colonel in a combat support branch. She received a direct 
commission from the Women’s Army Corps in 1978. She commanded a battalion at 
corps level. She is single.
Officer E is a general officer in a combat service support branch. She received a 
direct commission from the Women’s Army Corps in the late sixties. She held positions 
of increasing responsibility working at all levels in the military organization from 
division to Army level. She is married and has no children. Her husband had a career in 
the military.
Officer F is a promotable lieutenant colonel in a combat support branch. She 
enlisted in the Woman’s Army Corps and received her commission through an ROTC 
program in 1979. She commanded a battalion at division level. After this interview, she 
went on to command a brigade. She is single.
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Officer G is a general officer in a combat support branch. She received a direct 
commission from the Women’s Army Corps in 1975. She is married with no children.
Her husband also had a career in the military and is no longer on active duty.
Officer H is a lieutenant colonel in a combat arms branch. She received her 
commission from the United States Military Academy in the early eighties. She 
commanded a battalion at corps level. After this interview, she went on to command a 
brigade. She is single. Her father had a career in the military.
Officer 1 is a male lieutenant colonel in a combat arms branch. He received his 
commission from the United States Military Academy in 1981. He commanded a 
battalion at corps level. He is married with children.
Officer J is a colonel in a combat service support branch. She received a direct 
commission from the Women’s Army Corps in 1974. She commanded a battalion at 
division level and also a brigade equivalent organization at division level. She is single. 
Her father had a career in the military.
Officer K is a male colonel in a combat arms branch. He received his commission 
from an ROTC program in 1979. He commanded a battalion at division level and is 
currently commanding a training brigade. He is married with children. His father had a 
career in the military.
Officer L is a lieutenant colonel in a combat support branch. She received her 
commission from an ROTC program in 1982. At the time of the interview she was 
preparing to begin command of a battalion at corps level. She is married with no 
children. Her husband is also on active duty.
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Officer M is a lieutenant colonel in a combat service support branch. She 
received her commission from an ROTC program in 1980. She commanded a battalion 
at corps level. She is married with no children. Her father had a career in the military 
and her husband is also on active duty.
Officer N is a colonel in a combat support branch. She received a direct 
commission from the Women’s Army Corps in 1976. She commanded a battalion at 
division level. She was commanding a brigade at the time of her interview. She is 
single.
Officer O was a lieutenant colonel in a combat service support branch. She 
received her commission from the United States Military Academy in 1980. She 
commanded a battalion at corps level. She is single.
Officer P is a male lieutenant colonel in a combat arms branch. He received his 
commission from an ROTC program in 1980. He commanded a squadron at division 
level. He is married with children. His father had a career in the military.
Officer Q is a lieutenant colonel in a combat support branch. She received her 
commission from an ROTC program in 1980. At the time of the interview, she had just 
discovered that she had not been selected for command. She is married with one child. 
Her husband is also on active duty.
Officer R is a retired male four star general in a combat arms branch. He received 
his commission from an ROTC program in the early sixties. He commanded at all levels, 
from battalion level to combatant command. He is married with children.
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C ETC CS ROTC Father Single 0
D COE CS WAC Single 0
E MG CSS WAC Husband Married 0
F ETC(F) CS ROTC Single 0
G BG CS WAC Husband Married 0
H ETC CA USMA Father Single 0
I (Male) ETC CA USMA Married 2
J COE CSS WAC Father Single 0
K (Male) COL CA ROTC Father Married 3
L ETC CS ROTC Husband Married 0




N COE CS WAC Single 0
O ETC CSS USMA Single 0
P (Male) ETC CA ROTC Father Married 2
Q ETC CS ROTC Husband Married 1
R (Male) GEN CA ROTC Married 2
+ TTC -  Lieutenant Colonel, LTC(P) -  Lieutenant Colonel (Promotable),COL -  
Colonel, BG -  Brigadier General, MG -  Major General, GEN -  General (four star) 
# CA -  Combat Arms, CS -  Combat Support, CSS — Combat Service Support
This sample is fairly senior, necessarily so since it focused on commanders, and it 
generally takes 20 years to develop or “grow” a commander. The most senior 
participants were members of the Women’s Army Corps and directly involved with the 
initial integration of women into the Regular Army. Augmenting these face-to-face
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interviews were the more focused follow on interviews that focused on specific questions 
developed after the analysis of the first interviews. These interviews included one 
woman currently serving as a brigade commander, and another who had retired after 
battalion command. The more focused follow on interview format also included one 
male combat arms brigade commander.
Method of Inquiry: Semi Structured Interview
The primary method of inquiry for this research was in depth interviews, 
“conversation with a purpose” (Berg, 1995, 29). In this case, semi-structured interviews 
were used. The vehicle for these interviews was each individual’s career path. A typical 
career path would be as follows; officer basic course (professional education); platoon 
leader and company executive officer (rank of second and first lieutenant); Combined 
Arms Staff Services School (CAS3), company commander and/or battalion staff officer 
(SI (personnel)/S4 (logistics), rank of captain); advanced course, ROTC, Reserves, 
higher level staff assignment (i.e., working at the Pentagon)(rank of captain/major); 
Command and General Staff Officers’ Course (CGSC); primary staff officer (S3 
(operations)/battalion executive officer, rank of major); higher level command 
assignment (rank of major/lieutenant colonel); battalion command (rank of lieutenant 
colonel); higher level command assignment (corps, training, or unified/combatant 
command level) (lieutenant colonel/colonel); war college, brigade command (colonel). 
Following brigade command, there are many different paths that lead to further 
promotions. Most combat arms officers pursue assignments that lead to division 
command. These jobs are not accessible to women and rarely available to those men who
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are not combat arms officers. Normally the assistant division command positions for 
operations and for support are prerequisites for division command. Division command 
leads to corps command and higher. While careers may vary, company command and 
assignment as battalion operations officer (S3) or battalion executive officer (XO) are 
considered “branch qualifying” jobs and are prerequisites for battalion command. To 
achieve brigade command, one must have successfully commanded at battalion level.
Standard questions were developed and were asked of each interviewee in a 
systematic way (see interview questions in Appendix B). Interview questions were 
initially developed after first constructing certain relevant categories from the theoretical 
framework found in Chapter 2. These categories included questions about the 
organization and questions about each person as an individual in the organization. 
Organizational questions considered the organization’s military culture and change, 
perspectives on women in combat, the concept of gendered institutions (e.g., “Did they 
think certain jobs were female jobs?”), the implications of the direct combat rule, social 
conformity, and organizational fit. Individual questions considered proportional 
representation or tokenism (e.g., “Were you often the only woman in an organization and 
how did that affect your behavior?”), stereotyping, sex role behavior, and mentorship. 
Questions were crafted to get at these categories using each individual’s career path as a 
vehicle to get to the relevant categories and as a means to explore other areas about the 
organization and relationships within a particular organization or with other individuals. 
This semi structured interview format allowed for richer and denser descriptions of life 
within the organization.
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These interviews ranged from at least an hour to over five hours. Often the length 
of interview time was determined by the schedule and availability of the interviewee.
The general officers normally had very demanding schedules and could only allot about 
one hour of time for interviews. These interviews were usually conducted in the 
interviewee’s office or at a location of convenience selected by the person being 
interviewed. All interviews were confidential and pseudonyms were assigned to protect 
each woman’s identity. Pseudonyms were randomly assigned: Officer A, Officer B, etc. 
Statements made by male officers are also identified as male upon presentation. For 
example, “One male. Officer C, expressed his opinion about women in the following 
manner.” All interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. The interview 
evaluations came from these transcripts.
Evaluation
Initially, the interviews were considered in terms of the categories developed 
using the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2 and discussed above. By 
categorizing what the study participants had said, and by working and thinking about this 
data, using the continuous process of observing, theorizing, reobservation, retheorizing, 
questions and even some reasonable answers and themes began to emerge.
In many cases, emerging strategies contained parts related to findings in tokenism 
and sex role behavior, and more generally in the areas of social conformity and gendered 
institutions. Descriptions of participants’ experiences revealed that the mandated 
integration of women into the Army had affected the organization as well as the 
individuals, male and female, within the organization.
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One unexpected theme centered on the relationships that developed between the 
women coming into the organization and the men of the organization. One of the study’s 
original premises was that the organization would remain unchanged. Change in these 
discussions refers more to something happening to the individuals within the organization 
rather than having something fundamentally change. Once women began working face 
to face with men, their demonstrated performance seemed to change the opinions of these 
men. As individual relationships developed, women were able to demonstrate that “they 
had what it takes,” and were subsequently accepted by the men, whose beliefs and 
attitudes defined the organizational culture. Schein’s elaboration of Kurt Lewin’s change 
model is used as a means to explain this change process.
Another theme, related to the development of these individual relationships, 
focused on the women’s development of a workable persona. The success of these 
individual relationships relied on the women presenting themselves in a particular way. 
Many of the individual characteristics discovered during the evaluation of the interviews; 
being tough, working harder, maintaining feminine characteristics, pressure to represent 
all women are also relevant to the discussions found in Chapter 2, Theoretical 
Framework.
Another emerging theme that was less clear concerned the concept of gendered 
institutions, regendering, and the idea of organizational fit. The issue in this case dealt 
with the constructions of masculinity and femininity and the determination of where these 
constructions existed. In terms of a gendered institution, the “constructions of 
masculinity and femininity are intertwined in the daily culture of an institution rather than
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existing out in society or fixed within individuals which they then bring whole to the 
institution” (Kenney, 1996, 456). For many of the female participants, the existing 
construct of femininity in the military institution was somehow altered by the actual 
performance of these female commanders in the organization. The idea of constmct 
replacement or construct alteration is also explored. Finally, these individuals often just 
seemed to “fit” the organization as their longevity and progress implied.
Finally, the degree and scope of changes emerged as an important area for further 
evaluation. While changes have occurred, how much have these changes affected the 
organization? What are the possibilities for greater change? Can the organization fully 
integrate women? Under what conditions will greater integration take place? Is 
fundamental change even possible for the Army? These questions address the general 
issue of integrating women into a largely masculine institution that has the responsibility 
of waging and winning the nation’s wars. In light of today’s events and the war in Iraq, 
these questions continue to confound and perplex the population and warrant serious 
consideration.
Researcher’s Perspective
“July 7, 1976, dawned gray and humid, with intermittent rain showers adding 
dampness to an already dreary day. The weather seemed to reflect the mood of the 
Academy as it solemnly pushed through daunting change, and it suited the apprehensive 
demeanor of New Cadets conlfonting an intimidating watershed in their own lines” 
(Janda 2002, 79). I was one of those apprehensive new cadets, seeing New York for the 
first time in my life, having left Hawaii and my family and friends several days earlier.
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On that historic day in 1976,119 women entered the United States Military Academy for 
the first time mandated by legislation passed earlier in 1975. Almost four years later, on 
May 28, 1980, 62 of those original 119 women graduated and were commissioned as 
second lieutenants in the United States Army.
I was commissioned as an officer in the Signal Corps and spent the next sixteen 
years following a typical career path. I spent time as a platoon leader, battalion staff 
officer, and company commander. I was assigned to a university where I was an 
Assistant Professor o f Military Science (ARMS) for several Reserved Officer Training 
Corps (ROTC) programs. There I trained students who wanted to become officers in the 
U.S. Army. I attended the requisite professional schools, the Signal Officers Basic and 
Advanced Courses, and the Combined Arms Staff Services School (CAS3) and I was 
selected for attendance to Command and General Staff College (CGSC). While at 
CGSC, I applied to attend the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) as a follow- 
on course and was accepted. (I was the only female in a class of 52, and the sixth female 
to attend the course.) I worked as a division planner and as part of this assignment, 
planned the first joint peacekeeping exercise conducted in the United States with Russian 
soldiers. I also worked at a brigade level where I was a training and operations officer. I 
deployed to Bosnia for six months prior to my early retirement in 1996. At the time of 
my retirement, I had been in the Army for sixteen years, and had been selected for 
promotion to lieutenant colonel. 1 chose to retire for personal, family reasons.
I believe that my military background has given me a unique perspective from 
which to examine the organizational and individual changes under consideration in this
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study. I believe that many of the study’s participants I interviewed felt they could speak 
to me in an open manner because we shared similar experiences. I also think that my 
career path and progression made me a credible interviewer. I had done many of the 
same jobs they had done and had been in similar situations so there was not a lot of extra 
explanation needed as they described their experiences. While I feel that my military 
experience was a benefit to this study, 1 also had to guard against making assumptions 
based on my own experiences. I had to focus on listening closely to what each 
participant was really saying and ultimately meant, without putting my own experiential 
gloss on their words. Working from interview transcripts was particularly helpful as I 
was able to go over what someone had said several times. My familiarity with the 
organizational language and jargon also helped in the analysis of the interviews and what 
these interviews revealed about the women and the organization. As stated earlier, this 
study considers individual and organizational change. For me, this study has also been 






This study’s focus is on women who have chosen the Army as a career and who 
have continued to progress through its hierarchy, achieving command at battalion and 
brigade levels. The investigation is centered on the strategies these women developed to 
cope, adapt, and better fit in a predominantly male organization during a process of 
integration. While the main focus is on the individual in a military environment, this 
study also considers the impact the individual may have had on the organization, and the 
changes that may have occurred as a result. An understanding of the environment is also 
important to this evaluation as it establishes the organizational context in which these 
individuals operate. The change model (Lewin and Schein) is used as a way to 
understand (and explain) how the individual, both male and female, as well as how the 
organization may have changed.
Using a qualitative research strategy with semi-structured interviews as the 
primary method of inquiry, several interesting themes have emerged from the study’s 
interviews. In order to maintain continuity, these emerging themes will first be discussed 
from an individual perspective and second from an organizational perspective. Schein’s
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elaboration of Lewin’s change model will precede the section on the organizational 
perspective in order to first illustrate how changes may have occurred.
In some cases, these themes relate to the question of individual strategies 
developed to cope, adapt, and better fit in the Army environment. These emerging 
strategies contained parts relating to findings in tokenism and sex role behavior, and more 
generally to discussions in the areas of social conformity and gendered institutions.
Many of the individual characteristics discovered during the evaluation of the interviews 
spoke to the development of a workable persona. These characteristics included being 
tough, working harder, maintaining feminine characteristics, and responding to the 
pressure to represent all women and seem relevant to the discussions found in Chapter 2, 
Theoretical Framework. These characteristics support a workable persona that allows 
these women to progress through the organization. This theme, the development of a 
workable persona, will be discussed later in greater detail.
Descriptions of participants’ experiences revealed that the mandated integration 
of women into the Army seemed to have had an effect on the individuals within the 
organization, in turn, having an impact on the organization itself. (Without the mandate, 
it seems unlikely that the integration of women, at current levels, would have occurred.) 
One unexpected theme centered on the relationships that developed between the women 
coming into the organization and the men of the organization, and the impact of these 
relationships. One of the study’s original premises was that the organization would 
remain unchanged. Change in these discussions refers more to something happening to 
the individuals within the organization rather than a fundamental organizational change.
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Organizational changes are considered within the context of the existing organizational 
framework. Once women began working face to face with men, their demonstrated 
performance seemed to change the opinions of these men. As individual relationships 
developed, women were able to demonstrate that “they had what it takes,” and were 
better accepted by the men, whose beliefs and attitudes help maintain the organization’s 
culture. The development of a workable persona is also related to the development of 
these individual relationships. The success of these individual relationships relied on the 
women presenting themselves in a particular way.
Individual Change
Organizational changes occurred at the individual level through the development 
of personal relationships. These relationships speak to individual change in terms of 
these women applying strategies that helped them cope, adapt, and better fit the 
organization. There was a dynamic relationship between the individuals coming into the 
organization, and the organization itself, represented by the men operating in that 
organization. The women came in and, because they behaved in a certain way, were 
accepted by the men in the organization. This acceptance was incremental because there 
were so few women. As more women came in and demonstrated they were committed 
and competent, the acceptance of women grew; again building on a basis of personal 
interaction and relationships. Individual change is considered in the analysis of the 
strategies used in the development of a workable persona. These strategies include being 
tough, being feminine, working harder, regendering and organizational fit. These 
workable persona characteristics assisted these women as they pursued their careers in
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the Army organization. In some cases, women became more acceptable to the men when 
they were seen as being exceptional, unlike “the rest of the women.” Men in combat 
units did not have the experience of working with women early in their careers. It wasn’t 
until these men moved into jobs that put them working beside women that they were able 
to personally interact and learn for themselves how women worked and contributed to the 
organization.
Workable Persona Characteristics
This section examines the individual adaptations these women utilized as they 
made their way through the masculine hierarchy of the organization. This study found 
several general strategies these women applied in their development of a workable 
persona. These strategies included demonstrating a certain toughness that incorporated 
never crying in public, a willingness to work harder than everyone else, the maintenance 
of a feminine persona, and being true to their “core” selves.
The workable persona characteristics can be related to several concepts presented 
in Chapter Two, Theoretical Framework. The discussions on the socialization process of 
integration, tokenism, and stereotyping and sex role behavior seem especially relevant. 
The socialization process of integration presents an adaptation technique that appears 
applicable to the women in this study. The concepts of stereotyping and sex role 
behavior are relevant to the workable characteristics related to being tough and to being 
feminine. The discussion on tokenism is particularly relevant to the characteristics of 
working harder and feeling the pressure to represent all women. The idea of regendering 
examines the increased acceptability of women who have been designated honorary
81
males. Organizational fit considers the circumstance of women working in a masculine 
institution with limited personal dissonance.
Douvan (1976) proposed three different adaptation techniques in her discourse on 
the socialization process of integration; the first adaptation, “becoming just like the 
dominant group and abandoning one’s past,” the second, “deprofessionalization, the 
abandonment or de-emphasis of competence,” and the third, a “continuing effort to 
integrate professionalism and feminine goals.”
The women in this study did not choose an adaptation technique of 
deprofessionalization characterized by the abandonment or de-emphasis of competence. 
If anything, they worked harder to appear more competent. While several women 
initially adapted by becoming more like the dominant group, in the end, the women in 
this study appeared to pursue the third adaptation technique, a continuing effort to 
integrate professionalism and feminine goals. In her discussion of these adaptations, 
Douvan (1976) writes, “the difference is one of degree and consistency with which a 
particular element is emphasized” (14). The main difference between those who decide 
to focus on one or the other element in the duality, in this case, professionalism or 
feminine goals, and those who try continuously for integration may be the desire to be all 
things and have all rewards. Regardless of the rationale, the integration adaptation is 
difficult “for it requires a willingness to remain forever marginal, to live in between and 
partake in two realities without negating or invalidating either one” (14).
This idea of living in between two realities is best-illustrated using examples of 
these women trying to find their place during social situations. These women were more
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comfortable in their professional roles in the organization than they were in their social
roles outside of the organization.
At the social functions, it is awkward, you know. Especially being in the division 
where all of your peers are guys. You know, who do you associate with? Do you 
do the women thing? Do you feel this is a problem? Do you talk to all the 
women? Or do you talk to all the guys? When I was younger, it kind of bothered 
m e.. .that I would think that I should choose between the women and the guys.
The people I work with or the group of women who 1 had absolutely nothing in 
common with...kids change things. And then at least you have something in 
common with the other moms.
Okay, if you go to somebody’s house for dinner, the wives congregate one place, 
the guys congregate another place, where do you go? Well, I would try to do 
both. I would go and hang out with the guys because they would be talking shop. 
Then I would go hang out with the girls because they were talking stuff. But I 
never felt comfortable doing that.
You are in no man’s land. When 1 go to these functions [military functions] I 
have very little to talk to these women about. I don’t share their same interests. I 
don’t do what they do. [1 feel] much more [comfortable] with the men then 1 do 
with the women.
They [the wives] have never invited me to a coffee here. 1 enjoyed my time with 
the spouses as battalion commander. I tried to get involved here as brigade 
commander. They are uncomfortahle so I am not going to do it...Would I have 
liked to be included with the wives? Yes. Did 1 expect it? No. They don’t know 
how to handle me because I am a woman.
Now 1 have noticed when we have get togethers where the spouses come, I tend to 
gravitate to the men because they are talking work stuff. I am used to talking 
work stuff. 1 went to a baby shower and we were playing this game. I was so 
terrible. I mean I was really bad. I don’t spend enough time away from work is 
what it boils down to. In here from 6 to 8 every day. All day on Saturday. You 
don’t have much time for a social side. I don’t have time to talk anymore. 1 can’t 
talk recipes. That whole side of my life has been set aside, especially in this job. 
This job is very demanding.
Perhaps the discomfort these women experienced in the social situations described above
points to a greater emphasis on the element of professionalism rather than on the element
of feminine goals. These statements present an interesting state of affairs. These women
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were more comfortable with the men they worked with and felt they had more in
common with these men than with the women to whom these men were married. Yet,
most felt an obligation to segregate themselves with the other women at social functions
despite their discomfort. This situation seems to indicate that these women who
command construct their identities within the organization lending support to the premise
that the Army is a gendered institution. The preceding statements also reveal the level of
comfort these women feel in the organizational context as opposed to their distress in a
situation where one would expect them to feel at ease. This sense of comfort may lead to
a sense of belonging and to feelings of greater acceptance. While this feeling of
acceptance seems indicative of organizational changes, it is interesting to note that these
women seem to live on the margins both in and out of the organization. As one study
participant so aptly stated.
You are integrated in a way, but not fully integrated. It is not sort of parallel. It is 
like a helix. At certain points we go in and out. We touch and everything is 
peachy keen and then we diverge. You ask the guys and they say ‘what do you 
expect?’ You are hanging out in an all male organization. Boys will be boys.
You have to be willing to put up with a little bit of abuse. Everybody does.
In spite of this process, most of the women interviewed seemed relatively content with
their situation. While many women felt out of place around the spouses of their
coworkers, one senior woman complained, “I think if there is one fault, it is that they [the
senior leadership] have not learned how to accept a woman’s family.” Perhaps some of
the discomfort these women experience at social functions is due to a feeling of not being
accepted by the women whose husbands belong to the organization.
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Being Tough
The persona characteristic of toughness, including the rule to never cry may also 
relate to a greater focus on the element of professionalism and what these women believe 
the appropriate behavior of a professional to be. For most of these women, their role 
models were men.
I was raised by a lot of mean men. So you imprint as a young officer. Not 
callous, but hard people. And my first bosses were very tough. So I kind of 
imprinted on that leadership style. There were a lot of people in the Army like 
that back in the 70’s. I mean the nastier you were, the more effective. You know 
for being in the people business, we are not really good at human relations.
Which amazes me because our asset is people.
I haven’t seen many senior women. I have never had a female role model. Which 
is something I try to provide to the women around me. People will watch you 
because you are a woman and now I am very cognizant of the fact that 1 am very 
senior. I may be the first and only lady lieutenant colonel a lot of these people 
ever see. And I am the only example they will ever have.
Most of the study participants perceived the culture to be hierarchical and very
masculine. Many referred to it as “a men’s club.” One male participant described the
culture in the following way,
You can’t be a cream puffin this job. Yeah, but I think....in general, out in the 
real world.... A lot of women are pushovers. You can’t come in being Ms. 
Passivity or Mr. Passivity and expect to excel. This is the environment where 
meat eaters congregate. Meat eaters come here. If you’re a female meat eater, 
that’s cool.
His description of the best female he had ever worked with, that he would take “above
any other man” he knew, follows. His portrayal definitely fits the description of tough.
I have served with a couple of different females throughout the career. There’s 
one that sticks in my mind, as absolutely I would take her above any other man I 
know. [She] immediately started shaking the staff up because of the following 
things... First of all, she would pull the wagon longer and harder than anybody 
else regardless of her access or her mentorship. She knew her shit better than
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anybody else in the brigade, regardless of mentors or access or anything like that. 
And the third thing, she didn’t take any shit. She would kick your ass up one side 
and down the other and she didn’t need a mentor or access to do that. She was 
just flat good.
While less fervent than the example above, the women in this study believed that being
tough was an important characteristic to have as part of a workable persona. They also
recognized that they had to decide whether to temper their toughness in a way that made
it more acceptable to the men with whom they worked.
I come in hard. Always. It is always easier to become a nice guy.
They want a bunch of warriors. They want us to be tough. Physically tough, 
mentally tough.
You have to be hooah [military slang meaning squared away, hard-core, 
motivated, ready for anything.] You have to be tough.
When you are a man and you are that way [aggressive] then you are hard. You 
are demanding and that is a good thing. But if you are a female and you do it then 
you are a bitch and that is not a good thing.
I would describe myself as matter-of-fact. People accuse me of being brutal. . . . 
have always been this way... .and I am not afraid to tell somebody when I think 
they are doing wrong. Now those on the receiving end sometimes think that I am 
overbearing, that I am a bitch. I have been called a bitch more times than I can 
think. I have always thought that if I had been a male and acted the same way I 
have in my career, I probably would have advanced further than I have.
1 kind of like that reputation preceding me because it is easier when I get 
there.. .’she is so mean.’ My niekname is dragon lady. Of course a lot of women 
have that nickname. It is not just mine. That I am really tough. That my 
standards are unreachable. ...There is nothing wrong with high standards. I am 
not very bending. Another thing. People expect women to be kinder. They have 
the expectation when you come in the door that you will have more compassion. 
Then when you don’t have it then it is a harder knock than when Mr. Neanderthal 
man is sitting behind the desk because they expect him to be tough.
As illustrated above, these women understood that people have stereotyped
expectations of women. This relates to studies that found women to be stereotyped
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negatively at two ends of a continuum. “At one extreme, as mother, pet, or sex object,
women are considered too submissive or emotional to be effective leaders. At the other
extreme, women violate what is expected of them as women and are seen as ‘iron
maidens’, aggressive workaholics, and as domineering and manipulative” (Bass 1990,
711). These women had to find a place between too emotional and too domineering.
These commanders summed it up this way.
Women don’t have to be so masculine that they are considered dykes [lesbians] or 
whatever. You can’t be a femme fatale either. There is a line. You have to be 
hooah [military slang meaning ‘squared away”, hard core, motivated, ready for 
anything.]
They either expect you to be very dykey or if you are pretty at all, they expect you 
to not have a wit in your head. Because otherwise, why would you be in this male 
environment putting yourself through this? And my response to that is, ‘why are 
you doing it?’
As some of the examples indicate, these commanders were aware of the 
stereotypes (“People expect women to be kinder”) and developed a persona that did not 
pigeon hole them at either end of the continuum.
Being Feminine
These women’s general maintenance of a feminine persona may also relate more 
to the recognition that they need to contradict the stereotypes that their male superiors 
and peers have about women. These women needed to be seen as different in that they 
are “better than women” but they could not forfeit all traces of femininity because such 
behavior made them “too different” (Bass 1990, 737). They needed to find a way to 
behave differently within the allowable bounds of different. Most of these commanders 
made a point of appearing feminine. Some even considered their femaleness “a tool in
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their kit bag.” It was certainly not the only tool but maintaining a certain level of
femininity, as part of a workable persona, appears to have been an important strategy.
There have been women who have thought they had to be rough and tough and 
curse like guys to be accepted. I can tell you in my 27 years, 1 never felt 1 had to 
compromise my femininity, my sensitive side. When 1 took my uniform off, there 
was no question 1 was a woman. When 1 had my uniform on, there was no 
question 1 was a woman. So many people remember us because we are a 
minority. And 1 don’t remember them, [because you are one of a few and they 
are one of many.] And one of how many who are still in....it was amazing, the 
percentage of lieutenant colonels and colonels who are women in the Army is 
phenomenal. It is like 2%.
1 remember reading the article in the Washington Post [about] women in the 
military. The first piece was on an MP (military police) captain in the Gulf. 
Smoked cigars with the guys. Cussed. Did all this stuff. And 1 read that and was 
so disturbed by that because.. .1 did not join the Army to give up being a woman.
1 joined the Army to be a soldier.
People react emotionally to other people. It is part of why 1 wear make-up. I 
want to look nice. 1 am very particular about how 1 project myself in uniform. 1 
want to be crisp but 1 also want to be feminine. So 1 think how 1 look has 
sometimes helped me. 1 think it is important for women in the military to be 
women and to present a feminine appearance. They are never going to get away 
from seeing me as a woman because 1 am one.
The ability to work professionally during the day and to realize feminine goals in
the evening reinforces Douvan’s adaptation technique to integrate professionalism and
feminine goals and is evident in the following commanders’ remarks.
Well, 1 really enjoy it when you are in BDUs all day... and you clean up and walk 
down the stairs in a dress. High heels. And your hair down. And these guys look 
at you and go, ‘wow, you clean up good.’ And 1 like that which is probably one 
of the reasons why 1 still have long hair.
1 was always very professional during the day but at night 1 could let my hair 
down and 1 could be one of the guys. 1 could tell dirty jokes. 1 could drink most 
of them under the table. 1 think anytime you are in a command, you kind of feel 
separate because you are not just one of the guys.
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Examples of how some women used their femaleness as “tools in their kit bag” follow.
Do 1 like it? [The fact that I am different.] Most of the time, not. Sometimes it is 
good because I do get information. Somebody may be sexist in a positive way 
where they will be more apt to talk to me than my male counterpart.
It doesn’t hurt. I am sure it has [been to my advantage]... .1 could think of a time 
or two in the field where communication has not been all that it should be. That 
could have been nasty. I don’t know if it was a function of me being a woman 
or.. .it has something to do with my demeanor.
1 think the hardest part about that, is realizing how much you can use the feminine 
side. Who you can kind of flirt with and who you can’t. Who you can play the 
dumb broad with and who you can’t. I mean because some people respond very 
well to that. And so much of leadership is just deciding which buttons are going to 
get you the results... and if it is smiling at somebody, big deal. I mean, I am not 
going to go to bed with anybody. But if it just means being a little bit more 
feminine.. .1 just kind of figure that is their problem, if that’s what it takes.
This strategy was used to create a workable persona in order to develop relationships at
the individual level. These relationships, in turn, led to organizational changes.
Working Harder
The women in this study believed they had to work harder than their male peers to 
receive the same rewards. They also felt very strongly that they had a responsibility to 
represent all women in the military. This behavior is seen in Kanter’s (1977) discussion 
on the issue of tokens. She writes, “the existence of tokens encourages social segregation 
and stereotyping and may lead the person in that position to overcompensate through 
either over achievement or hiding successes, or to turn against people of his or her own 
kind” (206). In this case, these women overcompensated through over achievement. The 
women in this study appeared to adopt the perceptual tendency of visibility, which 
created performance pressure on them. These commanders, while highly visible as 
someone different in the organization, felt the need to represent the generalization or
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stereotype of women in the Army. In fact, these women, for the most part, were driven to
establish the generalization of women in the Army. Many believed that all women in the
Army would be judged by their own demonstrated performance. The following examples
illustrate the tendency to represent all women.
1 have always tried to be the best officer 1 could so that for other women coming 
up behind me, they may not have to work quite as hard blazing trails.
[Do you feel what you do reflects on all women in the Army?] 1 do. People were 
looking at me. And you get press and all that.. .1 wanted people to focus on my 
abilities and not my gender. And 1 wanted my soldiers to not feel the pressure. 
That was my biggest goal. 1 don’t want the fact that 1 am a female commander to 
impact my soldiers. And the fact that 1 was single. 1 didn’t want it to affect my 
family readiness group. I didn’t want them ever to be lacking anything or feel any 
undue pressure because of who their battalion commander was.
In this particular case, the commander was relatively senior and she had released
herself from the perception that she needed to represent all women.
[Do you look at yourself and what you do as representing all women in the 
Army?] 1 used to. 1 got rid of that a long time ago.. .It just got too heavy. 1 mean 
anytime you make a mistake there are 100 people who made a mistake behind 
you. You just can’t carry that burden.
The following examples illustrate the perception that women have to work harder
than men in the Army.
1 think women have to try harder all the time. Because 1 think she is different. 
Because she is a she and everybody is looking at her questioning. Whereas if  it is 
a male, there is no questioning going on.
But, 1 think a lot of it also has to do with, and it’s true for anybody, the 
willingness to be selfless, to give up all your free time, to turn it into a nun 
experience, which so many women do. Which is unfair. When you look at the 
things women, the prices they have to pay- to have a comparable career to men.
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And I think the other thing, too, is that women have to do more. At work, to get 
the same amount of applause, to get the above center of mass OER, it really has to 
be outstanding. Absolutely [more outstanding than their male peers.]
But, did I at one time think that I had to do the job so much better than the guys 
just to prove myself? I did feel that way. Now I just want to do the best job I can 
for me, my staff, and the people around me.
As these women become more senior, it appears that they also begin to make 
adjustments to some of their perceptions as illustrated by the example above. “I did feel 
that way. Now I just w ant.. . . ” As they achieve more rank and responsibility, they are 
at greater liberty to make decisions, and at some point, they also become an integral part 
of the organization. This achievement of more rank and responsibility relates to Yoder’s 
(2002) finding “that the unfavorable social costs of being a female token can be negated 
by enhancing the status of the token” (4). As these women attained higher status, it 
appears that negative tokenism outcomes also diminished.
Regendering
The processes of regendering individuals and the gendering of jobs are also 
considered as adaptations that made these women more acceptable to the males of the 
organization. Regendering was common although many women did not consider this to 
be out of the ordinary. Reactions to regendering were varied; being treated like an 
exceptional woman presented a challenge to prove that there were a lot of “exceptional” 
women, the process was ignored, or the individual commander reveled in being the only 
female. The closer the proximity to combat arms units, especially at division level, the 
greater the reliance on strategies that emphasized physical attributes and the more likely a 
woman had of becoming an honorary male. Often it didn’t matter because these women
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were usually the only ones in the unit, and it was their personal interaction that created 
the acceptance expressed by their peers and superiors. This also relates to tokenism 
outcomes, as discussed above, and Yoder’s (2002) discussion about “the impact of 
deviation from gender stereotypes defining occupational appropriateness” (7). Yoder 
also proposes that in order to disrupt negative tokenism outcomes, occupational roles also 
need to be redefined (7). The following are individual cases of women being regendered 
as men.
He always treated me as an exception. ‘Hey, 1 am one of literally thousands of 
women. ‘Well, I’ll believe it when I see it.” Because you are the first. They still 
have the preconceived ideas they were laboring under when you came in. So you 
have shown them that there is something else. But they still have preconceived 
ideas for years. Six or seven months with you is not going to change years of 
perception.
Certain jobs genderized? Yes, but I can’t blame the Army for that completely. I 
think the women are culpable too. First of all, somebody starts recruiting you into 
something that derails you from your career progression. We have to socially 
engineer not to do that. I regendered myself. 1 went into a place where they were 
not going to let me go. So every woman gets ‘you are different’, ‘you are one of a 
kind’, so we think we are special and unique and above the crowd when in fact, 
all of us are pretty damn good because this is a hard gig.
As the commander in the example above points out, the special, unique, honorary male
title does not change the circumstances of the woman, it just changes how that woman is
identified. The concept of regendering was a strategy that made the development of
individual relationships more palatable to the men of the organization.
Organizational Fit
While most of these commanders did, to varying degrees, adapt, change, and 
leam, they mostly seemed to “fit” the organization. Their personal characteristics aided 
their transition into the male hierarchy of a military organization. They seemed able to
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maintain their core personality. Those that had changed some behavior at first, found that
those changes did not feel comfortable or “fit” and they changed back to the way they
had been. Some were more outgoing, comfortable with humor; others more quiet,
reserved, and contained. Their longevity and upward mobility in the organization speaks
to this ability to fit. One commander reported, “the Army was a good fit for my
personality is how 1 view it.” As discussed earlier, these commanders longevity in the
Army speak to their organizational fit.
Well, 1 would have to say after 32 years, probably. If 1 had not felt that 1 did [fit 
in], 1 don’t think 1 would have stayed. 1 would have regressed if  1 hadn’t fit in. 
What is fit in? 1 guess if  1 had not been able to be a contributing part of the force; 
if 1 had not been able to be assigned a job and get it accomplished, then 1 wouldn’t 
be here.
The fact that these women self selected themselves into the organization and stayed in 
despite the challenges presented by a masculine, hierarchical organization implies a fit 
between the individual and the organization.
Summary
This study’s focus has been on women who have chosen a military career and have 
achieved command at battalion and brigade level. The study considered the strategies 
these women developed to cope, adapt, and better fit a predominantly male organization 
during a process of integration. One strategy discovered during the evaluation of the 
interviews spoke to the development of a workable persona. The characteristics of this 
workable persona included being tough, maintaining feminine characteristics, working 
harder, and responding to the pressure to represent all women. The concepts of 
regendering and organizational fit were also examined. These characteristics and
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concepts were discussed in the preceding section. The following section considers 
organizational changes that may have occurred as a result of mandated integration and 
uses the Schein/Lewin change model as a way to understand and explain how the 
organization may have changed.
Organizational Changes and the Change Model
One of the study’s original premises was that the organization would remain 
relatively unchanged with the mandated integration of women. In terms of fundamental 
change, this premise has remained accurate. However, organizational changes have 
occurred within the context of the existing organizational framework. Change in these 
discussions refers more to something happening to the individuals within the organization 
rather than to having something fundamentally change in the organization. The premise 
was that the only individuals who seemed likely to be affected by the change process 
were the women who were coming into the organization. The process of unfreezing, 
cognitive restructuring, and refreezing for these women seemed logical, especially as 
they began to leam the basic underlying assumptions that defined the organization’s 
culture. One unexpected theme centered on the relationships that developed between the 
women coming into the organization and the men of the organization. Once women 
began working face to face with the men in the organization, their demonstrated 
performance seemed to change the opinions of these men. As individual relationships 
developed, women were able to demonstrate that “they had what it takes,” and were 
subsequently better accepted by the men, whose beliefs and attitudes represented and 
maintained the organizational culture. The initial premise was flawed because it assumed
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that the women would be more likely to make changes upon entry into the military 
environment. In this case, it appears the men made changes. These changes are rather 
small in scope and are not uniform across the organization. Recent survey data also 
supports these findings of attitude change and a greater acceptance of women in the 
Army. These survey results will be discussed in more detail later in this section.
In general, this change process can be described using Schein’s elaboration of 
Kurt Le win's basic change model of unfreezing, cognitive restructuring, and refreezing. 
Conceptually, this change model begins with the belief that the stability of human 
behavior is based on a state of equilibrium between a system of driving and restraining 
forces. For change to occur in this force field, the driving or restraining forces must be 
altered. In order to drive the equilibrium in the direction of change, it makes more sense 
to remove restraining forces since driving forces are already in the system. In this case, 
the entry of women became the driving force and the organization’s ideas (held by the 
individual men in the organization) about women were the restraining forces. The 
unfreezing occurred with the realization that more women were needed in the military. 
The end of the male draft, the advent of the all volunteer force, and the movement toward 
equal opportunity aroused “the feeling [survival anxiety] that if we do not change we will 
fail to meet our needs or fail to achieve some goals or ideals we have set for ourselves” 
(Schein, 1997, 4). This survival anxiety played a role in the determination of legislation 
that permanently assigned women to nontraditional jobs in Army units. Survival anxiety 
also generated the second form of anxiety, called learning anxiety. The feeling that if we 
admit that something might be wrong with our way of doing something, running the risk
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of loosing our self-esteem, effectiveness, and ‘maybe even identity’ generates learning 
anxiety.
Learning anxiety is the fundamental restraining force, which can go up in direct 
proportion to the amount of disconfirmation, leading to the maintenance of the 
equilibrium by defensive avoidance of the disconfirming information. It is 
dealing with learning anxiety, then, that is key to producing change (Schein, 1997, 
5).
The uncertainty of having more women in the military and the belief that these 
women would have an adverse effect on their units of assignment and the overall 
readiness of the military eontributed to the organization’s learning anxiety. In some 
cases, this anxiety has yet to be fully resolved. Schein argued that to counter the 
restraining force of learning anxiety, a feeling of psychological safety needed to be 
created in order to experience the survival anxiety that motivated change. While an 
influx of women may not have created an environment of psychological safety-making 
ehange less difficult- relationships these women developed with their peers and superiors 
were crucial to the process of cognitive restructuring. Cognitive restructuring occurs 
when new information effects semantic redefinition, cognitive broadening, and/or new 
standards of judgment or evaluation. In this case, the women, through their demonstrated 
performance and ability to foster relationships, had an effect on how the men of the 
organization viewed women in the organization. By working closely with the members 
of the organization, and by changing their opinions about women and what women could 
accomplish, the restraining forces were softened and changes were able to occur. For this 
change model to work, however, one has also to consider if changes occurred in the 
women, or driving force as well. Both the driving forces and the restraining forces
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changed in a way that allowed these women to become more acceptable to the men in the 
organization. In the case of the women, the development of a working persona, discussed 
earlier, helped them to work more effectively with the men in the organization.
Once this restructuring is complete, some form of refreezing must occur to ensure 
the change remains stable. “The main point about refreezing is that the new behavior 
must be to some degree congruent with the rest of the behavior and personality of the 
learner or it will simply set off new rounds of disconfirmation that often lead to 
unlearning the very thing one has learned” (Schein, 1997, 8). Generally, this refreezing 
occurred at the individual level. Once the learner accepted the woman, she began to fit 
into his idea of what connoted an effective military organization. As long as the 
subsequent women he was exposed to and with whom he developed relationships 
demonstrated they had “the right stuff’, it is unlikely that disconfirmation would occur. 
The fact that many men have limited contact with many women also limits the potential 
for disconfirming opportunities.
This change model cannot be applied uniformly across the Army organization 
since women do not fully participate in all units. The opportunities to develop working 
relationships vary and this affects the extent to which cognitive restructuring takes place. 
The process of cognitive restructuring and refreezing in this organization is ongoing and 
certainly not complete.
In Chapter Two, military culture was defined as “an elaborate social construction 
and exercise of creative intelligence, through which we come to imagine war in a 
particular way and to embrace certain rationalizations about how war should be
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conducted and for what purpose” (Snider, 1999, 14). Herein lies the crux of the issue of 
integrating women into the military organization. It has been difficult “to imagine war in 
a particular way” that includes the full participation of women; before women were 
permanently assigned, the organization’s view of how to conduct war did not include 
women in nontraditional jobs. In fact, some of these “deeply rooted traditions that 
question the propriety of women under arms” have remained relatively sacrosanct, as 
women are still not allowed in combat arms units. This portion of the organizational 
structure has remained intact which would suggest that the ideas underlying this portion 
of the organization have remained unchanged as well. Survey results also support this 
idea as will be illustrated later in this section.
Once women were permanently assigned, two elements of military culture, 
ceremonial displays and etiquette of military life, and cohesion and esprit de corps, 
addressed the socialization process and internal integration of these women into the 
organization. Ceremonial displays and etiquette of military life, the salute, the uniform, 
shared physical hardship during real world or training operations, “provide order, 
hierarchy, and continuity to the life of military units.. . .  Such rituals mark collective 
identity and symbolize a common fate” (Snider, 1999, 16-17). This order and hierarchy 
established, in part, the structural context in which these women found themselves. 
Everyone in the organization had to adhere to these rituals and as these women became 
part of the organization and part of the group within the organization, their group 
affiliation moved them towards a more common identity.
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The second element, military cohesion, “refers to the feelings of identity and 
comradeship that soldiers hold for those in their immediate military unit, the outgrowth of 
face-to-face or primary (horizontal) group relations” (Snider, 1999, 17). Military 
cohesion relates to the premise that organizational changes occurred as a result of 
personal interaction and individual relationships. Once women began working face to 
face with their male peers and supervisors, their demonstrated performance changed the 
ideas of the men who represented the organizational culture. It seems likely that military 
cohesion would occur before esprit de corps, which “refers to the commitment or pride 
soldiers take in the larger military establishment to which the unit belongs, and outgrowth 
of secondary (vertical) group relations” (Snider, 1999, 17). The primary (horizontal) 
group relations would naturally expand to include secondary (vertical) group relations.
Military culture, and in this case specifically Army culture, is not going to 
dramatically change because the mission of the organization continues to be to fight and 
win the nation’s wars. As more women were assigned to units and as they became more 
familiar to the members of these units, the organization’s view of how to conduct war 
with women changed. The organizational members ideas about women began to change 
as their exposure to these women increased. Changes in ideas evolved after the mandate 
for structural change.
The structure changed due to necessity, the end of the draft and the advent of the 
All Volunteer Force, and this necessity was influenced by society’s changing view of 
women and the drive towards equal opportunity. The change in structure did not 
necessarily mean a parallel change in the ideas underlying that structure. The issue is
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extremely complex as it involves “a cross-cut of social and military factors.” There was 
the necessity of increasing the number of women in the Army and the corresponding 
“push for women’s equal rights in conflict with deeply rooted traditions that question the 
propriety of women under arms” (Binkin and Bach 1977, 101). Women began to be 
permanently assigned to Army units before unit members had satisfactorily answered this 
question about the appropriateness of women under arms.
The organization underwent structural change at both the formal and informal 
level. The formal level is defined by the legislation that permanently assigned women to 
units. Informal struetural ehange may be defined, in part, by the idea of a gendered 
organization. As discussed in Chapter Two, Sally J. Kenney (1996) explored the 
gendered culture of institutions by reconceptualizing gender as a category of analysis.
She found “that women report clearly being seen and treated as women holders of a role.
. . .Jobs as well as institutions have gender” (455). Gender does not represent some 
biological category for women but is socially constructed and may be changed arbitrarily. 
Kenney referred to McGlen and Sarkees who found that competent women were often 
regendered as men. “By recoding the competent woman as an honorary male, the job and 
the qualities associated with it remain gendered” (458). Women today continue to 
emphasize they be recognized as soldiers, not female soldiers. As women were assigned 
to units, attempts were made to place them in jobs considered to be primarily “female”, 
these included staff positions concerning personnel issues, logistics, and military 
protocol. Study participants have reported that superior commanders have become aware 
of this tendency to place women in “female” jobs, and were more conscious of where
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they assigned their women officers. At the individual level, women were also often 
regendered as honorary males, which made their acceptance more palatable to their male 
peers and superiors. In spite of these organizational and individual coping mechanisms to 
maintain the status quo -  changes have occurred at both the organizational and individual 
level. It is these incremental changes over time that speak to the potential for a much 
broader change.
The impetus for organizational changes began with legislation that permanently 
assigned women to Army branches with the exception of the combat arms (Infantry, 
Armor, Field Artillery, and Air Defense Artillery) (Holm, 1992). Women, in greater 
numbers, were integrated into units and into non-traditional jobs. As one study 
participant put it, “where women work, what they do, the decisions they make, have 
astronomically changed. But it changed because of integration not enlightenment.” 
Enlightenment would be slow to follow. Once women began working side by side with 
their male peers, for their male supervisors, and under the observation of males around 
them, their demonstrated performance began to change the opinions of the men whose 
beliefs and attitudes defined the organizational culture. As these individual relationships 
developed, women were able to demonstrate their commitment and competence and were 
then better accepted, by the males they worked for and with, into the organization. Peers 
and superiors would provide access to jobs that were essential to success within the 
Army’s hierarchical organization. These women demonstrated success by continuing to 
be promoted to the next level, achieving positions of greater authority and responsibility.
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Selections to battalion and brigade command are necessary steps for continued upward 
mobility.
Personal Interaction and Demonstrated Ability
Organizational changes were manifested in several ways. First, the women’s 
experiences while working with these reluctant, suspicious male peers and bosses show 
how their hard work changed the men’s attitudes from one of skepticism to one of greater 
advocacy. In these cases, the organization and the individual had an interactive 
relationship. In order for changes in the organization to occur, the individual presented 
herself in a way that co-opted the representative of the organization. The change process 
here focused on the person whose reality was the organization in its current state, the men 
of the organization. The incoming person, in this case, a newly integrated woman, had to 
change the ideas and beliefs that these men held about women in the organization. This 
was not an easy task. Simply because women were assigned to a particular unit did not 
mean that they were welcomed and accepted by that unit. The ideas underlying the 
structure were much slower to change. Although this section focuses on organizational 
changes, this assessment is incomplete without the examination of some individual 
behavior. As discussed earlier, the study found that most of the participants presented 
themselves in a way that convinced the men of the organization that they were serious 
and committed. Since changes occurred at the individual level through interaction and 
interpersonal relationships, the workable persona the women exhibited was important to 
the successful development of these relationships.
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In one particular instance, two women were selected to attend the Infantry 
Officers’ Advanced Course. This was unprecedented and would not occur today since 
the Infantry is a combat arms branch, and considered the keystone to the Army’s military 
organization.
We were the only two [females] who ever went [to the Infantry Officer Advanced 
Course at Fort Benning, 1973]. It was hostile. But it worked out because we 
basically did everything the guys did. . .  . But at that time there was not the 
requirement for physical training for men and women that you have now. It was 
evolving.
[At the Infantry Officer Advanced Course] there was a lot of focus on us. They 
wanted to interview us. We had to say no. We were classmates in the class. We 
did not want to be treated any differently. After time, you might say they got used 
to us and they knew we were serious about the Army and as serious as they were. 
At the end of the course, the commander at the Infantry Center wrote a letter to 
the Office of Professional Development saying we had two WAC officers. It 
worked well, send more....
The women in the above example, did not want any special attention, did not want to be
treated differently and, since they did everything the guys did, they felt they were
accepted. The men worked with these women and saw what they could and did
accomplish.
As discussed in Chapter Two, Theoretical Framework, these two women had to 
deal with the challenges of “only woman status” where proportional representation was 
15 percent or less. (In this case, proportional representation was much less, around two 
percent.) This status presents a series o f challenges. Kanter (1977) writes, “the existence 
of tokens encourages social segregation and stereotyping and may lead the person in that 
position to overcompensate through either overachievement or hiding successes, or to 
turn against people of his or her kind” (Kanter, 1977, 206). Kanter identified three
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perceptual tendencies that are associated with tokenism; visibility, contrast, and
assimilation. In this example, the women appear to have selected assimilation, or role
encapsulation. The women, while highly visible as someone different in the
organization, responded to this performance pressure by attempting to become socially
invisible. ‘There was a lot of focus on us. . .  .We did not want to be treated any
differently.” In fact the challenges of “only woman status” in the Army may account, in
part, for many of the individual strategies and adaptations that assisted these women as
they developed personal relationships with the men of the organization. These strategies
and adaptations were discussed earlier.
Another woman, in an “only woman” situation, convinced her boss that she could
do the job. But, before he would give her a position of greater responsibility, she had to
prove her worth to him in a job that did not officially exist. In the following example, an
S3 position deals with the operations function of the battalion. The S3 is responsible for
training, planning (present and future), and the execution of exercises and real world
operations. The executive officer is the organization’s second in command. The
executive officer is responsible for the remaining staff functions; personnel and logistics,
as well as maintenance.
It was very hard locally. I think a lot of women got ground down locally... In fact, 
when I went up there [Alaska], the support battalion commander told me I was 
not qualified to be in his battalion and he was going to send me to DOT 
(Directorate of Logistics). So 1 said, ‘okay sir, as a promotable captain, give me 
any job in this battalion. I don’t care what job you give me. Let me prove myself 
for a year.’ And he said, ‘okay. I’ll make you the assistant S3 [operations] (which 
is not a slot).’ And I was really too senior to be carrying an M16 [rifle]. And I 
said, ‘I don’t care, let me prove it.’ Sure enough, the next year he made me the S3 
[operations officer], and I was the battalion XO [executive officer] the next year. 
So once I applied myself to the idea this is a career -  and got my foot in the door,
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it was just a matter of performing, which it always is. It was a male only 
battalion.
The women in this study seem to have realized there was an appropriate
organizational way to behave as they negotiated their way through a male dominated
organization and these “only women” situations. Most women responded by working
harder in order to prove that they could do the job before them. This behavior relates to
Kanter’s findings that one way a token responds to performance pressure is by
overachieving and constructing a public image that minimizes organizational and peer
scrutiny. Performance pressure comes from being highly visible as someone different in
the organization and feeling the need to represent or establish the generalization or
stereotype of that different group. Often these women were the only women in their
units, or one of a very few. They felt the pressure and responsibility to set the standard
for all women in the organization. If they failed to prove themselves capable and up to
the task, the women in their footsteps would experience greater difficulty in being
accepted. This idea of needing to work harder to prove one’s self was considered earlier
during the discussion of the workable persona.
I would say most of the time when we reported to a job, people were not used to 
working with women and they really preferred that you were not there. So you 
know you have to prove yourself. That is hard for me to say because I am not 
sure I have changed in any way, shape or form or that I have worked harder 
because I am a female or because it is just my makeup. I try to work hard at what 
I am doing. I care about it. I am conscious of it or the fact that people may judge 
me differently, at least initially, for that reason. I think that if  they find that you 
are serious about your job and you are competent and professional, then you are 
respected and accepted for that purpose.
A colonel looked at me and said, ‘Who’s numb nuts?’ And I took off my helmet 
and said, ‘Sir, that is no nuts.’ ‘Are you a nurse?’ I just went about my work. By
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the end of the exercise, I don’t think I had changed his mind about women in the 
military but I certainly changed his mind about me. That is kind of a victory. So 
the next time he sees a woman in an environment like th a t, he won’t have the 
same immediate reaction. I have had to go out of my way to prove myself on 
more than one occasion.
Again, the examples above reinforce the notion that proving one to be capable was
necessary in order for acceptance and changes to occur. The ehanges were incremental
and individual and the burden of proof was the responsibility of the person coming into
the unit. Each woman felt the need to prove that she could do the job and this proof was
most often demonstrated through personal job performance. Instead of balking at the
requirement, the women in this study felt challenged by the requirement, and each
woman applied herself in ways that won the approval of her male peers and supervisors.
In fact, many women seemed to thrive on the challenge of proving their nay sayers
wrong.
There were those.. .who were hell bent on making sure I did not succeed.
Because I was a woman. As a matter of fact, one of them out and out told the 
Brigade XO [executive officer] that he was going to make sure I failed because 
women don’t belong in Infantry brigades. And that again became just one more 
challenge to me.
[At airborne school] I was the only one [woman] left. They all [the other women] 
fell out. Black hat [airborne instructor] got in my face. ‘You are next. No 
women are graduating from this thing.’ I said, [to myself] ‘Thank you, now I 
know I will graduate. If I needed any motivation, thank you very much.’
[Have you always been challenged by someone saying, ‘you can’t do it’?] Yes, 
[it’s like a red flag], to me -I  am after it.
These women did not accept the role that many males had constructed for them. Instead
of giving up and leaving, they sought to prove themselves. Generally, the more senior
participants in this study did not care what others thought about them. One officer said.
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“I have no idea what they saw. Nor do I really care.” This attitude may have developed
after spending considerable time in the organization. This participant was a general
officer and it is likely that she was no longer concerned about having to prove herself
because she already had as implied by her rank. Some women weren’t even given the
opportunity to demonstrate competence in order to develop a relationship that would
make a difference. In one instance,
I had one colonel look at me when I went into a brigade TOC [tactical operations 
center] to check on one of the radio systems. He looked at his XO [executive 
officer] and said, ‘who’s the skirt?’ I said, ‘Sir, I am Lieutenant [So and So] and I 
was sent up here to look at the radio.’ And he said, ‘Look, you don’t belong up 
here honey. I will do without before I do with you.’
As the senior male study participant put it, “We have some officers that are
holding tired, old positions for too long. But they are fast retiring out of the Army. And
sooner rather than later that resistance will be gone for the most part. At least open
resistance.. . .it is not accepted.” The comments of the colonel in the example above
probably fall into this category. What may have been acceptable ten years ago is no
longer acceptable now. This, in itself, speaks to changes. As another male participant
described,
I kind of fall back on the football team. It is still a man’s game. I think the guys 
realize th a t. It is a man’s game, but guess what fellas? Women are playing and 
guess what? They are pretty good.
From Exceptional to Routine
Second, organizational changes are seen as reactions to women in nontraditional
jobs become more routine and less of an out-of-the-ordinary event. These considerations
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range from societal acceptance of women in the military to individual commanders 
moderating their behavior because women are present.
One woman was very concerned that the general public would create a hullabaloo 
about women in the military after the skud attack on a National Guard Unit during the 
Gulf War in 1991.
It was mostly women. And I was very concerned about this because I thought, ok, 
here comes the [public opinion] backlash. Women in body bags. Some of them 
were mothers, etc. It didn’t happen. It was a very unfortunate and very sad thing 
because people had died but no one singled out the fact that these were women. 
These were soldiers who had chosen to serve.
This reaction was in sharp contrast to language Senator Sam Ervin used in his fight
opposing the Equal Rights Amendment in 1972. He argued “passionately to prevent
sending the daughters of America into combat to be slaughtered or maimed by the
bayonets, the bombs, the bullets, the grenades, the mines, the napalm, the poison gas, and
the shells of the enemy” (Holm, 1992, 264). This greater acceptance of women in the
Army was also seen during the war in Iraq although the conflict revived the debate on
women in combat. The discussion of this debate will be discussed later in this section.
One story that illustrates a situation that would never happen today is one
woman’s experience of reporting to Fort Bragg for her first assignment in 1977. Fort
Bragg, located in Fayetteville, North Carolina and home to the renowned 82"'' Airborne
Division, had just opened its post to women. In her interview, she recalls wanting to be a
platoon leader, which wasn’t one of the traditional jobs that members of the Women’s
Army Corps had habitually filled.
I fought real hard to be a platoon leader. So they were opening Fort Bragg to 
women. So 1 asked if  I could go to Fort Bragg. So I get to Fort Bragg as a leg
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[non-airbome qualified] and I get there and they mess with me for several 
hours.. .what was going on was they couldn’t believe the Army was really serious 
that they were sending women and that I was coming there and wished that I was 
away.
[She meets with the Brigade commander.] He was really, really nice to me. Acts 
like a father. He says, ‘I have decided what your assignment is going to be. You 
are going to be the brigade Public Affairs Officer.’ And I said, “No sir, I want to 
be a platoon leader.’ He says, ‘Lieutenant, you just don’t understand. This is 
really a premiere assignment.’ ‘Sir, I really want to be a platoon leader.’
[Finally, sent down to the battalion that had most of the brigade’s criminals (this 
is a time when individuals were given the option of going into the Army or going 
to jail) with the option of coming back to the brigade to take the PAO job.] [At 
the battalion, she is greeted by the battalion executive officer.] He says, 
‘Lieutenant, it is great to have you here. We should have your desk set up by 
tomorrow or the next day but you will have to get in processed. I am going to 
make you the assistant S I.’ ‘Sir, I want to be a platoon leader.’. . .  ‘Lieutenant, I 
have held this position open because I was looking for the right lieutenant. And I 
can tell by looking at you that you are the right lieutenant to be assistant SI.’
[She keeps asking to be a platoon leader. Had reported in class A’s, skirt, pumps, 
6’5” tall, 6’6” with pumps. They did not know what to do with her.] The 
battalion commander did not know what to do with me. He said, ‘I have got a 
live one! ’ [So the XO] says, ‘okay, you be here tomorrow morning in your 
fatigues. I am sending you to the field. Charlie Company is going out to the 
field. You are going to be assigned to Charlie Company. But I tell you what I am 
going to do. I am going to keep the assistant SI job open for you.
Both the Public Affairs Officer and SI, the staff position that deals with personnel, were 
considered jobs typically filled by females. The males in this woman’s chain of 
command could not see a woman serving as a platoon leader. In fact, they had a difficult 
time understanding why a woman would want to be a platoon leader. Women going into 
non-traditional fields, previously the sole domain of men, caused a dissonance between 
what these men thought these women should do, and what they were actually able to do. 
In the end, the second lieutenant went to the field with her platoon and won her platoon 
over.
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I worked with them. By the time we came out of the field, the platoon was 
starting to respect me because when we went into recovery . . .  1 was down there 
with them doing recovery. . . .1 took a real interest in them.
Six months later, she was out participating in a very, big, important exercise. Several
high-ranking officers, to include the Corps commander, visited her site to see the “female
platoon leader.” Later at the Corps Update (a daily meeting where the commander was
updated on significant events) the Corps Commander announced, “There is a second
lieutenant -  female type- down in the [named] battalion. Everybody needs to go see her.
She is really hard charging.” Another woman who reported to Fort Bragg around the
same time had this to say,
Got to Fort Bragg. And, Oh My God. You were wanted. People did not want 
you there. I mean it was you would go to “Happy Hour” and have lieutenant 
colonels spitting in your face, calling you and your mother very bad names. You 
knew you weren’t loved.
Today, the above scenarios would never happen. A large crowd of senior officers would
probably not make a special effort to observe some “female-type” second lieutenant in
the field. The typical career progression for a second lieutenant is platoon leader, for
males and for females. Most units, including the brigade referred to in the example
above, assign incoming second lieutenants to platoon leader jobs. What was once a big
ordeal is now routine.
As described below, one participant noticed a change in verbal expression. She
found her immediate supervisor, the division commander, moderating his behavior in her
presence. Some of this behavior stems from social traditions that follow an expected
pattern of behavior.
110
You know, it is still male oriented.. .but times are changing.. .times are changing 
because ten years ago.. .there was no such thing as this dignity and respect thing 
(program of consideration for others). Soldiers and anybody could curse. And 
have the foul mouth and sexually harass.
[The division commander] every now and then will say something that he knows 
he is not supposed to say and he will catch himself and .. .apologize [to me] for 
that.
Many of the study’s participants emphasized that as men worked with more
women; it seemed to increase the women’s feelings of being accepted. They felt as
though they were part of a team. Most believed that they became a valued member of the
team. Once their peer and superiors got over the fact that they were female, all felt they
were contributing members to the team. This was especially true for women who
continued to be placed in jobs of greater responsibility. As one senior woman described.
But when you arrive at that level [battalion command and higher] as a woman . . .  
life is good. There was never a time when I wasn’t taken seriously or consulted 
or relied upon heavily.. .And I always felt I was part of the team.
This idea about teamwork goes back to the definition of military culture and the
concept of cohesion as discussed earlier. Women in this study worked to increase unit
cohesion. As one battalion commander explained,
I was not PC all the time.. .1 always wanted everyone to be very comfortable 
around me and not have to feel like, ok, I have to watch the jokes... They would 
tease me about stuff. I didn’t distance myself. I didn’t put myself on this 
battalion commander pedestal. I am so much better than you. Look at me. I was 
more down to earth. I want to be the same in many respects. I want them to feel 
a closeness to me and not [feel] that we can’t talk to her because she is this way.
The commander worked at making everyone feel as though they were included and part
of a team. This strategy also reinforces the idea that women who are in command
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positions may feel they are more easily accepted when they use a more participative style
of leadership. Another women reported her strategy,
I think you get accepted faster if you step right in there and say, ‘how can I help?’ 
Everybody is looking for help. And if they see you want to be part of the team, 
you are part of the team. You are just a green glob out there in your BDU’s 
[battledress uniform] and you are a good Joe or you are a good Josephine. But it 
doesn’t matter. You are a good soldier.
Many of the women in this study did not have the opportunity to leam along side
their male peers. Today male officers are growing up with female officers. Nearly all
commissioning sources, to include the United States Military Academy and most colleges
with Reserved Officers Training Corps programs are coeducational which may help
increase acceptance. Most branches train men and women side by side in their branch
schools, officers’ basic and advanced courses. For those in branches without women,
opportunities to work with women are found during professional schooling like the
Command and General Staff College and the War College, as well as assignments above
the task force/battalion level. Individual relationships are developed during these
professional development programs and working with women becomes more familiar and
routine. One woman described the process in the following manner,
You are just a person who happens to be an Army officer.. .you are not thinking,
T am a woman.’ It is so fundamental.. .But the second you encounter a male 
soldier and he looks at you, he sees a woman...and he will always relate to you 
first and foremost as a woman and after he deals with all that baggage, 
somewhere down there, he will soldier with you. I think it lessens and it doesn’t 
create dissonance after a while. I think initially it causes huge, huge, just huge 
dissonance. Until it is dealt with. No one took me seriously [as a captain] and I 
was deadly serious. I would have to deal with that dynamic and get it off the 
table. Get rid of that, then we could soldier.
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Again, women had to develop a personal relationship with these men in order for them to
get past their preconceived perceptions about a woman in the Army. Familiarity led to
greater acceptance as illustrated by this senior participant.
As I became more senior, it became more obvious that there was less thought that 
I was female. And then as you become more senior you have interacted with 
some of these folks along the way and they really want you to come work for 
them. That was really nice. I have got to say I have seen men change in the 
military and that has been gratifying to see outstanding leaders just look at 
soldiers as soldiers and not block you out based on your gender.
Personal Observation and Experience
Third, organizational changes were seen in the personal observations of the
study’s participants. Each person was in the Army at least 20 years, with the most senior
participant’s career spanning more than 36 years, and each observed and experienced
changes within the context of the organizational framework. While not completely
satisfied with the extent of these changes, they all acknowledged there were
organizational changes. Changes in the organization were again attributed to working
together and building rapport. Attitudes, held by the individual males in the organization,
about women were modified when confronted with the reality of actually working with
women. “What exactly did these men expect?” As one senior participant expressed,
Will there never be bias? I doubt it. It is very difficult to change everyone’s 
attitude. Has the institution changed? Has the leadership changed? Immensely. 
The change is from the top down. From the bottom up and from the top down and 
that is how change occurs. Because the numbers are so large at the bottom - 1 
mean the training base and the units -  that is where a lot of change started 
occurring. As soon as you had more men working with more women then it just 
became a natural matter of rapport. Same as racial integration. The more you 
work in an integrated unit, the less of a big deal it is. People are people.
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This change phenomenon clearly makes one wonder about the social construct these men
had of women before working with any of them. Perhaps these women were able to
provide a different construct to replace the ones held by these men. In “Soldiering: The
Enemy Doesn’t Care if You’re Female” (1996), former prisoner of war (POW), Rhonda
Comum, describes an interview she did with Sergeant Dunlap, a fellow POW.
He was asked, ‘What do you think about women in combat?’ and he said, ‘I don’t 
think they should be there.’ Then he was asked about me specifically: ‘Would 
you go to war with Dr. Comum again?’ He said, ‘Of course. I’d go anywhere 
with Major Comum.’ What does that mean? It means that his experiences did 
affect his thinking but not enough to generalize to all women. And I don’t blame 
him. That’s why I think it is so important to have women who are competitive 
and have the ability and will be successful-and to take those women and allow 
them to compete for and in everything. Then the rest of the military can base 
their opinions on successful women instead of relying on memories of their 
mothers, their wives, their girlfriends, and their sisters (22).
The barriers came down when men worked alongside women. Another study participant
emphasized the idea of acceptance.
Well, we have a lot more acceptance than we did 26 years ago when we had 
WACs. We kind of weren’t even in the Army in a lot of people’s minds. So there 
is a lot more acceptance now. But acceptance only comes when you break down 
barriers and put men and women side by side.
The following examples are personal observations that reinforce the idea that changes
have occurred because men and women are working more often and more closely
together.
They [guys coming up] are used to having more women in the unit. They are also 
seeing that women are making contributions and doing a good job. Even at that, 
even at best, there is still prejudice, gender kinds of arguments. But less cultural 
discrimination than we have been used to.
I think very well [how well are women integrated?]. My female lieutenants are 
integrated very well. Female staff officers. Female soldiers. I think from what I 
have seen, very well.
114
I think it [change] is coming though, with all the women. And with male officers 
growing up now with female officers.
These examples certainly do not intend to imply that organizational changes are
completed and no further organizational changes are required. As noted earlier, these
changes have been incremental, seeming small in the moment but much greater when
considered over time. As stated above, “there is still prejudice, gender kinds of
arguments.” These examples are presented to indicate that there have been
organizational changes as men became more familiar with women.
Recent survey results also support these findings. In a survey report, “Trends in
Attitudes Toward Women in the Army” (1999), the U.S. Army Research Institute for the
Behavioral and Social Sciences reported trends in male and female soldiers’ perceptions
about issues such as, work atmosphere, unit cohesion, physical requirements, and combat
issues (1). The results were collected through the semi-annual. Army-wide Sample
Survey of Military Personnel (SSMP). This is the same survey discussed by Judith Hicks
Stiehm in Chapter 2, Theoretical Framework in the section. Women in the Army. (Her
comments concerned the SSMP conducted in the fall of 1994). The sample for this
survey included approximately 10 percent of 65,396 officers (Male N=55,648, Female
N=9,748) and 2 to 3 percent of 363,591 enlisted personnel (Male N—308,654, Female
N=54,937). The sampling error for these data sets is generally +/- 5%. “Survey items on
women in the Army are carried in the fall versions of the SSMP and provide the
opportunity to monitor trends in male and female soldiers’ attitudes about women” (1).
Since the 1994 survey,
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There have been statistically significant increases in positive responses for both 
male officers and enlisted personnel on recurring Women in the Army (WITA) 
items. Compared to previous survey findings, males are now more positive about 
taking orders from a female and about female soldiers’ abilities to meet the 
demands of being an Army soldier.. .  . In addition, soldiers who are assigned to 
occupational areas within Combat Arms, where assignment of women is 
restricted, have also experienced positive gains to WITA items (8).
As in the findings suggested by this study, “the survey results also suggest consideration
of the premise that male soldiers who routinely work with women may be more positive
about female capabilities, having observed their female counterparts in action” (1). The
survey found that males in units that habitually had women assigned to their units were
more positive about women in the Army, while males in units where the assignment of
women was restricted were the least positive. These survey results seem to support the
idea that once women begin to work face to face with men, their demonstrated
performance seems to affect the opinions of these men.
Senior Leader Influence and Support
Organizational changes are also implied by the actions of the male leaders who
make decisions that promote the integration and advancement of women in the
organization. This finding also relates to Yoder’s (2002) assertion that “findings suggest
that the status-enhancement of tokens, albeit competent tokens, rests in the hands of
organizations whose high-status members can legitimate women” (7). One example
stands out. A Corps Commander, looking at the diversity in one of his divisions, changes
the assignments of two of his incoming commanders, one male and one female. The
male had been selected to command at the division level, a very prestigious assignment
where no woman had ever before commanded, and the woman had been selected to
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command a battalion in a brigade that provided support to the Corps. In a letter, the 
Corps Commander writes, “Hey, I need diversity in my division and right now I don’t see 
any women commanding in the [named] division.” In response, an assignment swap was 
made immediately and the woman was reassigned to command at the division level. In 
fact, she was the first woman to ever command that type of unit in a division in Europe. 
Upon her assumption of command, she was the only female commanding in that division 
until another woman took command several months later. Another women, who had had 
the opportunity to spend time with this same Corps Commander, recalled a conversation 
she had with him in reference to women commanding at the division level. He asked her 
what she thought about the idea of sending women down to command at division level. 
She told him, “Sir, there is no reason why they can’t go do that.” The Corps 
Commander, a very high status organizational member, was in a position to make a 
change and he did so because he realized the value of having a diverse group of 
commanders. As individuals, representative of the dominant culture, embrace the 
necessity for diversity and integration, and have the power and authority to move women 
into critical, highly visible and prestigious jobs, and do, in fact, put them in these 
positions speaks to changes in the organization.
Mentoring
This action of moving women into critical and prestigious jobs also applies to 
mentoring. Most of the participants in this study had at least one mentor in their career. 
Often these mentors provided access to jobs that were required for further advancement. 
This again speaks to Yoder’s finding reference high status organizational members
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legitimating women as previously discussed. These men, convinced of each woman’s
capability, ensured the appropriate grooming occurred. Below are two examples of
mentors who provided access to career enhancing jobs.
The CG and I were talking because he is my mentor. He asked me, ‘Well, what 
do you want to do?’ and I said, T don’t know if I want to be a brigade 
commander.’ And his jaw about hit the ground. [He replied] ‘well, you better 
make a decision before we start putting you and other people who want to be 
brigade commanders in all the right jobs to get them the experience and all the 
stuff they need to have, you need to make that decision. We don’t want to waste 
slots on you.’ So I said, ‘trust me. I will figure it out.’ . . .  [Later] I made the 
decision I would like to command a brigade. [She is currently commanding a 
brigade.]
I worked for him when he was a division commander. He thought I did a good 
job and really he has kind of always kept tabs on me. Whether I liked it or not. 
Moved me around to do things. So I think he just thought I had potential so he 
kind of made sure that I got encouragement and that I did the things he thought I 
should do. [Other mentors told her] you need to talk in more fighter terms. I was 
one of their commanders. I worked for them. They did it with the guys and they 
did it with me.
It appears, however, that mentoring for these commanders was not necessarily
automatic. One senior woman participant discussed how, due to her lack of sponsorship,
she had to rely on a strategy of extreme effort and becoming undeniably the best in order
to keep getting promoted and selected for positions of greater responsibility.
The difference between [a named general] and that group of women and myself is 
each of them was picked out and had mentors, real mentors, who had charters in 
the senior levels of the Army to grow them and groom them to become general 
officers. . . .they were good, hard working, and they were attractive. And the 
reason I never got picked is because I was bumping along with these guys, like I 
had with my brothers, and it took me longer to realize it is okay to be a woman.
This is [my] opinion. [She names four women.] These are all general officers. 
All women. All anointed back when they were captains.. .  .They already had 
been preordained.. .  .It was common knowledge when I was a captain that 
[named female] would be the first female general in the [combat support branch].
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They were mentored along. . .  .each of them for their branches. I am not 
attractive or cute. They are. So my experience has been a lot different.
She felt that because she was “not attractive or cute” and did not present herself in a more
feminine way, she was not among the selected few to be groomed to become a general
officer. The women she felt that had been specially mentored were also “good
[competent] and hardworking.” It appears that some level of attractiveness contributes to
an easier acceptance. This idea corresponds with Bass’(1990) assertion that women must
conform to two sets of demands in order to be successful. Women need to contradict the
stereotypes that their male superiors and peers have about women. These women need to
be seen as different in that they are “better than women” but they must not forfeit all
traces of femininity because such behavior makes them “too different.” It seems that one
of the keys to a woman’s success in the Army’s large, male-dominated organization
depended on the woman’s ability to balance these expectations of “different but not too
different.” It may be that this woman seemed too different because she did not have the
requisite trace of femininity.
This specific participant believed that in order to be successful, she had “to be
twice as smart as all the guys. So you have to study these FMs [field manuals], these
TMs [technical manuals], the ARs [Army regulations].. .  .1 made sure I knew m ore.. . .1
was always being challenged. I always had to prove I could do it.” Being tactically and
technically proficient in all aspects of her profession seems to have been one way to cope
without more active and supportive mentoring. Once she achieved battalion command,
she reported,
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1 always wanted to be mentored and I was never mentored. Now I have received 
more mentorship since I became a battalion commander. Now I am somebody’s 
prize. He can show me off. As a battalion commander, the seniors had to start 
looking at me differently. But I still had to work much harder than my male 
contemporaries.
Another woman’s experience seems to reinforce the impressions of the preceding
commander. In the recounting of a discussion with her supervisor, she recalled he told
her that “it is a foregone conclusion right now in [our branch] that you are going to
command a brigade [which she is currently doing], and if you want to be, it is almost a
foregone conclusion that you are going to be chief of the branch.” When asked, during
her interview, why he had said that, she replied.
Because they [senior leadership of her branch] look at me and they think, ‘Ah, we 
have got a woman who is not a two-bagger [unattractive], who stays at least 
decently physically fit, who does the right jobs and does okay in them. We can 
groom her to be the first female general officer. Combat arms general officer.
She can be the one.’ So everyone is like, ‘you are going to be it.’
She seemed to feel that not being unattractive played into the calculus of her acceptability
as potentially the first female general officer of her branch. Attractiveness, while not
essential, appears to play a role in how women are accepted. The strategy of adopting a
feminine persona has already been discussed in an earlier section in this chapter. Future
studies may want to consider attractiveness theory in more depth.
Mentors played many different roles for these women as they progressed through
the organization. One woman talked about “[Learning] the acceptable way of behavior.
There was a way to play the game and you need to leam the rules.” Most mentoring
relationships were paternal. “They were father-daughter. Always. If there was a
mentoring relationship at all, it was father daughter.” “The brigade commander, he was
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my very first mentor in the Army and he was a very strong influence on me. Frequently,
he was paternal and I knew that.” “It was more parental. So I had a parental view of
everyone who worked for me.”
Interestingly, it seems that many of the study’s participants felt a special
responsibility to mentor their women subordinates.
And I am grateful to every woman that came before me. Because a lot of those 
women had to kick in the doors that I walk through. And when I look at the 
younger women coming up behind me, I really go out of my way to explain to 
them their responsibility not only to walk through the door, but to take a brick out 
of the wall supporting the door post. The ideal, I think, and it will come 
eventually, is when it is no longer a big deal to be in the Army and to wear 
fatigues. I feel a special responsibility to women that are around me because God 
help her if she is playing the stereotype or if  she is not presenting herself in a 
manner which brings credit to us. Because every day we have to prove ourselves 
over. It is not having a chip on your shoulder but, you are visible. Yeh, it is this 
man’s Army. We have a place but we have to establish that place and it starts 
every morning.
But I talked to them [female subordinates] more about being assertive versus 
being aggressive. Talking to them more about how to be successful. I told them 
not to lose sight of who they were. If they are the type of person who liked to 
wear lots of makeup all the time, whether it is in uniform or whatever, then wear 
it. Don’t worry about your peers.. .be yourself.
I do [feel a responsibility] to mentor. Both, men and women but more so women.
Responsibility to mentor women? Yes, I think it is an enormous responsibility of 
mine.
The idea of social conformity may be relevant in this case. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
social conformity was deemed important to managerial careers. “There is ample 
evidence from organizational studies that leaders in a variety of situations are likely to 
show preference for socially similar subordinates and help them get ahead” (Ranter,
1977, 47-48). It appears that women want to help their subordinate females in ways they
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know will make them more like themselves. These senior women have been successful 
in their units. These women have the experience of what has worked for them-what has 
allowed them to be better integrated into the unit. Several discussed how they were 
harder on women, or that their women subordinates had the perception that they were 
harder on them. Since many of the study’s participants felt as though they had to 
represent all women, they wanted to ensure that the women they influenced also behaved 
in a way they deemed appropriate. “The token, while highly visible as someone different 
in the organization, is forced to represent the generalization or stereotype of that token 
group.” Most of these women have felt the necessity to represent the stereotype of what 
they think is necessary to be successful-e.g., being tough, fit, competent but feminine, etc.
Equally interesting are the women who did not feel a special responsibility to 
mentor women.
If you look back over 32 years, I think when there were fewer of us, there was 
more of a tendency for us to draw together. And in that capacity, I think just 
being together. ..was perhaps as much mentoring as anything. And being 
available to talk about assignments in certain situations. But, as women became 
more and more plentiful...the ranks increased. I had less involvement in it. 
Because we now longer have WAC companies or attachments. Everybody is 
integrated now. So the integration piece was very important because of the 
mentoring and examples needed to be from men and women.
I think women are getting a fair break. I don’t feel they need special mentoring. I 
don’t mentor them any differently than I do the guys.
One even recognized that junior women had the expectation that she would share her
strategies with them.
Role model for women in the Army? No, I don’t. I know a lot of women see me 
that way, but I don’t think of myself only as a role model for women. I think they 
do [women look to her for mentorship]. I try to help. But I am not easy on them
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either. I think sometimes they are disappointed in me because I am not going to 
treat them special.
One of the junior women described it this way,
I wanted [a certain general] to talk with us about how she became the first female 
division battalion commander [for her branch]... .How did you do it? What were 
your successes? What were your pitfalls? I thought she owed us some openness 
and frankness about that. She sees no responsibility to do that. I see it the other 
way. If someone wants to know the challenges, the pitfalls, how I got there, then 
I owe it to them to tell that story. Maybe they cannot do it exactly the way I did 
it. ...There is no magic path other than doing every job to the best of your ability 
and taking care of soldiers.
It appears that mentorship/sponsorship remains important to the vertical mobility 
of women in the organization. Bass (1990) found that support from higher authorities 
was necessary for the success of women at the higher executive levels. All participants in 
this study, female and male, acknowledged the value of mentorship and each had at least 
one mentor at the time they became battalion commanders. Several believed that all 
selections following battalion command relied heavily on a system of networking and 
sponsorship. Even those commanders who felt that women did not require special 
mentoring recognized that sponsorship was invaluable to one’s career.
Debate on Women in Combat and Assignment Policv
Finally, organizational changes can be seen in a new scholarly approach to the 
question of “why not?” when considering women in the combat arms. That this question 
is being seriously considered in a scholarly periodical. Military Review (Nov/Dec 02), 
read by military professionals, indicates a willingness to explore the possibilities. Three 
articles, all written by male officers, demonstrate a new willingness to consider a topic
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that has usually been quickly dismissed as impossible. That, or articles were written with 
the intent of explaining why women could not be in combat arms units. The fact that 
each article speaks to the possibility of success shows how much the organization has 
changed.
In a similar way, due to the war in Iraq, several recent newspaper articles have
also addressed the ongoing debate especially after images of the only female prisoner of
war and pictures of two women missing in action were shown on television.
They signify not only the wide expansion in the combat-related roles women fill, 
but also changes in the very nature of combat itself. Since there is no longer a 
clear front line, women and men serving in maintenance, supply, and other 
support units can land in as much danger as those dropping bombs or shooting 
guns.. .. This war promises to involve more women in combat than ever before 
(Wilgoren, 2003, 1).
In a New York Times editorial, published in the International Herald Tribune (25 March
2003), the news of the capture of the female prisoner of war was less dramatic.
While women are still barred from some sorts of duty, the case for equal footing 
is gaining ground.. . .  The present war with Iraq, which will engage the greatest 
number of American women yet, could change much of that by debunking the 
argument against fully employing them .. . .  The U.S. policies of excluding 
women threaten the readiness of the armed forces, particularly when there is no 
draft. Fuller integration of women into the U.S. armed forces would of course 
carry the increased risk that women might desert, make mistakes or get killed. Or 
they could out perform their male counterparts. It’s happened before.
The tone of this editorial and the tone of the earlier article seem more measured and
approach the ongoing debate of women in combat using language very different from
Senator Ervin’s speech. Women were killed in the first Gulf war and have lost their lives
in the war on Iraq. (Women still face the potential of being killed in post war Iraq,
illustrated by the number of soldiers who have been killed almost daily since the war
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ended.) The fact that the idea is now being more seriously contemplated in the open 
press appears to describe some change in general attitude. The rescue of Private First 
Class Jessica Lynch also has implications in this ongoing debate as well. It will be 
interesting to see what effects this episode has on the debate about women in combat.
While the debate about women in combat is now in the spotlight, it has never 
really gone away. In fact, although the newer discussions seem to indicate a more open 
or ambivalent attitude toward women serving in combat, the debate and the arguments 
surrounding the debate remain relatively constant. Amazingly, the recommendation to 
conduct an experiment integrating women into a combat arms unit, recommended in one 
of the recent Military Review articles, was first suggested in 1977 by Binkin and Bach in 
their study on women and the military. “A reasonable first step might be for the 
Department of Defense to set up an experimental program for each military service, 
which would be required to integrate selected combat units that currently exclude 
women” (110). In this case, more measured coverage and a new openness towards 
women serving in combat does not necessarily mean actual changes in the organization.
As discussed earlier, the structure that does not allow women to serve in combat 
units is supported by the ideas that do not support women in combat units. Most of the 
study’s participants felt that women did not belong in combat units so there was no real 
dissonance between their ideas and the ideas of the predominant culture. They generally 
cited inadequate physical capabilities and the infeasibility and cost effectiveness of 
integration as reasons not to integrate combat arms units. The debate about women in 
combat is far from over. Although the majority of study participants support the current
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policy on women in the Army, a small minority believes that it is necessary to open all
branches to women. The following remarks offer a sample of why women should not be
assigned to combat arms units.
1 do not believe in the military that women can do everything. I guess I am 
reactionary in that regard. I feel there is no place for women in the Infantry. I 
think there is no place for us in Field Artillery and Ranger battalions. And for no 
other reason than the physical limitations.
[Is the Army ready to consider the assignment of women without looking at 
gender?] No, I think that is because our society is not ready for that. We still 
have traditional roles. Maybe the younger generations might change that years 
down the road.
Will we get down to the Task Force Level [battalion size units]? The answer is 
yes. I mean we were on Operations Desert Thunder and let me assure you, I was 
closer to the Iraqi border than the Army unit was. We are already there. We are 
in CPs [command posts]. It is going to be broken. Then I get asked, ‘should we 
allow women to go into the Infantry and Armor?’ Then you have to understand 
where I come from and how I grew up and my time in the Army. Do I think so? 
No. Do I think it is going to happen? Yes.
[Women in Infantry?] Not in the near future. I think it is because they don’t see 
the need for it. I think it is more the decision based on the view of the American 
people, view of Congress, view of the Secretary of Defense establishment. 
Remember the women only went to the academy because it was law. Should it 
become law that every job is open, that would cause this to occur.
[Reference women assigned to combat arms based on ability.] I think that sounds 
good. But in reality, it is not very practical. No matter what we do, we are not as 
strong. To me, it is just not worth it. I do agree that the Army needs to take a 
look at the general officer corps and decide a different way of assigning general 
officers. I believe if  we wanted to have three and four-star women officers -  or 
general officers -  we could. Just by changing the way we think about general 
officers. It is a branch thing more than a gender thing. I think we will eventually 
get there... So you are not going to be able to have the luxury of deciding you 
can’t except somebody because of what they look like... .It won’t be any time 
soon.
[Does Army culture have a ceiling for women?] Sure it does. They can’t say it 
doesn’t. It becomes a ceiling for gentlemen too. But, by far, they have more 
opportunities. Women have none. I don’t know that there has ever been a
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transportation officer that has been elevated to Chief of Staff of the Army. Well, 
because silently, seriously deep down inside, we know the real senior leadership 
is closed [and] you realize it is not going to get better tomorrow. I mean this will 
be a huge, huge change.
Several commanders believe that until all branches are open, women will never be treated
fairly in the organization. In other cases, instead of focusing on the women in combat
arms debate, several other commanders felt that certain policies at upper echelons were
discriminatory to women, and to some men as well, since only combat arms branches
have ever been able to attain the highest position in the Army, that of Chief of Staff of the
Army and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Given the organizational changes that
have occurred since women were integrated into the Regular Army, many felt it was a
matter of time, although many felt it would be a matter of a very long time.
I think as far as the way I have been treated personally -  no. I think there have 
been some discriminatory policies. And I have seen a lot of changes. Because if I 
could have gone Infantry, I would have. So that was a policy. Maybe I would 
have been Air Defense. Again, I was accepted at one tim e... .The only thing then 
is policy. And then there is attitude. But are those attitudes different in the 
military than the civilian world? No. Are they more apt to have a structure with 
which you can achieve and overcome those attitudes? Sure. There are all kinds 
of processes and ways if  there is a problem, you can deal with it.
I would like to see us open everything. But, that will come with time.
I have been in 26 years and there are a lot of things that go on that I don’t see or 
touch. So I almost have to intellectualize it and probably come down on the side 
which has huge proponents, even among men, without women in combat arms, 
they will never be perceived as equal at the table. Anytime you have a class 
distinction, you have a class structure. That is logical. So I think from that 
standpoint, it is not a good thing. We have never had a woman four star general. 
Probably won’t have... .So I don’t think we are ever going to come to the table as 
equals unless we just pull out every barrier and let the water find its own way.. .1 
don’t know if we can get there. What made me believe that women don’t belong 
in the Infantry, even armor, they don’t have the physical strength.. .there is too 
much physical stuff. Even a lot of men can’t handle it.
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What is the primary mission of the Army? It is to go out and win the Nation’s 
wars. Where is that done? Down in divisions and corps. Until we put women in 
Infantry units and they become great brigade commanders or ADCs in division 
commands, it is not going to happen. It is all about loving your soldiers and 
wanting to lead them and take care of them. It’s about being a good leader and 
knowing what you are doing....We would have to start down there at ground zero 
and work our way up. I argue we would do just fine... .If you stay in that culture 
where it is a matter o f daily routine, I don’t see where it is an issue...if a woman 
started out that way and kept going, why would they not be able to walk 100 
miles?
It is apparent by the various opinions and arguments that this is an ongoing debate that 
will not be easily resolved. While there seems to be a greater willingness to discuss the 
possibilities of women participating in combat units, most of the study’s participants 
support the status quo. It may be that they feel they are able to contribute to the 
organization without being in a combat arms unit. As the recent circumstances have so 
grimly illustrated, when the Army goes to war, everyone is exposed to the dangers of 
combat.
Conclusion.
In conclusion, organizational changes became more likely and began with the 
mandate by legislation that permanently assigned women to Army branches with the 
exception of the combat arms. Women, in greater numbers, were integrated into units 
and into nontraditional jobs. As described in the preceding section, organizational 
changes were manifested in several ways. First, organizational changes occurred through 
personal interaction and demonstrated ability. Once women began working side by side 
their male peers, for their male supervisors, and under the observation of the males 
around them, their demonstrated performance changed the opinions of these men.
Second, organizational changes were seen as reactions to women in nontraditional jobs
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became more routine and less of a major, out of the ordinary event. The general societal 
acceptance of women in combat, and the attitude of business as usual by senior officers 
illustrate the movement from exceptional to routine. Third, the study’s participants 
described how they felt the Army had changed during their time in the organization. 
Fourth, organizational changes were implied by the actions of the male leaders who made 
decisions that promoted the integration and advancement of women in the organization. 
The importance of mentorship/sponsorship was also discussed as it related to providing 
access to positions of increasing responsibility and stature. Finally, organizational 
changes were seen in the different approaches to the debate concerning women in the 
combat arms. Each of these examples indicates that organizational changes are 
occurring, albeit in varying degrees. While relatively insignificant in the moment, these 
seemingly small incremental changes appear to add up, producing greater changes in the 
long-term, attesting to the potential for changes in the future.
Table 3.-Summary of Findings: Individual and Organizational Changes
□ Individual Changes: Considered in the analysis of the strategies used in the 
development of a workable persona.
> Workable Persona Characteristics 
o Being Tough (Never Cry!)
o Being Feminine
o Working Harder
o Regendered as a male, “An exceptional woman” 
o Organizational Fit
□ Organizational Changes: Occurred at the individual level through the 
development of personal relationships.
>  Occurred through personal interaction and demonstrated ability
> What had been exceptional became routine
> Seen via study participants’ personal observation and experience
> Demonstrated by actions and support of senior leaders/mentors
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In this study, organizational and individual changes have been revealed through 
the experiences of the study’s participants and the telling of these experiences. The time 
frame included careers spanning more than 36 years with the first male participant 
joining the military around 1960, the first female participant entering the Woman’s Army 
Corps in 1968, and the most junior participant coming on board in 1982. This chapter 







This study’s focus has been on women who have chosen the Army as a career and 
who have continued to progress through its hierarchy, achieving command at battalion 
and brigade levels. This research has centered on the strategies these women developed 
to cope, adapt, and better fit in a predominantly male organization during a process of 
integration. Due to legislation that permanently assigned women to Army branches with 
the exception of the combat arms, women in greater numbers were integrated into units 
and into more non-traditional jobs. While the main focus of this study has been on the 
individual in a military environment, this study also considered the impact the individual 
may have had on the organization, and the changes that may have occurred as a result. 
Schein’s elaboration of Lewin’s change model was used as a way to understand and 
explain how the individual, both male and female, as well as the organization may have 
changed.
Individual Change
Individual change for women was considered in the analysis of the strategies used 
to cope, adapt, and better fit the organization. Organizational changes occurred at the
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individual level through the development of personal relationships. These relationships 
alluded to individual change in terms of these women applying strategies that helped 
them cope, adapt, and better fit the organization. There was a dynamic relationship 
between the individuals coming into the organization, and the organization itself, 
represented by the men operating in that organization. The women came in and, because 
they behaved in a certain way, were accepted by the men in the organization. This 
acceptance was incremental because there were so few women. As more women came in 
and demonstrated they were committed and competent, the acceptance of women grew; 
again building on a basis of personal interaction and relationships.
Individual change for women was considered in the analysis of the strategies used 
in the development of a workable persona. These strategies included being tough, being 
feminine, working harder, regendering and organizational fit. These workable persona 
characteristics assisted these women as they pursued their careers in the Army 
organization. In some cases, women became more acceptable to the men when they were 
seen as being exceptional, unlike “the rest of the women.” Often, once women achieved 
higher rank and greater responsibility, their enhanced status diminished some of the 
unfavorable outcomes they had previously encountered, and strict adherence to the 
characteristics of this workable persona seemed less critical. Men in combat units did not 
have the experience of working with women early in their careers. It wasn’t until these 
men moved into jobs that put them working beside women that they were able to 
personally interact and leam for themselves how women worked and contributed to the 
organization.
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Individual change cannot be discussed without reference to the women 
themselves. It is important to remember that the women in this study are exceptional 
individuals and represent a powerful and talented group of women. While their workable 
persona strategy facilitated the development of personal relationships and appeared to 
enhance organizational changes at the individual level, one must not lose sight of the 
person behind the persona. Each was a strong force to contend with individually. These 
women were motivated to join the Army and stayed and prospered in an organization that 
did not embrace their integration. While this study did not focus on their individual 
accomplishments, it is prudent to keep in mind that these women are among the best. 
Organizational Changes and the Change Model
One of the study’s original premises was that the organization would remain 
relatively unchanged with the mandated integration of women. In terms of fundamental 
change, this premise has remained accurate. However, organizational changes have 
occurred within the context of the existing organizational framework. Change in this 
context refers more to something happening to the individuals within the organization 
rather than to having something fundamentally change in the organization.
Schein’s elaboration of Lewin’s change model of unfreezing, cognitive 
restructuring, and refreezing was used as a way to understand and to explain how 
individuals, male and female, as well as how the organization appeared to change. 
Conceptually, this change model begins with the belief that the stability of human 
behavior is based on a state of equilibrium between a system of driving and restraining 
forces. For change to occur in this force field, the driving or restraining forces must be
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altered. In order to drive the equilibrium in the direction of change, it makes more sense 
to remove restraining forces since driving forces are already in the system.
In this study’s case, the entry of women became the driving force and the 
organization’s ideas (held by the individual men in the organization) about women were 
the restraining forces. The unfreezing occurred with the realization that more women 
were needed in the military. Survival anxiety played a role in the determination of 
legislation that permanently assigned women to nontraditional jobs in Army units. 
Survival anxiety also generated the second form of anxiety, called learning anxiety. The 
uncertainty of having more women in the military and the belief that these women would 
have an adverse effect on their units of assignment and the overall readiness of the 
military contributed to the organization’s learning anxiety. In some cases, this anxiety 
has yet to be fully resolved.
Sehein argued that to counter the restraining force of learning anxiety, a feeling of 
psychological safety needed to be created in order to experience the survival anxiety that 
motivated change. While an influx of women may not have created an environment of 
psychological safety-making change less difficult- relationships these women developed 
with their peers and superiors were crucial to the process of cognitive restructuring. In 
this case, the women, through their demonstrated performance and ability to foster 
relationships, had an effect on how the men of the organization viewed women in the 
organization. By working closely with the members of the organization, and by changing 
their opinions about women and what women could accomplish, the restraining forces 
were softened and changes were able to occur.
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For this change model to work, however, one had to also consider if changes 
occurred in the women, or driving force as well. Both the driving forces and the 
restraining forces changed in a way that allowed these women to become more fully 
integrated into the organization. For the women, the development of a working persona, 
discussed earlier, helped them to work more effectively with the men in the organization.
This change model carmot be applied uniformly across the Army organization 
since women do not fully participate in all units. The opportunities to develop working 
relationships vary and this has affected the extent to which cognitive restructuring takes 
place. The process of cognitive restructuring and refreezing in this organization is 
ongoing, uneven, and certainly not complete.
Organizational changes were manifested in several ways. First, organizational 
changes occurred through personal interaction and demonstrated ability. Once women 
began working side by side their male peers, for their male supervisors, and under the 
observation of the males around them, their demonstrated performance changed the 
opinions of these men. Second, organizational changes were seen as reactions to women 
in nontraditional jobs became more routine and less of a major, out of the ordinary event. 
The general societal acceptance of women in combat, and the attitude of business as 
usual by senior officers illustrated the movement from exceptional to routine. Third, the 
study’s participants described how they felt the Army had changed during their time in 
the organization. Fourth, organizational changes were implied by the actions of the male 
leaders who made decisions that promoted the integration and advancement of women in 
the organization. The importance of mentorship/sponsorship was also discussed as it
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related to providing access to positions of increasing responsibility and stature. Finally, 
organizational changes were seen in the different approaches to the debate concerning 
women in the combat arms. Each of these examples indicates that organizational changes 
have been occurring, albeit in varying degrees. While relatively insignificant in the 
moment, these seemingly small incremental changes appear to add up. The synergy of 
these individual examples o f organizational changes suggests the potential for greater 
change in the future.
Methodology
For the purpose of this study, a qualitative research strategy was primarily used. 
Most of the evidence for this study was drawn from interviews conducted with 
commanders in all three branches of the Army; combat arms, combat support, and 
combat service support. Other sources of information were also used (e.g., personnel 
reports and Army surveys), but the primary research source was interview data and the 
triangulation of those data. The vehicle for these interviews was each individual’s career 
path.
Limitations
This study was limited in that it focused on female officers who had the 
experience of commanding at battalion and brigade levels. The sample was not intended 
to be representative of the Army’s population. Studies of officers who were not selected 
for command, who left the Army early, as well as studies of enlisted women would have 
added to the findings of this study and given the reader more depth and a much broader 
view of the strategies women used as they progressed through their Army careers. A
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more diverse sample should be considered for future work. This study assumed that 
women had to change as they were integrated into the masculine, hierarchical 
organization of the Army. This research design was not capable of capturing the degree 
of change since it lacked a clear picture of participants “before” integration; a 
longitudinal study that observed these women over time would have been a more 
appropriate, albeit a much longer-term endeavor. What made this study interesting was its 
emphasis on the strategies these women developed to cope, adapt, and succeed.
The sample size was not large enough to generalize findings to the greater 
population. Another consideration for future work would be to conduct more interviews, 
both male and female, and to augment these interviews with a survey instrument that 
could be distributed to all commanders in the field.
This study’s reliance on self-reporting is another limitation. The semi-structured 
interviews relied on the individual’s ability to recall and identify behavioral changes and 
past challenges throughout the progression of a twenty-plus year career. The value and 
validity of these recollections must be tempered with the knowledge that their accuracy 
may have become somewhat distorted by time, memory, bias, and political correctness.
A longitudinal study over the duration of an individual’s career would provide more 
accurate reporting since the participant would be interviewed over time and would not 
need to rely on memory. Interviews with subordinates, peers, and supervisors would also 
provide a more complete picture of each commander. These interviews could be 
augmented with researcher observations, as well. These different techniques should be 
considered for future work.
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As a former Army officer, the researcher had to be careful about her own 
objectivity during the interview process and the subsequent evaluation of these 
interviews. During the conduct of the interviews, the researcher discovered situations 
that had also been personally experienced and observed. She had to guard against being 
distracted by the hasty assumptions that came from shared experiences and needed, 
instead, to make sure she carefully listened to what was being described by the individual 
being interviewed. Although she had had similar experiences, this familiarity and 
potential for bias was recognized and has not appeared to be a drawback to the value of 
this research.
Implications of Findings
This study has three major implications. The first implication concerns the overly 
ambitious nature of the Schein/Lewin change model and addresses its efficacy in 
accounting for individual and organizational changes. The second implication deals with 
organizational change and the realization that, no matter what, the military organization is 
unlikely to fundamentally change in the near or distant future. Finally, the third 
implication addresses what the future may hold for women in military organizations. 
Change Model
The change model was used as a means to understand and to explain how 
individuals, male and female, and organizations might change. While a useful, 
conceptual tool, the model is vague and falls short, both in terms of the capacity of the 
model to explain organizational change and to provide a model by which an organization 
can be changed. The model describes a process of individual change that accounts for
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how an organization can fundamentally change. Individual changes within an 
organization, in turn, suggest organizational change. In this study, however, this 
potential for fundamental change does not occur despite individual changes within the 
organization. The study illustrated how individuals within the organization had been 
affected by the integration of women. Through the development of personal 
relationships, the women had a generally positive impact on how men felt about women 
in the organization. The model suggests that the individual changes within the 
organization should translate into the organization becoming a different organization. 
Unfortunately, in this case, the changes occurring within the organizational context did 
not mean fundamental organizational change. The model is a powerful conceptual tool 
that provides a useful way to look at the process of change within individuals and 
organizations. It overestimates its power, however, to explain and account for how 
organizations can fundamentally change.
Organizational Change
The second implication deals with organizational change and the realization that, 
no matter what, the military organization is unlikely to fundamentally change in the near 
or distant future. This study has consistently made the distinction between organizational 
changes and organizational change. While changes have occurred within the military 
organization, fundamental organizational change has not occurred.
It appears the Army is an organization in a relative state of equilibrium. In part, 
the dilemma can be framed by the question, “Why change when there is no driving need 
to change?” The Army will only undergo dramatic change when overriding need dictates
139
this change. This impetus must come from outside of the organization. At this point, 
societal norms seem more likely to support the Army in its current form. The majority of 
individuals within the organization seem relatively content with their current status.
Even the complete integration of women would seemingly not effect fundamental 
organizational change.
The presence of women in the Army, while more familiar, often seems slightly 
curious. The idea of women and combat appears to cause dissonance since the 
prosecution of war has largely been identified with men and masculinity. Part of this 
comes from a belief that men bear a greater responsibility for the nation’s defense. 
Perhaps, in this case, equal opportunity for defense may be somehow linked to equal 
responsibility. Women are not required to register for Selective Service while men are 
required to register in the event of a restoration of the draft. Until there is a driving need 
to have more women involved in the direct prosecution of war, which would mean 
assignment to combat arms branches, women will remain in their current branches. One 
has to change the standard of what is currently acceptable for women. Once this has been 
reframed or redefined, this new frame then becomes the newly accepted standard. In 
order for change in the Army to occur (regarding the greater integration of women), the 
role of women in the Army must be redefined and accepted. This redefinition, in turn, 
becomes the new standard and “frame of reference” for future assignments. Changing 
the role of women in society more generally or changing the role of the military in 
society offer different perspectives in this development of a new frame of reference and 
warrant closer examination in the future. Greater technological advances that
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compensate for physical differences may also eventually allow women to perform all 
physical tasks and this leverage in physical strength will also support a new frame of 
reference.
A new frame of reference, however, does not necessarily connote organizational 
change. Due to the nature of its overarching mission, to fight and win the nation’s wars, 
it seems unlikely that this organization will suddenly change. What, in fact, does 
fundamental change in the Army look like, what kind of organization would the Army 
become? What would cause the organization to change? These are questions that have 
implications for future studies.
One can only imagine the military organization being transformed into some 
futuristic fighting force, along the lines of Heinlein’s (1987) Starship Troopers, where 
women commanders in space ships attack the enemy alongside their male compatriots. 
This new fighting force would speak to fundamental change. Although somewhat 
overstated in the preceding example, it is relatively safe to conclude that as an 
organization in a state of equilibrium, the Army will remain fairly static and will continue 
in its current form as a male gendered organization with a proportional representation of 
women at about 15 percent. Changes in the Army will continue to occur within the 
existing framework of the current military organization and the scope of this change will 
remain fairly limited.
The Next Step.
Finally, the third implication addresses the next step. What happens next? What 
does the future hold for women in military organizations? The findings in this study
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largely describe a situation where women had to adapt to succeed in a hierarchically 
masculine, military organization. They learned to survive in an organization that was 
largely hostile to them because they were women. Although the overt hostility has 
diminished, in varying degrees, women remain a small minority in an organization where 
they still confront some (but less) sex-based discrimination on an individual level and 
structural obstacles (assignment policies) to their success. While many women appear to 
accept and/or prefer the status quo, the option to participate in all units is not available to 
those who choose a different career path.
In 1973, there was a definite need for more women. This need, however, did not 
require full integration to meet the organization’s goals. Full integration, while 
theoretically acceptable, did not have an experiential foundation upon which to base such 
a decision. Satisfaction with the current status of women in the Army and the uncertainty 
associated with the effects that full integration (women assigned to combat arms units) 
may have on military effectiveness and readiness, have regulated the degree of change in 
the organization. The scope of change has been constrained by existing personnel 
policies that dictate the structure of the organization. The majority of the individuals 
within the organization seem relatively content with their current status. As these women 
have progressed through the organization, they have become part of the organization. 
Their longevity implies an understanding and acceptance of the basic underlying 
assumptions that define the organizational culture. As indicated by their general belief 
that women do not yet belong in combat arms units, they may have become part of the 
restraining forces within the organization and are unlikely to be change agents.
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Barring need, greater organizational changes seem unlikely. Faced with this set
of circumstances, at what point will someone decide that the current situation is no longer
acceptable to women in the organization and use legal action to force a decision on the
policy barring women from combat units? While the first women in the organization
seem satisfied at the progress that has been made, the cohort of women who follow may
be less patient with a system that measures change one individual at a time. Acceptance
is not uniform across the organization, with units without women expressing less positive
attitudes concerning their contributions and abilities. In her work on gendered
institutions, Kenney (1996) writes,
Perhaps one of the more interesting and also encouraging findings is the 
difference in aspirations and perceptions of the newer cohort of women. In the 
1950’s and 1960’s, women lawyers or legislators recognized their uniqueness and 
that they faced overwhelming obstacles to practice their professions at all, let 
alone to aim for distinction (452).
This point seems to relate to the situation of the women who blazed the initial trails into
the organization. They continued to progress through the military hierarchy and achieved
positions of greater responsibility, setting an example of one type of success. As more
women continue to come into the Army and to attain positions of higher rank and
responsibility, there may come a time when they are no longer satisfied with the status
quo. As Kenney (1996) explains.
This psychological shift from considering oneself lucky to be plying one’s trade at 
a ll.. .  to demanding that one have the same opportunities for growth as one’s 
male cohort has revolutionary implications. What leads women to reject the 
gender coding of the institution, to refuse to be limited to their social role, to form 
together with groups of other women and to seek social change through lawsuits 
(453)?
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The exceptional women in this study have broken ground for the cohort of women that 
follows. They generally kept their focus on “making it” in the organization without loud 
protest or overtly dissident behavior. They found a way to operate within the established 
boundaries of the organization. Just as the legislative mandate forced integration, 
lawsuits may become the catalyst for significant and enduring change. These actions 
would force a decision on current assignment policy and the opening of occupations 
where women have not been allowed. These lawsuits, while providing a way to make 
organizational changes also carry risks for those who initiate them. The likely 
beneficiaries of these legal actions would be the cohorts of women who follow those that 
initiate any legal action.
Since it is reasonable to assume that women will continue to maintain a token 
presence in the military institution (increasing the female population by 20% to a 
proportional representation of 35% is unlikely), it is important to consider Yoder’s 
proposals that disrupt the cycle that produces and sustains negative tokenism outcomes. 
While changing proportions is not likely, redefining occupational roles, enhancing the 
status of tokens, and continuing to have high-status organizational members legitimate 
women is within the realm of possibility. The redefinition of occupational roles relates to 
women, albeit competent and qualified women, having the opportunity to participate and 
to be accepted into roles that have been traditionally closed to them. Hostility has been 
shown to increase as women attempt to participate in occupations that have not been 
traditionally congenial to their gender. As women begin to work in these occupations.
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what was once considered out of the ordinary and exceptional will just become routine 
and considered “due course”.
Implications for Future Work
Future scholarship should continue to focus on the integration of women into 
masculine organizations and male-dominated settings. Military institutions provide a 
unique organizational context where attitudes about women’s roles in nontraditional 
occupations and continued integration into these occupations can be explored. The 
concepts associated with gendered institutions are particularly relevant to better 
understanding the integration of women into the military institution an.
Research designed to consider women both before entry into the organization and 
during the process of integration would be of particular value since it could potentially 
elucidate an organizational change process. The opportunity to compare the gender 
constructs that these women, and men, have developed outside of the organization to the 
ones developed inside of the organization would be valuable as well to the concept of 
gendered institutions.
Conclusion
This study considered organizational and individual changes that occurred when 
women were integrated into the Army, an organization characterized by a masculine 
hierarchy and a female population of approximately 15 percent. The findings from this 
study are particularly relevant to institutions with similar characteristics. Full integration 
of institutions remains an important goal in a society that values equality, and in this case, 
begs the question; what does full integration mean to an institution like the U.S. Army?
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This question seems especially relevant in light o f the current situation in Iraq and other 
difficult situations from around the world. The issue is to determine how to best integrate 
a consistently small percentage of women into an organization that remains, by mission 
and design, masculine and hierarchical. As contributing members of American society, 
competent and qualified women deserve the right to pursue what they desire and the right 
to be evaluated not on what they are but rather on how well they perform. This is the 
dilemma faced by the military institution.
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APPENDIX A 
CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT LEGAL AND POLICY CHANGES 
AFFECTING WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: 1947-2000
1947
□ Congress passed the Army-Navy Nurse Act, which:
• Established the Army Nurse Corps and the Navy Nurse Corps as permanent 
staff corps of the regular Army and Navy
• Integrated nurses into the officer ranks of the regular Army and Navy with 
lieutenant colonel/commander as the highest permanent rank. Corps directors 
were authorized to hold the temporary rank of colonel/captain.
1948
□ Congress passed the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act, which:
• Allowed women to serve in the regular active peacetime forces.
■ Women could constitute no more than two percent of the total force.
" The number of women officers could total no more than 10 percent of 
the two percent.
• Capped the promotion of women officers above paygrade 0-3 
(captain/lieutenant). Paygrade 0-5 (lieutenant colonel/commander) was the 
highest permanent rank women could obtain. Women could be promoted 
temporarily to paygrade 0-6 (colonel/captain) to serve as directors fo WACs, 
WAVEs, WAFs, and Women Marines.
• Barred women from serving aboard Navy vessels (except hospital ships and 
certain transports) and from duty in combat aircraft engaged in combat 
missions.
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Denied women spousal benefits for their husbands unless the husbands were 
dependent on their wives for over 50 percent of their support.
By policy, women were precluded from having command authority over men.
The Coast Guard was not included in this legislation. A few SPARS remained 
in the Women’s Coast Guard Reserve.
1951
□ The Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) was 
created.
□ President Harry Truman signed Executive Order 10240 authorizing the services to 
discharge any woman who became pregnant, became a parent by birth or 
adoption, or who had a minor child or stepchild at home.
1967
□ The Women’s Armed Services Integration Act (Title 10 USC) was modified by 
Public Law (PL) 90-130 to:
• Remove the two percent ceiling on women’s numbers.
• Remove the caps on officer promotions above paygrade 0-3 and make women 
eligible for permanent promotion to paygrade 0-6.
• Make women eligible for flag/general officer rank.
1969
□ The Air Force opened its ROTC to women.
□ The Joint Armed Forces Staff College admitted women.
1971
□ The Air Force became the first service to allow pregnant women to request a 
waiver of the automatic discharge policy. The Air Force also changed recruiting 




□ In Frontiero v. Richardson, the Supreme Court struck down the differences
between men and women with respect to dependents’ benefits.
□ The Army opened its ROTC to women.
□ Chief of Naval Operations Elmo Zumwalt issued Z-116, which:
• Suspended restrictions on women succeeding to command ashore.
□ Chief of Naval Operations Elmo Zumwalt issued Z-116, which:
• Suspended restrictions on women succeeding to command ashore.
• Authorized the limited entry of women into all enlisted ratings.
• Opened assignment aboard the hospital ship USS Sanctuary to non-medical 
women
• Allowed women into all restricted line designators (e.g., intelligence, 
cryptology, etc.) and opened the Chaplain Corps and Civil Engineering Corps 
to women.
• Opened Navy ROTC to women
• Allowed women to be selected for war college.
1973
□ The draft ended when the Selective Service Act induction authority expired. The 
era of the All-Volunteer Force began and the goals for women’s accessions into 
the armed forces started to increase.
□ The first Navy women were designated aviators ensuant to Navy policy changes.
□ The Coast Guard began accepting women for regular active duty.
1974
□ The first Army women were designated aviators ensuant to Army policy changes.
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1975
□ Women enrolled in the Coast Guard Academy.
1976
□ Women entered the service academies as a result of PL 94-106 (passed in 1975).
1977
□ The first Air Force women were designated aviators ensuant to Air Force policy 
changes.
□ The Coast Guard assigned women to shipboard duty.
1978
□ The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) provided a definition of combat to 
Congress at congressional request.
□ The Coast Guard removed all assignment restrictions based on gender.
□ In Owens v. Brown, a U. S. district court ruled that 10 USC Section 6015, which 
precluded the permanent assignment of women to naval vessels other than 
hospital ships, was unconstitutional. As part of the FY-79 defense authorization 
bill, this law was amended to allow permanent assignment of women to 
noncombatant ships and temporary assignment to any ship not expected to have a 
combat mission.
1979
The Navy initiated its “women in ships” program and opened the surface warfare 
and the special operations communities to women officers. Enlisted women 
became eligible for assignment aboard ships.
1980
□ The Defense Officer Manpower Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) was 
passed, which:
• Abolished laws requiring separate appointment, promotion, accounting, and 
separation procedures for women officers in the Army, Navy, and Marine 
Corps. (No such laws had applied to the Air Force.)
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• Provided that women in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps be selected 
(rather than appointed) to flag/general officer rank, i.e., they must complete 
with their male peers for promotion.
1981
□ In Rostker v. Goldberg, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
excluding women from the draft.
1983
□ The U. S. invaded Grenada (“Operation Urgent Fury”). 170 women soldiers 
served during the operation, as did a number of Air Force women on air transport 
crews.
□ Air Force women in KC-135 and KC-10 crews participated in a raid on Libya.
1988
□ The DoD Risk Rule was promulgated. It set a single standard for evaluating 
positions and units from which the services could exclude women. 30,000 new 
positions were opened to women as a result.
1989
□ The U.S. invaded Panama (“Operation Just Cause”). 770 women participated in 
the operation, either deployed to the theater or already serving there. A woman 
MP commanded troops in a combat-like operation. Women flying Black Hawk 
helicopters came under fire.
1990/1991
□ Women’s superb performance in the Persian Gulf War shattered many 
assumptions about women’s liabilities in a combat zone.
• 40,782 women were deployed to the Persian Gulf theater.
• 13 women were killed and two were taken prisoner of war.
1991
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□ Congress passed the 1992-93 Defense Authorization Act, which included the 
landmark Kennedy-Roth Amendment that repealed the statutory prohibition (in 
10 USC) that barred women from flying combat aircraft in combat missions.
□ The Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women was established.
1992
□ U.S. military operations in Somalia began. Between 1992 and 1994, more than 
1,000 women participated in those operations.
1993
□ Secretary of Defense Les Aspin acted to expand opportunities for women. He;
• Ordered all services to open combat aviation to women (dismissing the 
recommendation of the Presidential Commission).
« Directed the Navy to draft legislation to repeal the combat ship exclusion 
(Congress passed the legislation in 1994).
1994
□ The DoD Risk Rule, which had closed many units supporting ground combat 
operations to women, was rescinded. 32,700 Army positions and 48,000 Marine 
Corps positions were subsequently opened to women.
□ Congress repealed 10 USC 6015, the combat ship exclusion. As a result, most 
Navy combatant ships were opened to women (submarines and a fewer smaller 
ships remained-and still remain-closed).
1995
□ More than 1,200 women were deployed for peacekeeping duties in Haiti.
□ The first Marine Corps women were designated aviators ensuant to Secretary of 
Defense Aspin’s 1993 directive to open combat aviation to women.
1996
□ Peacekeeping in Bosnia began. Since then, more than 13,000 women have been 
deployed for this operation.
1998
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□ The U. S. attacked military and security targets in Iraq (“Operation Desert Fox”). 
Women aviators flew combat missions for the first time.
1999
□ The Navy opened coastal mine hunters and mine counter measures ships to 
women.
□ Women aviators participated in combat operations during the air war in Kosovo. 
Women were deployed as peacekeepers to Kosovo. Since then, more than 5,000 
women have served in Kosovo.
2000






Why did you join the Army?
What does the concept of organizational culture mean to you?
How would you describe the culture of your unit? Of the Army?
Describe the level of freedom and support characterizing the Army’s culture.
How did you leam about the culture?
What role did informal learning played in your learning about this culture?
What role do informal power structures play in the organization?
What are the dynamics between men and women in the organizational culture?
How do you define feminism? How is feminism viewed in the Army’s culture?
To what extent do you feel comfortable and confident with your role within the 
organization and the culture?
How has the culture impacted your career development?
Describe the barriers you’ve confronted during your career. How have you dealt with 
them?
How are treated by other women in the Army? In the organization?
What are men’s expectations of women professionals (officers, commanders) in the 
Army culture? Have these expectations ever been in conflict with yours?
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What role does the Old Boy Network play in the organization (Army in general, unit in 
specific)? Have you encountered resistance to you in the culture? If yes, how did you 
handle it?
Are there any jobs, except those coded “combat”, that are unavailable to you because of 
gender? Are there any that are unavailable to men, normally filled by women?
Have you experienced a situation in which you were excluded or discriminated on the 
basis of your gender? If so, describe it.
Does tokenism exist in your culture? If it does, please tell me about it.
What strategies have you perfected in order to overcome the cultural environment or 
barriers?
Describe a situation in which your personal style was at odds with the culture. How did 
you handle this conflict?
If you were in a meeting (or involved in an exercise) and someone made a sexist or racist 
remark, how would you respond? How have you responded?
How has being a woman helped you?
Have you had mentors? Who was your mentor (gender)? Were you satisfied with the 
mentoring? How have these relationships affected your career?
If you were advising an aspiring woman entering the Army with the intention of making 
it a career, what advice would you give her?
What inroads do you expect women to make in the Army in the next ten years?
What kind of relationship do you have with your brigade/division commander 
(immediate supervisor)?
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Branches of the Army (Some branches perform multiple CA/CS/CSS duties.):
Combat Arms (CA): Directly involved in the conduct of actual fighting. The 
Combat Arms Branches are: Air Defense Artillery (ADA), Armor (AR), Calvary (CAV), 
Aviation (AV), Engineer (EN), Field Artillery (FA), Infantry (IN), Special Forces (SF).
Combat Support (CS): Provides operational assistance to Combat Arms. Combat 
Support Branches are; Aviation (AV), Chemical (CM), Engineer (EN), Military 
Intelligence (MI), Military Police (MP), Signal (SC).
Combat Service Support (CSS): Performs personnel service support, logistics, 
and administrative functions for all branches. Combat Service Support branches are: 
Adjutant General (AG), Army Medical (AMEDD), Aviation (AV), Chaplain (Ch), 
Chemical (CM), Civil Affairs (CA), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Engineer (EN), 
Finance (FI), Judge Advocate General (JAG), Military Police (MP), Ordnance (OD), 
Quartermaster (QM), Signal (SC), Transportation (TC).
Battalion: A battalion is composed of four to six companies with 300-1000 soldiers, 
depending on the organization. A battalion is normally commanded by a Lieutenant 
Colonel. A battalion is tactical and administratively self-sufficient.
Brigade: A brigade headquarters commands the tactical operations of two to five organic 
and/or attached combat battalions. A brigade is normally commanded by a Colonel.
There are normally three brigades in a fully structured division (DA PAM 10-1 1994, 50- 
57).
Combat Occupation vs. Combat position: One question that often arises deals with 
combat occupations, i.e., how one can tell what occupations are combat occupations. The 
answer is not always self-evident. Some occupations, like surface warfare officer, 
bomber navigator, or infantryman are generally considered combat occupations, although 
the practitioner of any of these occupations can be assigned to a noncombat unit. For 
example, an Air Force officer who is a fighter pilot is in a so-called combat occupation
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but she may currently be assigned to the Air Staff in the Pentagon and thus is in a 
noncombat position. A combat position is usually determined by the unit to which the 
individual is assigned. Units whose mission is to seek out, reconnoiter, or engage the 
enemy are usually considered combat units. (WREI 2000, 19).
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